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A. Y. WSHINSKY 
Speech in the Political Committee 
November 24, 1951 
Mr. Chairman, Messrs. Delegates: 
F OLLOWING the declaration of the "Tbree" submitted to the General Assembly by the United States, Britain and France. 
the delegations of these same countries introduced their draft 
resolution on "reguhtion, limitation and balanced reduction 
of alI armed form and all armaments." There is no difference 
between these two documents either as regards the ,principle 
underlying them or as regards the substance of the solution of the 
problem raised. Both documents are designed to seme one objec- 
tive and pmpse o m  and the same method for attaining this ob 
jective. Therefore one cannot agree with those who try to present 
the draft resolution of the "TW' as B step forward as cornpard 
with the dedaration, referring to the fact that the draft resolution 
conlains certain new elements and that this testifies to the redi- 
ness of the three Powers to meet the proposals of the Soviet Union 
half way md reach some kind of agrment on the question under 
consideration. 
I sbaIl try to show how matters stand in reality in the opinion of 
the Soviet delegation. In doing it I shall m a t  with due attention 
- ~ i n e  ird ~i studio - everything tbat has been said here by the 
supporters of the draft resoIution of the "Three" and shall be 
guided solely by the interests of truth d the cause of peace which 
we are defending here. 
We have carefully studied the proposals contained in this draft. 
We hold that it is i m p i b f e  to judge these proposals properly 
if you take them separately from a number of faas that chariicterize 
the trend of the foreign poticy of these countries, b t  and fore- 
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most of the United Stares, which phys a leading role in this matter. 
We are told here that the proposals mntained in the draft 
resolution of the "Three" could become a turning point in his 
tory, a point at which the world could turn back from the tense 
situation and danger now facing every country. This was said by 
Mr, Acheson here on November 19 and following him has been 
repeated, Ilke an echo, by other representatives of skates, members 
of the same Atlantic camp. 
Such an attitude to the draft resolution of the 'Three" is devoid 
of any grounds, since this draft carefuIIy avoids precisely those 
important questions which require an immediate solution and 
without whose sdution no real turning point in history is possible 
The resolution of the "Three" circumvents the ve y question of the 
armaments reduction, too, by surrounding the solution of this 
question with dl kinds of groundless reservations md conditions 
whose objective must be clear to anyone who will carefully study 
this draft. 
It is );ermissibie to ask, however, of what, under these cirmrn. 
stances, "turning point in history" can the authors of the xesolution 
speak, especiaIly if we take into consideration that they themselver 
make no secret of the fact that the measures for the reduction of 
armaments and acmcd fmes  hey propose in no way exclude the 
further increase of armaments and armed forces. 
It was precisely these two principles, these two tasks, that Mr. 
Acheson put forth in his speech of November 8, seeking to pmvc 
that there was no contradiction whatever here since these, said he, 
were two sides of the same coin. One task, Mr. Acheson asserted 
is  to increase one's military might. This is one side of the coin. 
The other task is  'to work for peace. This is the other side of the 
coin. Here is a new two-faced Janus : one side of his face shows 
peace, the other - war. 
Such a double-dealing poky, however, caanot serve and has 
never sewed the cause of peace, the interests of peace-loving 
countries and nations. 
Mr. Acheson also said that the resolution of the "Three" 
opened the way for the solution of some of the greatest questions 
which are the object of discord between the East and West. 
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As for the Soviet-Union, I must remind you that on October 5 
of this yeai the Soviet Government declared to the Government 
of the United States, in connection with the oral statement of the 
United States Ambsssador to the USSR Mr. Kirk, that adhering 
to its p e f d  policy and unswerving in its deire to establish co- 
operation with all countries that are ready to cooperate with the 
Swiet Union, our Government is wiUing to examine (rill the im- 
portant and unsettled issues with the participation of the Govem- 
ment of the United States and to discuss measures for improving 
internatiooaI relations, induding the relations between th Sovic: 
Union and the United States. 
Thus, we have stated our readiness to exexamine "dl the impat- 
tant and unsettled issues." 
Mr. Acheson said that the proposal of the "Three" could open 
the path for settling "some of the greulest yrjr~tion~." We say: 
"all," we are told: "some." W e  say: "settle aII the questions," 
we-are told: "let us settle some of the greatest questions." This, 
of course, is a detad, but this is P characteristic detail, though 
there is no need to dwell on it especially. 
To caIm those who might be sincereIy alarmed and grimed at 
the prospect of a further armaments drive and preparation for 
war, cwered up by tallcs abut a reduction of armaments, about 
"work for peace" and other such h e  words, Mr. Acheson found 
nothing better to state than tbat "there is no way of escaping this 
requirement." 
We cannot agree with such a stand. The peoples of the wodd 
must not be regarded as daamed, as aIready condemned by a 
merciless fate, by some kind of destiny, eternally to bear the heavy 
burden of armaments and pay with their blood for the reckless 
policy of unleashing new wars. 
If one is to accept Mr. Acheson's thesis that further armament 
is inevitable - and this is the main thesis of the entire foreign 
policy and diplomacy of the United States of America and certain 
states wbich support this policy -then one cannot seriously raise 
the question of a reduction of armaments and armed forces. 
To introduce proposals for the reduction of armaments and 
am-& forces and at the same time develop feverish activity to 
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increase one's armaments and armed form, ktrengthar the exist- 
ing agg~essive military blocs and knock together new aggrasive 
military HOG, like the so-called "AIlied Command in the Middle 
~ & t "  - to do this means to try to cover up one's aggressive aim 
aad plans with talk about reducing armaments and striving for 
peace. 
Is it not: clear that this "AlIid Command in the Middle East" 
is aimed at drawing the states of the Near and MiddIe Eastern 
area into the war prt$amtions of the aggressive Atlantic bloc under 
cover of the alleged "defense" of this acea? 
Under the pretext of "aid" to Egypt and to the other cwntrie 
of this area, &e four Powers, beaded by the United States, are 
foisting heir troops on these countries and are seeking to have 
military bases, ports, instahtiom, amed forces and commamica- 
tions placed at the disposaI of this command. 
The organization of such a command is Jinked with extensive 
plans for setting up new and expanding the existing military bases 
in Egypt, Iraq and other countries of the Near and Middie East, 
psolonging the presence of foreign armed forces and bringing ad- 
ditional foreign armed forces to their territories, contrary to the 
dearly expressed will of their population. 
Our note pertaining to this question painted out that, if real- 
ized, this entire plan for setting up a soaUed Middh Eastern 
C o m m d  must inevitably lead to the actual military oxupation of 
tbe countries of the Near and Middle East by tmops of the United 
States, Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand, which are lo- 
cated 12,000 to rr,ooo kilometers away from this area, as well as 
by troops of certain other camtries - members of the Atlantic 
alliance. The establishment sf foreign military bases, in tbr fitst 
place American, on the terrihries of the Middle and Near Eastern 
stam stiH more emphasizes the aggressive nature of this under- 
taking, References to the interests of the d e b  of the Near and 
Middie East covet up the involvement of these counuk in the 
mititary measures of the Atlaatic bloc, which are d i r d  against 
tbe Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. It is known, how- 
ever, that the Soviet Union is firm in its polrcy of peace and is the 
initiator and ardent champion of such important measures as the 
prbhibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of inter- 
national control over this prohibition, as the reduction of am& 
forces of the h e  Great ~6wets by one-third, cessation of the ag- 
gressive war in Korea and conclusion of a Pact of Peace. 
As for the countries of the East, including the Near and 
Middle East, it is generally known that sympathy for the 
national aspirations of the peoples of the East and for tbe 
struggle they wage to obtain national independence and MV- 
ereignty defines the policy of the Soviet Union toward these 
countries. AIso known to all is the support which the Soviet 
Union has invariably rendered to these countries in the satis- 
faction of their lawful national demands. 1 ha11 remind you 
that it was precisely the Soviet Union which in 1946 supported 
in the Security Couad the lawful demands of Syria and 
Lebanon for the evacuation of foreign troops from their 
territories; it was the Soviet Union that in 1947 in the Security 
Council supported the similar demands of Egypt. 
All these facts speak far themselves and require w com- 
These facts d e  it dear what a difference there is in principle 
between the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, a peace policy, and 
the policy of the imperialist states, which pursue aggressive 
ends. This policy dso dekrmines the stand of these Powers in 
considering such questions as the reduction of amarnenrs 
md amed forces. No matter what honeyed speeches the rep 
rffentatives of these countries may make in the effort to 
lend a different appeatance to this policy, the truth will out, as 
the saying goes. 
Each day offers more new facts revealing the real nature 
of the foreign poiicy of the Athatic bloc states, and first and 
foremost of the United States, whose ding circles are obsessed 
by the maniacal idea of world domination. The more ruthkss 
the facts exposing this poky become, the more urgent 
becomes the need to cover up, camouflage the aggressive 
nature of this policy, to style themselves as friends of peace 
and internationa1 cooperation. But how is this styling to be 
tallied with everything that is being done by the organizers 
and 1eadcrs.of the Atlantic bloc? They even go on to degc 
that the war, imposed by American interventionists on the 
Korean people, is being waged to defend the United States; 
that the war against the Vietnamese people is being waged 
to defend France, and that the British troops in Egypt are also 
acting out of p&ceful considerations. 
It is not accidental that the other day the Egyptian deIegate 
stressed in this committee that the speech Mr. Eden had made 
at the Assembly, professing the peace-loving aspirations of 
British foreign policy, was hardly mmpatibie with the pres- 
ent behavior of the British troops in the S u a  Canal Zone. 
This was also confirmed by the Prime Minister of ~ g ~ p t  
Nahas Pasha who, it seems, yesterday again drew attention to 
the excesses, marauding and a11 kinds of outrages perpetrated 
by the British troops in the Suez Canal Zone they had occupied. 
The events in the Far, Near and Middle East fully dispel 
the legend about the peacefuI aims and peaceful nature of the 
foreign p i icy  of the Atlantic bloc. 
The aggressive policy of the United States, which calls the 
tune in the Atlantic bloc, is an embodiment of the principles 
underlying the very foundation of this policy. It is known that the 
most important of these principles is the so-called establishment of 
"situations of strength," according to the favorite expression 
of Mr. Truman and Mr. Achesoa, a principle signifying the 
worship of armed force, upon which the United States Ieaders 
place all hopes. 
Why, it was precisely Mr. Truman who said that the 
possibility of ensuring peace will be greater if the United 
States unswervingly realizes its military program. When asked 
whether this statement couId be interpreted in the sense that 
the United States would sooner rely on strength than on 
agreement with the Soviet Union, Mr. Truman repiid in the 
affirmative, adding that this was necessary under the present 
circumstances. 
Still earlier, in his message to Congress in January this year, 
Mr. Truman said that creation of United States military might 
was "the only realistic road to peace." 
Formulating the principles and aims of United States foreign 
policy, tbe USA Secretory of State on his part stressed the 
importance of increasing the American armed forces, pointing 
out that the armed foms of tbe United Sbtates were expand- 
ing, that new types of weapons were being forged and 
that simultaneously the &es of the United States, (i.s., the 
very same membek of the Atlantic blw), were increasing their 
war production and re-establishing their armed forces. 
In a speech in Detroit on the occasion of the 250th anni- 
versary of that city, Acheson energetically praised the suc- 
cesses achieved in organizing the armed forces of the Atlantic 
bloc, mentioning such, as he said, positive facts as the forma- 
tion of new divisions. maneuvers of tactical air force. expan- - A - sion of the chain of American tactical air bases in Europe and 
development of war production in Western Europe. In a word, 
Mr. Acheson spoke like s real war minister or like a com- 
mander in chief of an army getting ready for a campaign. He 
praised the "Schuman plan" as "bold and very promising," 
although it is generally known that this plan for merging the 
coal and metallurgicaI industries of Western Europe on the 
basis of the Ruhr, this age-old seat of Prussian militarism 
and Hitlerite aggression, ;s directed at increasing the war 
wtential of the-kt~antic bloc and remesents a direct threat 
;o the security of Western ~ e r m a n q s  neighbors, includinp: 
France, to the security of dl of Europe and consequently to 
the general security of all peoples. 
Mr. Acheson frankly spoke of the efforts of the United 
States to build up "situations of strength" in Asia, the Middle 
East and other countries of the world, humoring himself and 
others that these "situatims of strength" would force the Soviet 
Union to yield to the aggressive demands and claims of the 
United st&. One should wonder how imprudent and short- 
sighted the USA Secretary of State is in supposing that the 
Soviet Union could be made to do anytbing by force and in 
not understanding that this is altogether unsuitable I=- 
gwge with regard to the Soviet Union. 
In February f 950, at a reception in the White House arranged 
by the Advertising Guncil, Mr. Acheson said that the only way to 
do business with the Soviet Union was to create a situation h 
which strength would be redconed with. 
TQ mislead the American people and the peoples of other coun- 
tries participating in the aggressive Atlantic bloc, lies and slander- 
ous inventions are circulawd about tbe Soviet Union, which is 
allegedly - threatening to attad tbe United States ar some other 
country. 
The hurdity  and falsity of such statements have already been 
expased more than once by the Soviet Union. 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union 
J. V. Stalin pointed out in the interview given to a Prmdu carre- 
spmdent in February this year that the Soviet Union, like any state 
in the world in general, cannot develop its civilian industry to the 
fdl, undertake huge construction works like the hydroelectric 
stations on the Volga. Dnieper and the Amu Darya which require 
tens of billions in budgehry outlays, continue a policy of system- 
aticaIly reducing prices of artides of mass consumption, wbich 
likewise requires tens of billions in budgetary outlays, and invest 
hundreds of billions in the rehabilitation of the national economy 
&bred by the &man invaders, and at the same time, simul- 
taneously with this, enlarge its armed forces and expand its war 
industry. J. V. Stalin poiated out that "so reckless a p&cy would 
have led any state into bkmptq ."  And today, right here in the 
capital of France, we ourse1ves feel the fulI justice d this remark- 
able prediction. 
Today we already have numerous facts fully confirming this 
statement of J. V. Stalk. The economic and financial position of 
Great Britain, France and a number of other countries, which is 
the result of the subordination of these countries to the aggressive 
policy of the United States, has deteriorated to such an extent that 
this can no Ionger be concealed. 
The other day the newspaper Le 1Monde wrote: 
"Europe is now living through the most setious crisis since lib- 
eration. Its denouement is near. It may be very dangerous for 
France and for the cause of peace. But this danger can still be 
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averted if those who play s part in this matter agree to overcome 
their prejudice. It is a dual uisis: economic snd political. 
"Until now there was talk ody of its fiist aspect, which after 
the alarming speeches of Butler and R. Mayet disturbed Mr. Ache- 
son as well . . ." 
The British journal Trib~ne, s p d i g  of "aid" which Britain 
bas to receive from America, said that t b i  aid would be given 
and added that it would lx given, but "not with the aim of mak- 
ing our economy viable but for the precise and declared putpose 
of enabling us to carry r rearmament burden which would other- 
wise break our backs . . ." 
France is groaning under the weight of economic diffidties 
caused by so-called rearmament, i.e, expansion of the arrned 
forces of France . . . Great Britain fean that the burdm of re- 
armamat might break her back. 
As for the situation in the underdeveloped countries, it is char- 
acterized by the following faas: they have become poorer in the 
p a ~ t  .lo years; they have less foad t h  they had 10 years ago ; 
hey have no internal resources to cover the shortage of capital 
since, in addition to everything else, they do not fully control 
their natural wealth and since a substantial and disproportionate 
part of the income derived from this wealth is exported. In other 
words, these countries are being robbed by the foreign monopo- 
lists. An insigndcant part of the annual p d t s  derived from the 
present capital investments - only one per cent of what the At- 
lantic cammonwedth, i.e., tbe Atlantic bloc, spends on its manna- 
ment program - is set aside for accomplishing the tremendous 
task connected with developing the underdeveloped countries. 
Tbis is almost a word for word outline of what was said by the 
President of the United Nations Economic and Sacial Council, the 
Chilean delegate Sanh Guz who can dso in no way be sus- 
pected of a dispsitim to paint a gloomy picture of the situation 
in the capitalist countries or to engage in propaganda exposing 
the pernicious influence of the United Stares foreign policy on the 
mode position of the countries of the capitalist world. (I must 
however explain &at the words: "in other words, these countries 
are being robbed by the foreign rnonopolisb" do not belag to 
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Santa C m  but to me. AU the rest outlines the content of his 
speech almost t d y . )  
Such are the results of the present foreign political course 
of the United States, which has already made itself definitely 
feIt in such countries as Great Britain, France, Belgium and 
a number of other countries, including so-called little- or under- 
dweIoped countries. Yet the United States continues to pursue 
its line, counting on its ddhrs, on their aIIeged magic power. 
As we have dready been able to learn from the statements 
of authoritative American spokesmen, the United States 
continues to steer a murse of foreign policy associated with 
the frenzied armaments drive and precluding any serious 
measures for an armaments reduction. Here the id& fixe, this 
positive obsession of the leaders of the United States that they 
must preserve for the United States the military superiority 
of which they love to taIk so much, especially in the fields of 
aviation and atomic weapons, continues to dominate. It was 
of this that Mr. Acheson spoke at a joint meeting of the 
Senate Foreign ReIations and Armed Services Committees 
in February this year. He argued that the best method for 
utilizing the United States advantage in aviation was "to 
move ahead under this protective shield to build the balanced 
collective farces in Western Europe," to cantinue along this path 
even after, as Mr. Acheson put it, the superioiitg of the 
United States in atomic weapons lessens. In anticipation 
of the inevitable advent of such time, leading statesmen of 
the United States declare that they will continue to adhere at 
all levels of state power to the present course of action, the 
object of which is the further expansion and establishment 
of new armed forces and armaments. This, Mr. Acheson said, 
is the greatest contribution to peace. I should Iike to invite 
the Measrs. delegates to ponder seriously on the meaning of 
this and to compare aU these statements, extolling the cdt  of 
force and the need for further expanding their armed forces, 
further strengthening military bases, organizing new bases, 
consolidating the existing bases, further developing atomic 
weapons, with this pIan of so-called reduction of armaments 
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which is depicted here as a turning point in wodd history. 
Then perhaps it will become clearer whether it is in pIace to 
say that a hand is being extended to us, or whether it is more 
to the point to say that a hand brandishing arms is being 
extended to us. 
This is how matters stand in reality. 
W e  considered it necessary to review all these facts, not 
out of a predilection for polemics, but because it is necessary 
to put aU things in their proper places, it is necessary to call 
each thing by its reaI name, because it is necessary to review 
deeds in order to appraise the true meaning of words. Without 
this condition no serious and fruitful discussion of important 
problems is possible. 
The real aims of the foreign policy of the United States 
can, however, be judged not only by what American dipbmats 
say but also by what they do not say and by what the American 
manoplists themselves reveal. In this respect two verp recent 
facts are noteworthy. One is the 38th wuaI  convention of 
the so-called National Foreign Trade Council held in the 
United States at the end of October this year with the partici- 
pation of representatives of the Morgan monopolies--the 
United States Steel Corporation and General Electric; the 
Rockefeller mono$lies-Standard Oil of New Jersey and Chase 
National Bank; the Du Pant General Motors Corporation; 
and so on. 
It is sufficient to name these so-called corporations, monop- 
olies of Morgan, Rockefeller, and Du Pont for it to become 
clear that we are dealing here with an important force which 
controh the destiny of the United States and wants to control 
the destiny of the entire world. 
The declaration adopted by the convention states that the 
United States foreign economic poIicy should be "directed 
aggressively toward facilitating the contribution which private 
industry can make in  increasing raw material production in 
foreign h d s  and toward assuring the availability of these 
materials in a quantity adequate to meet our growing require- 
ments in the United States. . . ." 
Aggressively directed toward seizing the raw materials in 
foreign countries t 
That the American monopolists have no intention of being 
fastidious about the means of seizing the raw material re- 
sources of other countries is also evident from the following 
place in this declaration: 
"The convention," the deciaration reads, "holds it to be 
essential . . . that the tremendous diplomatic, political and 
economic facilities at the disposal of the United States Government 
be exerted aggressively . . . This dilemma, which could be fatal to 
the whole program of economic expansion abroad, can be resolved 
ody by forthright and aggressive action on the part of the United 
States Government in the heid of its fundameold for* eco- 1 
nomic poliq." 
It is characteristic that Mr. Truman sent a message of greet- 
ing to the convention tbus stressing bis support of the pro- 
gram adopted by the National Foreign Trade Council. And 
this is natural because it is precisely these monopolistic circles 
that determine the trend of the entixe foreign policy of the 
United States and the entire position in this respect of the 
American Government and the State Depactment, the Ameri- 
can Government and representatives of the American Govern- 
ment at this Assembly. They are speaking's language in the 
interests of precisely these monopolies, of this, I shouId say, 
38th convention of the so-called National Foreign Trade Council. 
The second fact likewise worthy of serious attention is the 
First International Conference of Manufacturers, scheduIed to 
be held in New York in the beginning of December, to which 
300 big industrialists of Europe, including industrialists from 
Western Germany, have been invited; among them are Mam, 
head of the chemical trade group in Western Germany; Fritz 
Berg, president of the German Industrial Federation; h u t  Hall, 
president of the Norwegian Industrial Federation ; and others. 
The principal question to be discussed at this conference is that 
of accelerating arms produbion. 
And so the convention of the National Foreign Trade 
Council, the conference of which I have just spoken, the 
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conference which is opening in Rome today to which Mr. 
Eden and Mr. Acheson hastened, having no more impoctant 
interest than what will take pIace at this conference in Rome, 
at the so-caIled Atlantic bloc council where the interests of 
peace will be considered in a different aspect, in other words, 
where attention will be devoted to one side of the same coin 
of which Mr. Acheson spoke here. The other side of the cdn 
-to work for peac-is today left to the attention of lesser 
representatives of the United States of America because Mr. 
Acheson has no time to spend here on talk b u t  peace. Hc 
must "make peace," "work for peace" and he hurries off 
. to work these days together Gith Adenauer and other plotters 
against peace in Rome where Mr. Eden has also hastened, 
having no time to be here with us where vital and urgent 
problems of peace are being discussed. 
Everyone acts in accordance with his interests and the interests 
of those who have sent him to do their wilI. 
And now attempts are being made to persuade us &at in 
this atmosphere of war psychosis and war fever, when all the 
eflorts of the leading c ~ K ~ S  of the United States are being 
concentrated on carrying out war plans that h v e  nothing in 
common, and can have nothing in common, with the so-called 
defense of the United States, they speak here in a *riaus vein 
of some desire to reduce armaments and armed forces. 
Under such circumstances, can the rep-ntatives of th'c 
three Powers offer anything more than what they offer in 
their puny draft resolution on the so-called armaments re- 
duction ? 
We have seen what is the real aim, what is the real desire 
of the National Foreign Trade Council, this influential 
organization of the American monopoGsts, whose weight in 
defming policy, including also the foreign policy of the, 
United States, is welt known. * * *  
I T has been said here that the draft resoIutim of the United States, Britain and France for the reduction of armaments is , "new and bold." 
I 
I It is necesssry however to say outright that this draft 
altogekher ignores the accumulated experience and the dis- 
appointment suffered. This plan is not new, for it is framed 
in full conformity with the principles of the so-called "Baruch 
plan," which principles are known to dl and have long been 
rejected by a number of countries. This plan is not bold for 
it does not give a single worthy solution of the problems 
raised in this draft Suffice it to say that the entire pIan of 
the so-called reduction of armaments and armed forces pro- 
posed in this draft is made d i r d y  depeadent on a number 
of preIiminay conditions, some of which are mentioned in 
this draft and some of which' are not but are intensively . 
mentioned in the speeches made by the authors of this draft. 
This for example is how matters stand with such a pre- 
liminary condition as the cessation of war in Korea. Zo the 
deckration of the "Three" this condition was recorded in 
item six which said directly that the general program of 
reduction could not be put into operation as long as war 
continued in Korea, and pointed to the necessity of simul- 
taneously solving also the political questions dividing the 
world. N o w  this is not mentioned in the draft resolution. 
This, however, does not mean that the authors of the resolu- 
tion of the "Three" have given up this prelirniaary condition. 
Indeed, if you recall Mr. Acheson's speech made in the First 
Committee you will see that he continues to insist on this 
preIiminary condition. In that speech of his Mr. Acheson 
stated that the system of armaments reduction could not be 
put into operation while the war continued in Korea and 
that as long as this situation remained no plan could be 
implemented. 
This reference to the war in Korea is a mere pretext for 
evading agreement on the reduction of armaments. If matters 
stood differently how could one understand the statement 
made by Acheson last June when, in answer to the question as to 
whether the government would be satisfied with a sum smaller 
&an that envisaged in the m u d  security bill iE the situation in 




in Korea this program would not be reduced or cut in any 
respect. 
What does this mean? It only means that last June we 
were told that no matter whether the question of the Korean 
war was settled or not, whether the wax in Korea ended or not, 
this couId in no way influence the program of armaments 
drawn up and approved by the American Government, by 
Congress. And here we are told: we cannot agree to a re&- 
tion of armaments before the war in Korea ends. This is 
an important condition. It would be senseless to speak of 
disarmament, Mr. Acheson said, when we are waging a wat 
and when arms are required. Later oa, when Mr. Acheson 
encountered the resistance of many delegate-pen resistance 
on the part of some, as for example on the part of the USSR 
delegation, and hidden resistance on the part of others, though 
the latter are still forced to vote for the American proposals 
-the Ameriaan delegation resorted to a maneuver. 
Haste was made to delete this point from the resolutim the 
poiat about the prefiminay condition, but the same thing is being 
reiterated in the m1 i . r ,  that cessation of the war in Korea is 
a p r e f i  condition for the duction of armaments. Here you 
have the gauge of sincerity of those who extad a "Ibelaundist" 
hand, i,e., the hand of which Mr. BeIaunde spoke. He has not 
extended his own hand so far. 
It is clearly evident from Mr. Acheson's June statement tha! 
there is no coanection whatsoever between the question of the 
armaments reduction and cessation of the war in Korea. Yet it is 
precisely cessation of the war in Korea that is now bang put 
forth as a prelirninnry condition for reducing armaments, although 
this is being smuggIed through in speeches explaining' the resolu- 
tion in which this point no longer Qum. 
At the same time everything is being done to drag out the war 
in Korea, to drag out the negotiations far cessation of hostilities. 
Mr. Eden has even stated in the House of Commons that the 
questidn bf war prhners k me 6f the hdis-e tbnditi~hs 
for ceasing fire ia Korea, for ceasing hostilities. But can cease- 
fire be made a preliminary condition for paving the way to a 
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f& p c e f u l  settlement? Now the exchange of war prisoners 
is a l r d y  being put forth by the Anglo-American bloc as a new 
additional condition for the cessation of hostilities. 
This means another attempt, another pretext, another captious 
abjection, another means of disrupting the negotiations in Korea 
on ending the war. Now, compare all these, m e  with another, 
and then tell yourself how to appraise these so-called propids for 
a reduction of armaments and these preliminary conditions, teI1 
youmIf, not us, not here, not during voting, tell ywrself and tdl 
your conscience . . . In reality, of course, thme is no connectim be- 
tween these questions, and linking tbe termination of the war 
ia Koxea tu the question of armaments duction is devoid of 
any ground whatsoever. This is all the more so because the very 
cessation of the war in Korea fully d e p d s  upon the. Govern- 
m a t  of the United States. 
The White House merely has to give an appropriate signal and 
the war in Korea will end. CoasequentIy it wilI be easy to eliiin- 
ate one of the obstacles which the American G~vmnmmt sees 
in the way of reducing armaments and the armed £ o m .  
The situation as regards the other preliminary conditions toa 
is no better. We heard Mr. Acheson paint tq the connection be- 
t w m  the reduction of armaments and the elimination of tension 
in international relations. He said that "if we are honest, if we are 
shting what is true and if we are not making dogam or not mak- I 
iag propaganda we will say that if, at the time this system of ! 
reduction of armaments is worked out, we are in a period of highly 
mounting tensions and additional frictions throughout the world, 
it is highly unlikely that nations would enter into a system of 
arraameats reduciion." And further: "In candor and in honesty 
we must say that there is a direct relation between the ability to 
put into effect a system of disarmament and the international 
temperature. If the international temperature is approaching the 
boiling point, few things are possible. If it has reduced so that 
solutions of problems are on the way and are quite possible, then 
disamament becomes a wholly different thing so far u the im- 
mediate future is concerned." 
What is true is true. But is it not precisely the American Gov- . 
ernment that bars mpnsibility for the fact that the political 
atmosphere is becoming ever more heated, that h e  political. tern- 
perature keeps ri-? Certainly it does, no matter how hard the 
repre~ent~tives of the United States may shun this responsibility, 
no matter how had  they may trg to wade it. 
To confirm this one could cite many facts. I dready spoke about 
them last time when reviewing the foreign policy of the United 
States toward Korea, the People's Republic of China, Germany, 
Iran, Egypt, Triate, Austria, a n d  so on and so forth. 
All these faas accordingly affact the temperature in intermtion- 
d relations. As for the Soviet Union spe&caIly, with regard to 
which the United States is obviously pursuing its aggressive line, 
breaking international agreements with the Soviet Union and im- 
plementing measures that adanger the security of the USSR and 
carry the threat of anather world war, such facts are generay 
known and I have already spoken about them too. I s h d  add to 
what was said, but only those facts which refer directly to recent 
times. 
It is known that almost on the eve of this session, in the middk 
of October, the President of the United States, Mr. Truman, 
signed a new law known under the titk of the "Mutud Security 
Act of 195 1 ." This law envisages the special appropriation of 100 
million dollars for Lancing - I am citing the respective point 
from this law - "any selected persons who are residing in or 
escapees from the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Romania, Bulgaria, A U  . . . either to form such persons into 
elements of the military forces supporting the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization or for other purposes." 
This law provides, as we see, that the United States wouId 
6rance persons and armed groups on the territory of the 
Soviet Union and a number of other states for carrying out 
subversive activity and sabotage within the above states. The 
law points out directly that the Government of the United 
States undertakes to pay people who fled from the USSR and 
other countries enumerated in this Isw or even residing in 
these countries, and that it undertakes to finance uniting them 
into special armed detachments. In other words, the Govern- 
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ment of the United States of America undertakes to organize 
and finance armed groups from among persons, both who 
are residing in the USSR and who have fled from here, for 
the struggle against the Soviet Union. Such actions of the 
United States constitute an unprecedented intervention of the 
United States in tfie internal affairs of the USSR and the 
People's Democracies mentioned in this new American law. 
This direct inkvention of the United States in the internal 
affairs of other countries dso represents a violation of both 
the generally recognized standards of international law and 
the principles undtrlying the United Nations Charter. It alsu 
constitutes a crass violation by the United States of tke Soviet- 
American agreement of November 16, 1933 concluded by the 
People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR M, M. 
Lihrinov and the President of the United States of America 
Frmklia D. Roosevelt during the establishment of diplomatic 
relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. 
Under that agreement, sealed by the signature of President 
Roosevelt on the part of h United States, the Governments 
of the USSR and the United States mutually undertook to 
respect the sovereignty of both states-this is said in the 
intemationaI agreement of whose sanctity certain delegates, 
Mr. Eden in particular, have spoken at such length here. 
The adoption of the law envisaging the apprvpriatioa of 
100 million dolhrs for subversive activity and sabotage against 
the Soviet Union shows that the government of the United 
S t a h  of America, crassly violating the commitments it 
assumed, thereby continues to pursue a p o k y  of further 
worsening rehiions with the Soviet Union and further agg5a- 
vating the international situation. 
By promulgating its "Act of 1951" the United States Gov- 
ernment has permitted itself to commit an unparalleled vioh- 
tiw of international standards, a violation which is incom- 
patible with normal relations between countries and respect 
for state sovereignty. Such an act cannot be regarded other- 
wise than as afl aggressive act designed to further complicate 
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relations betweed the United States and the Soviet Union and 
aggravate the internations1 situation. 
The Soviet Government has lodged a resoIute protest with 
the United States Government against this new aggressive 
act of the Government of the United States toward the Soviet 
Union and against the crass violation by the U n i d  States of 
cammitrnents it assumed under the agreement of November 
16, 1933 and pIaced dl responsibility for such actions upon 
the Government of the United States and stated that it expects 
the United States Govemment to take appropriate measures for 
repealing the above hw. 
This unexampled, unprecedented act demands that thc 
United Nations intervene in this matter. On the instructions 
of my Government 1 have submitted a proposal to include on 4 
the agenda of the General Assembly the question of this 
"Act of 1951" as highly urgent and important so as to have 
the General Assembly recommend to those who are still 
capable of heeding its recommendations the repeal of such an 
unparalleled altack on the United Nations Charter, on our 
sovereign rights, on the Soviet Union. 
The question arises in face of such actions of the United 
States Government: How can they, without indulging in 
hypocrisy and falsehood, speak of striving to relieve .the 
tension in intermtiand relations? How can they present this 
relieving of the tension in international relations as a preliminary 
condition for adopting this resolution on the reduction of a m -  
ments and m e d  form ? 
I think this is irreconcilable. 
In his sp& Mr. Acheson tried to allege that the draft 
resolution of the "Three" envisaged prohibition of the atomic 
weapon. In reality the draft resolution contains no probibi- 
tion of the atomic weapon whatever. If you examine this 
draft you will easily become convinced of this. The draft 
speaks of the necessity of establishing international control so 
as to ensure prohibition d the atomic weapon. But this does 
not at all resembIe prohibition of the atomic weapon. We have 
already met such s formula before and always did the legiti- 
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mate question arise: How can any international control 
agency ensure prohibition of the atomic weapon if there is 
no decision on prohibition of the atomic weapon? 
I deem it necessary to remind you that as early as during 
the First Session o£ the General Assembly in 1 9 4  a deciston 
was hken obligating the Atomic Energy Commission to sub. 
mit its proposals for the removal of the atomic weapon from 
national armamen&. Wbat is the diffwencc h e e n  this 
decision taken in 1946 and the present drdt resolution pro- 
posed by the representatives of the three Powers? Actually 
there is no difFerence whatever hrwcen them. Still, it is a 
fact that the decision of the General Assembly of 1946 has 
hot h e n  fulhlled and there has been no prohibition of the 
' atomic weapon to this day. That i s  why it is absoiutely wrong 
to present the draft resolution of tbe "Three" as allegedly 
providing for the prohibition of the atomic weapon. 
I must remind you that the delegdon of the USSR bas re- 
peatedly introduced its propod for the prohibition of the atomic 
weapon and the atablishmcnt of international control over the 
impfernentation of this probibition. On Novunber 16 of this year 
the USSR delegation iiubrnitted a props4 that .the h e r d  As- 
sembly declare the unconditiond probibition of the a r d c  weapon 
and the establishment of strict international control over tbe im- 
plementatim of this prohibition 
There is nothing resembling this proposal in the draft m l u -  
tion of the three Powers. Herein lies the fundamental difference, 
a difference in principle between the proposal of the the Powers 
and that of the Soviet Union. 
However, a decision on the unconditional prohibition of the 
atomic weapon nnd the establishment of strict international mn- 
trol over the impIementatim of such prohibition by itself is still 
ins&cient. 
That is why the delegation of the Soviet Union proposes that 
the General Assembly a h  adopt another decision: "To instruct 
the Atomic Ewrgy and Conventional Armaments Commission to 
prepare and submit by February 1, 1952 for consideration of the 
Security Council a draft convention envisaging m o r e s  that en- 
sure f&llment of the decisions of the G m d  Assembly w the 
prohibition of the atomic weapon, the discontinuation of its pro- 
duction, and the utilization solely for civilian purposes of atom 
bombs &ady produced, and on the establishment of strict inter- 
national control over the irnpIementation of the above conventiw." 
We are told that it wodd be unacceptabIe to prohibit the atomic 
weapon without estabhshing international control over the imple- 
mentation of such prohibition became this can endanger the pi- 
tion of those states which will scrupdously fulfill such a decision 
on the prohibition of the atomic weapon while some other state 
ventures to violate this decision. But we do propose to prohibit 
the atomic weapon and to establish interaatiod control, prwid- 
ing for this either in one convention or two conventions which 
should be concluded simultaneously. 
But this is k i n g  rejected. These, we are told, are simply 
"Pm~leI," tbat is, mere words. It turns out that to prohibit the 
atomic weapon is  parole^,'," while to instruct the commission 
merely to study the possibility of ensuring prohibition of the 
atomic weapon is a concrete deed. 
AU these are fairy tales for very small children. These are 
fairy tdes of Andersen, Hauff-I do not want to insult the 
repraentatives of the Arab countries and for this. reason I will 
not say '"Arabian taIes" although I must admit that they are 
charming both for their imagination and beauty of conception. 
But it is suficjent to recall Andersm, Hauff or our Russian 
fairy tales, for example, one about the wolf and Little Red Riding 
Hood ( l ~ g k t e r ) ,  how the wolf wanted to devour Little Red 
Riding Hwd and pretended to be her most devoted friend 
(laughter) . Well, and what were the results ? Tbe wolf devoured 
Littk Red Riding Hood. But since then "Little Red Riding Hoods" 
have become so strong and powerful: that it is no longer easy 
to devour them, let alone to deceive them. 
If it is incorrect to prohibit tbe atomic weapon without cstab 
lishing international control over the implementation of this 
prohibition, it is incorrect to establish in te tnat i~d  control 
without prohibiting the manufacture of the atomic weapon at the 
same time. Thjs should be dl the more dmr because my control 
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presuppases the existence of the object to which this mntro1 
should be extended. We however are offered establishment of in- 
ternational runtroI, while prohibition of the atomic weapon and 
even the very so-called disclosure and verification of infoxma- 
tion about the atomic weapon, about which the draft resoIutim 
of the "Three" aIw speaks, is to be postpoaed for some inde6nit.e 
time. True, this dare is quickly fixed. It is d e d  sine die - 
without fixing the day. 
At previous sessions the Soviet Union also demanded pro. 
bibition of the atomic weapon. But each time this demand of 
the Soviet Union was rejected, and those rejecting it were not 
uhamed at tbe same time to hold out the t h t  of using atom 
bombs. It is dear that it is good for those who prepare to attack 
the Soviet Union to preserve some kind of advantage for them- 
sdves in this matter, at first & advantage of monoplists, when 
the United States considered itself h e  monopolist ia this sphere, 
and then, after such a monopoly was eliminated, the quantitative 
advantage, for which the United States still has hopes. 
In the reply to a Praud4 correspondent "On the Atomic 
Weapon" the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, 
J. V, S k l i ,  pointed out that the United States would like to 
have a monopoly of the production of atomic b b s  aud have 
t m h i  ted opportunity to intimidate and blackmail other coun- 
tries and that the proponents of the atomic bomb "may Bgree 
to the prohibition of the atomic weapon anly if they see that they 
B C ~  no longer mrmopolists." 
To prove that the United States stan& for the prohibition of 
the atomic weapon Mr, Acheson referred to the fact that in 1946, 
in the commissiqn presided over by Acheson, 3aruch had pro- 
pased to discontinue the manufacture of atom bombs and to 
destroy the &sting atom h d s .  MI. Acheson, however, said 
nothing about the faci tlqt in advancing his proposal for the 
pxobibitim of the atomic weapon Baruch made it dependent not 
upon a respective international agreement but upon the internal 
Iegislation of the United States. As for the de~tmaioa of the 
atom bombs already produced-again werytbing was onIy an 
empty phrase. Why, it is known to dl, at Ieast this should be 
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known to Mr. Acheson, that this question of destroying stocks 
of ready atomic weapons and atomic weapons which were being 
completed was raised in 1947 in the Atomic Energy Commission 
not by Baruch, but by the representative of the Soviet Union. This 
proposal envisaged the destruction of the atomic weapon with 
nuclear fuel being used solely for ppareful purposes. Then d1 
the members of the Atomic Energy Commission, except the 
representative of the United States, agreed with this plan. The 
representative of Britain (Thomson), h a d a  (McNaughton ) . 
Brazil (Akrto), China (Wei) , Australia (Hodgson) agreed with 
l h i s  plan at that time. The mIy me not to agree was the repre- 
sentative of the United States (Osbarn). Here we have an 
answer as to how the Americans proposed to destroy atom bombs. 
The representative of the United States Qsbom stated then that 
the provisions of the international treaty on atomic energy must 
be implemented step by step and that only at a definite stage of 
the implementation of this treaty would liquidation of the 
atomic weapon in me way or another be provided for. The pro- 
posal submitted by the USSR representative for the destruction of 
manufactured atom bombs was rejmed. Thcse facts show that 
wben the matter really reaches the point of prohibiting the 
atomic weapon and destroying manufactured atom bombs, it 
invariably encounters resistance on the part of the United States. 
It has been so before; it will evidently be so now. 
EEKING to prove that the United States favored prohibition of S the atomic weapon in the past too, Mr. Acheson tried ta 
interpret his letter of 1946 in a sense favorabk for the sbnd 
taken by his commission. He pointed out that this letter also 
said at what stage of the drafting of the plan prohibition of the 
atomic weapon would be necessary. Thiq however, is not the point 
at issue at dl, but the point at issue is that no matter at what 
stage this would be necessary, Mr. Acheson's commission recog- 
nized that the decision, no matter when it might be taken, would 
be connected with msidemtions of high policy affecting the 
m i t y  of the United States and, as it is put in Mr. Acheson's 
fetter, "must be made by out Government under ics conrstmttioaal 
procases and in the light of all the fasts of the world situation." 
What could this mean if not that when matters reach the 
point of prohibiting the atomic weapon, although his might k 
envisaged by any kind of international agreement either in the 
form of the Baruch plan or my other document, the question of 
the prohibition of the atomic weapon would be decided "in the 
light of all the fa& of the wodd situation," i.e., irrespective of 
plan or international agreement. It is absolutely impossible to 
interpret this as Mr. Achem wodd like it, as a recognition of 
the need for the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon. 
It is necessary to add to tbis that h e  distinctive feature of the 
Baruch p h  consists p&ly in the fact that the solution of the 
question of prohibiting the at& weapon can, with the heIp of 
the stage system, be p p n e d  far an indefinite time, Another 
distinctive feature of this plan is that tbe production of atomic 
energy in amounts that could seme for the production of tbe 
atomic weapon, and in such a case would be recognized as 
dangerous, is placed at the exclusive disposal of the intematiooaI 
control agency and that all the atomic p h t s  are placed in its 
sole psession. 
But what might tbis inkemationd a p c y  be? Here is what 
B a d  said h u t  this, referring to the composition of this 
agencg: "The personnel of the Authority should be recruited on 
a h i s  of proven competence hut a150 so far as possible on an 
international basis," 
It follows from Banrch's statement that first of all these must 
be people extremely competent in this field-it may bt: said in 
advance that the Americans will dways argue that their sden- 
tists like Lilienthd, Barnard, Thornas and others are the most 
competent persons--that *ere are none more competent. And sec- 
ondy, "so far r~ #ossibIe" the agency should be international. 
Now if we were told that the United Nations Organhtion should 
be "so fur 4s po~lible" intematiwnd, what would our attitude 
be, although right now we already have something of the sort? 
But we are not satisfied when in our international organization, 
in the United Nations Organization, members of the A t h t i c  Mac 
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boss the whoIe show, when the United %tag of Amerim does 
everything it wants in the United Nations. For iastance we say: 
the United States of America was the hst  to raise the q d o n  
of a r m  duction at the General Assembly. Therefore, in all 
justice, this question shaufd be taken up first at our session as 
the United States was first to submit it. Fobwing the United 
States we submitted our question "On Meaoures against the 
Threat of Another World War and for the Strengthening of 
Peace and Friendship among Nations." We demanded that it be 
second on the agenda. But the United States delegation did not 
agree to this, and this question was put fifth. 
Now dections to the Security Council are to be held. Yugo- 
slavia's term in the Security Cwncil is ending, Yugoslavk is a 
Slav country. Under h e  agreement in London seats ia the 
Security Council should belong not only to representativs of 
Western B u m p  but also to a repmentative of Eastern Europe, 
of SIav countries, and aIso to represmtatives of the Latin h e t i -  
caa region, etc. In the past we demanded and we now demand that 
according to the established tradition, to the gentlemen's agree- 
ment concluded in 1946, the candidate to the Security Council 
should be proposed by the countries of the corresponding geo- 
graphic region. Until 1949 this is what was done. but then they be- 
gan to hinder the group of Slav delegations from carrying this out, 
imposing their own candidate on them. 
Last time they wanted to propose YugosIavia--to spite us- 
they propsed her and pushed her through. Now they have dis- 
covered a new "Slav" countrp--Greece (hgb te r ) .  Aad they 
want to impose this new "Slav" on us as a representative of 
Eastern Europe, i.e., of the region to which the USSR, Czecho- 
slovakia, Poland, Byelorussia and the Ukraine belong, and only 
by agreement among whose representatives may a candidate to 
the Security Council be proposed. 
In 1749 we objected to Yugoslavia for no other reason, except 
that it bad vaulted over to the other camp and betrayed this 
principle, not desiring to take into consideration the will of the 
majority of states of this region which deprived her of the right 
to daim to repmat the countries of precisely this xegion. This 
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iime we proposed Byelorussia for the Sgcusity h e i r ,  But the 
Anglo-American blac propa Greece from the countries of 
Eastern Europe. They also propose another "Slav" country, newly 
ihvented for this c h  Philippines (irf~lghtm). 
CoIJusion is in progress behind our back, a bargain with regard 
to the elections to the h i t y  Council: is being struck, and it ha 
wen k n  hinted to us hat their support of ByeIowir will 
depend on how hactable we ate ia our today's speech. But I 
must dedare that we will not bargain. We will @ht for our 
right to propose our candidate and insist on his eldon-we 
wiIl also expose the crafty technique of the violators of this 
rigkt of ours under the Charter. By the way, this technique 1 
is not so very crafty. Thus if mambea of such an international 
organimtion as the United Nations conduct thtmsefves in this 
manner here, then what can we expect of a so-called intemahnd 
control authority when the Amerimis themselves, Baruh for 
instance, admit that this author* must be international onIg 30 
fnr ar po~~ib le ,  stipulating that of course most competent prsons 
should be in it. And who are these? Ammian atom mongers. 
Very :competent persons" who h v e  shown their "hpetence"  
at Hiroshima and Nagasaki . . . 1 
It is clear to us that this stipulation that the control zuthoritp 1 
will be "so far as possible on an internationd basis" indicates that 
there may be no such possibility. In any case there is no guarantee 
whatever that there will be such a possibility. Thus it should be 
dear that in cornpition this agency, as contemplated under the 
Baruch-L'dientbal-Ach plan, wilt not be international: but 
American. 
Can there be any doubt as to the kind of decisions which will 
be made by this so& international control authoriq when 
the matter concerns, for instance, the Soviet Union? 
In his interesting b d t  P e e  W M  and the Bomb Professor 
Blackett points out with perfectly g w d  foundatim that the 
national composition of members of this contrd agenq over the 
next 10 or 20 years would asme a major* of votes to the 
course to which the United States wodd attach special importan*. 
In order not to go into too much detail we dull medy say that 
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I under such cbmmmxa control of a l l  the world reserves of 
: atomic energy w d d  in faa be concentrated in the hands of 
I the United States Government, that it h e  would have undivided 
sway in this field, that it alone would determine the further line 
of dweIopment of the atmic energy plants, permitting or refus- 
ing to permit other countries to pduce  atomic energy on a 
scale which the United States Government would consider against 
its interests. 
The very system of COII~MI proposed in the Baruch pian, 
which does not stem from the economic requirements of the 
vwious countries but exdusiwly from strategic considerations, 
s p h  for itself. 
Professor Blacketr justly says: "It will k remembered that in 
the Lirienthal FIm the major atomic plants were to be located 
on strategic grounds, not according need. How would the 
number of plants, allocated, say, to America and Russia be deter- 
mined? If it was according to relative need, America, with her 
. . . ample supplies of coal and oil, wouId receive few or none! 
If the Atomic Dwdopment Authoritg made such a decision, Amer- 
ica would certainly repudiate the whbfe scheme. But allocation on 
strategic g m d s -  would lead q d y  to grave injustices. For 
instance, Russia might find herself all& the same number of 
plants as America . . . 
"These conditions make it probabIe that the United States 
Government would not have proposed a scheme such as the 
Atomic Development ~uthority-i€ Ihey had not every confidence 
that tbe Western Powers wwlfd bE assured of a majority on 
ADA." 
As far inspeaion, it too would be compleiely under the contd 
of the United States with all the resulting consequences. The 
so-called "honest profession" of Oatises, of which Mr. Acheson 
spoke bere, would no doubt Ix p t I y  encouraged in work of 
this inspection too, at least with regard to a l l  the countries in 
which the United States is interested and, aaturally, not least 
of all, with regard to the Swiet Union and the People's De- 
mwacies. 
Indicating the biggest shtcomings of the Baruch p h ,  which 
render it entirely unacceptable to seif-respecting s t a t e ,  it cannot 
but be pointed out right here that this plan wouId be disz&ous 
to the development of a p c e f u l  economy, especially of thc 
countries which need atomic energy for civilian purposes. But 
for dl that the Baruch plan is incapable of muring real mtmI 
if one is to hkliwe, for instance, the spokesman of the United 
States Oslmm who declared pubIicly at the h t  session that there 
is not a single manber of the Atomic Enera  Gmmissim who 
M k ~ e s  it possible to crate a p h  excluding the possibility of 
abuse and the psibi l i ty  of an atomic war. O h m  admowledgd 
that in a situation with an international control authority owning 
and dnhist&ing plants, pot- expIosive malt, as formerly, 
get into the hands of a state through seizure if the situation pxwes 
practicaI1y hopeless. 
And here such a plan is being d led  tbe best p h  that could 
be framed and for many years a h d y  attempb have k made 
to foist w other s t a t e  this p h  of control which is unsuitable 
in reality. 
Impsing bet plan w b i 4  as we see, pursues aims that have 
nothing in common with international controI, they pointed out 
the necessity of reconciliation with the fact tbat tbis plan is 
diread against the sovereignty of other states. Whm we objected 
to such an assertion directed sgaiast the state sovereignty of 
independent counkis, we were told that it is unavoidable ia the 
interests o£ higher aims. T h e  higher aims, however, boil down 
merely to assuring American monoplies domination in atomic 
affairs. 
Attempts were made to reproach us for our so-called rigorism 
which, they allege, makes us ready to disregard the fate of 
millions of people who may become victims of an atomic war 
if no agreement is reached on a t d c  control h a d  on the 
Baruch plan. But we have beady said that tbis plaa does not 
answer the task of a t a b W g  effective i n t d d  control. 
We have already repeaidly explained our position witb rewd 
to sovereignty, pointing out tbat wery interaationd agreement 
naturally demands certain limitation io this sphere. But it is m e  
thing to limit sovereignty for truly common interests. It is another 
to strive to limit and, men mdre, to completely cancel sovereignty 
under cover of common interests while really pursuing the inter- 
ests of one country, in this case of the United States, as is 
mntempk~ under the Baruch p h .  Such so-called restriction 
of sovereignty cannot be accepted by a single sensible person. 
It is not superfluous to recall that even such an American 
leader in the fieId of atomic weapon manufachue as Chester 
Bamard, former president of the New Jerseg 3eU Telephone 
Company, member of the State Department's Board of Consultants 
on atomic energy contd, said in 1946, speaking of the Baruch 
plan, that in accepting this plan the other countries would g d -  
ually and voIuntariIy bave to repudiate considerable elements of 
their sovereignty before the United States give up the atomic 
bomb. Barnard added to this that it was difl idt to imagine less 
favor&& conditions for successful negotiations between proud 
and equal powers. In 1946 it was already cleat to him, as he 
himself declared, that the chances that this American pIan would 
be accepted were very slight. 
Speaking of the Saviet proposals regarding international con- 
tml, Mr. Acheson referred to the remark in the five-power doc- 
ument of 1949 thmt the Sovief proposal would endanger inter- 
national security. This of course has no foundation whatever, and 
we have already refuted this time and again at previous sessions. 
There are, however, a number of competent indications point- 
ing out that it is the Baruch plan that d j  endaqers p e w  
because under it any red or imagined violalion of agreement: in 
the opinion of the majority of the cmtiol agency could be used 
to unleash a new world war. 
It is a fact that the well-known Bullitt went so far as to con- 
sider tk Soviet Government's decision to raise production of 
steeI in our country to 60 million tons a year as proof of Soviet 
aggression. Under the Baruch plan in action, it would not k 
f i c u l t  for Bullitt to push through a corresponding decision in 
the control agency with all  the consequences following from 
such a decision. 
* * *  
N conclusion we wouId like to aslr the authors and admates of I the draft molutmn of the "Three" to reply m ehe foUowing 
questions: 
Do they agree that the G e n d  Assembly should proclaim the 
unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon and the wtab- 
Iishtnent of strict inkrnatiod mntml aver the implementation 
of this prohibition ? 
Do they agree that the General Assembly should instruct the 
Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to 
prepre and submit to the Security CounciI by Februa y I, 1952 
a draft of a respective convention? 
Do they agree that this convention should envisage measures 
ensuring the implementation of the decision of the General 
Assembly on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, discontinua- 
tion of its manufacture atsd.utilization of the d d y  produced 
atom bombs solely for civiIian purposes, and the estabIishment d 
strict international control over the implementation of the above 
convention 7 
Do they agree h a t  the General AwembIy should recogniae 
that every sincere plan for a substantial reduction of all armed 
forces and armaments must include the estabIishment of an 
international control agencp within the framework of the Security 
Council ? 
Do they agree that the task of this agency should be control 
of the reduction of all  tgper, of armaments and armed forces, as 
well as control to ensure that the decision to prohibit the atomic 
weapon is strictIy and scrupulwsly observed, and that this inter- 
national agency should dixlose data on all armed forces, incIud- 
ing semi-military forces, securifq forces and poIice, as well as alI 
armaments, iincluding the atomic weapon, and having also in 
view effective internationd inspeclion carried out by decisions of 
the h e  international control agency? 
FinaUy, do they agree that the international agency for con- 
trol over the pmhibition of the atomic weapon should immediately 
after the conclusion of the convention inspect a I I  the enter- 
prises for the manufacture and storing d atomic weapns with the 
object of verifying the implementation of the convention on 
the prohibition of the atomic weapon? 
An dinnative reply to d these questions will serve as the 
genuine and best p m f  of the willingness to prohibit the atomic 
1 weapon and establish genuine international control to ensure 
the implementation of this decision. 
We wodd be happy, and not onIy we but all the pace-ldng 
I p p l e .  wwld be happy, if we meived an &imative, clw 
and exact reply to h e  questions of ours. 
At the same time the reply to these questions will show who 
shpuid d y  he held responsible for the rejection d the uncon- 
ditional prohibition of the atomic w e a p  and the establisbent 
of strid international control. 
The delegation of the USSR believes that the draft resolution 
submitted by the delegations of the United Stata, Great Britain 
and France cannot in its present form serve its dedared purpose. 
This draft resolution requires important amendments which the 
USSR delegation is presenting simultaneously for the consridera- 
tioa of the First Committee. 
W e  hope that thse mmdments, which in our view are indis- 
puAIe, will be adopted a d  that the way wilt thus be opened 
for agreement on such important questions as the reduction of 
armaments and the prohibition of atomic weapons, with the estab- 
lishment of strict international control to enforce the prohibition 
of atomic weapons and to etlsure real, honest and scrupulous ob- 
servance of the decision ta reduce armaments and armed forces. 
Speech in the Political Committee 
November 30, 1951 
Mr. C h a h i q  Messrs. Ddegaks: 
w E have already reached the point in our work when it is  tsecessarp to summarize certain results, draw conclu~ions 
arid chart a further path in the solution of the problems fat- us. 
Under these conditions it is especially important to pick out 
the main, decisive questions discussed during the general debate. 
It is important to make nm efforts in order to define most fuily 
and clearly one's stand on quations that arouse disputes and dif- 
ferences and to make we of a11 the opportuaities for eliminating 
the obstacles hindering a proper mutual understahding of these 
stands. This is dl the more essential because in the course of 
polemics, in the heat of, so to say, verbal battles, a cmsiderabre 
number of all kinds of extraneous layers have been formed, with- 
out whose removal it is frequently d&lt to find a proper 50111- 
t h  of the problem. Zhis means that ia summarizing the re- 
sults and in working on the precise definition of some or other 
p e p ,  it is impossible to proceed without removing these lay- 
ers, without casting aside weergthing that does not bear a direct 
reiation to these important issues and can merely hamper the at- 
tainment of decisions agseed upon, evqihing that does not facili- 
tate a calm analysis and proper conclusions. This ;Jso means that it: 
is  necessarp to clear the facts f ram distortions and to restore them 
to their true, real fwrn and significance, which alone can ensure 
their proper undelrstandig. 
It should k said, however, that the authors ofthe draft resolu- 
tion of the "Three" and certain supporters of this draft have 
frequently disregarded the demand outlined above, although they 
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have given ammnces that thq. are allegedly striving for atlaining 
an agreed program and are guided solely by the interesb of truth, 
by the interests of tht matter. Such assurances can in no way be 
reconciled with the spepches of certain delegates who bave con- 
sidered it proper to M their speeches, spiced with considerable 
doses of malice and dander, with dl kinds of fables and banal 
attacks against us which have long since becoqne tedious. This is 
unfortunately being repeated at every session, and not infre- 
quently the same tricks are being employed, the same so-catled 
facts are being used, the same quotations are being cited, notwitb- 
standing the fact that such amoks have already been repulsed 
d i m ,  the tricks q o s e d ,  the false statements refuted, the ignor- 
ance of their autboxs exposed, and the authors themselves put in 
their place. 
Whether one wants it or not, one again has to take up such 
sallies of these Messcs. delegates. This time too I am forced to 
dwell on the speeEh of the former French Minister of the Interior, 
M. Jules Mocb, who, speaking on November 26, piled up a hcap 
of absurd and slanderous JIegations regarding the -@ion and 
"annexation by Russia." as he put it, of some kind of territories 
before the war and at the beginning of the war. 
M. M d  stated in his speech that a repetition of tendentious 
assertions umses mistrust and that this mistrust, entertained by 
him and people of a like mind, grows as they acquaint them- 
selves with c d n  methods of the Soviet regime. He attempted 
to vilify our methods whose substance rLIeged1y consists in con- 
d i n g  the truth and in inather mortd sins. To substantiate this 
slanderous invention of his, Moch went on to cite a quotation 
from the work of our great teactrer V. I. tenin, "Lejt-Witrg" Corn- 
mrmis~m, an Infmtih Di~arder, He, of course, doctored it ac- 
cordingly, tearing out s e v d  phrases from the entire context and 
thus resorting to obvious fahifieation. 
Mmh, however, hars become a victim of the falsification which 
the American representative Austin permitted himself to indulge 
in right here in Paris three years ago. I cannot help but recall 
that Austin I ikmise ventured to quote - distorting and mutilat- 
ing the real text aad the meaning of this q~otation-'~I;ef#-Wing" 
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Comm~ninn, con Infmiiie Disorder accordin& to the crib p ~ -  
pared for him by tbe officials of the State Deparbaent, who did not 
understand, and of course did not want honestly to out, the 
substance of this qtlestion, 
flight there and then, three years ago, this base falsification of 
Mr. Austin was exposed. Right there and then the tat was re- 
stored to its original form and it was proved that the tactics wbicb 
"Left-Wing" Commnnitn, an Ittfmtile Disordw recommends 
the advand represenlativm of wo&ers' p t k s  to mpIoy have in 
view the circumstances when in the struggle against the labor 
movement "thwe gentlemen, the 'leaders' of oppo W s m ,  wiI1 
resort to wery trick of bourgeois diplomacy, to the aid of bour- 
geois governments, the priests, the police and the courts, in order . . . to insult> bait, and persecute" advanced representatives of the 
working claw. 
It is pointed out in the corresponding place in "'kft-Wing" 
Comm~~nism, rm Infmiile Disordw that it is necessary 'hot tn 
feu  diffidties, not to fear the pinprih, chicanery, insults and 
persecution by the 'leaders' (who, being opporhmista md social- 
c h 8 u v ~ ,  are, in most cases, directly or indirdy connected 
with the bourgeoisie and the police) . . ." (M. Moch, pay atten- 
tion - with the police.) 
This is what is taught by hhmh-Leninism - this great 
doctrine, this great invincible banner of the working class, of all 
working mankind. 
It should bc recalled that methods of falsifying quotations 
were m r t e d  to in I948 by Austin, McNeil and their friends, in 
order, in addition to eveqthing else, to divert the attention of 
pubIic opinion from tbeir fabrications and specifralIy from the fab- 
rication known as "Protocol M," which was needed in order to give 
the American and British ompation authorities in Western Ger- 
many the pretext for raining down repressions on the democratic 
organizations of Western Germany, going so far as to prohibit the 
People's Congress, intensify the pressure on trade unions, and 
so on. 
Thiee years ago Austin gave currency to his falsification out of 
sympathy for the M weighing down the German and French 
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I police. This year the former French Minister of the Interior, M. Jules Moch, tried to employ this same tri& evidently prompted by similar aspirations and motives - to support the police meas- ures against advand representatives of the working class in his country. My colleague, chairman of the Polish delegation, Werblowski 
restoring the truth, bas already given Jules Moch a lesson in hand- 
ling quotations, advising him to md more closely the sources from 
which be takes quotations. But this perhaps is a diffi lt  task for 
M. Mach for he evidently in general prefers to use secondhand 
quotations, not king in the least disturbed by the fact that these 
quotations are presented in a distorted and faIs3ed way. 
With such tmtment of facts and documents it is, of course, 
impossible for the discussion to yield any kind of fruitful results. 
It is characteristic that M. Mmh said nothing else, if one omits his 
statement to the effect tbat the United States, Britain and Fxance 
could elf& a reduction of armaments - he used the word - 
"disarmament," which does not at all correspond to the propais 
contained in the draft resolution of the "Three" - only if full 
gua~antees of sincerity were submitted. What these guarantees 
should consist of M. Moth did not take the pains to state. 
Notwithstanding the fact that M. Moch spoke on behalf of the 
Three - the United States, Great Britain and France - represen- 
tatives of the United States and Great Britain have taken the flwr 
after him and each me of them has also spoken on khalf of the 
Three. 
In his speech the United States representative, Mr. Jessup, has 
repeated the attempt to give assurance of the striving of the 
United States to lessen the tension in international relations and, 
as he put it, to advance along a peaceful path of negotiations. 
It is not the first time that we have heard statements by the 
delegations of the United State, Great Britain and France about 
the readinesg &egedIy to reach agreement with the Soviet Union 
and assurances of the dmire to lower the temperatwe of the politi- 
cal atmosphere. We have already pointed to the peculiar division 
of labor in the camp of the A h t i c  bloc. On the one hand the 
representatives of this bloc at the AssembIy do not spare words 
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e!.out peace and coopetation, the need to relieve the tension in 
international relations, disappointment with the a+d unyield- 
ingness of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, just as r e s p -  
sible, and sometima even more responsible, representatives of the 
countties of this bloc d e k  hcendiary, bllirose speeches, up to 
the p i n t  of directly d i n g  for an attack on the Soviet Unian and 
the PeopIe's Democracies. No one here will dare to deny thcse 
facts. The entire world is confronted with these facts, and let 
myone try to deny these facts. 
I 
While here in the First Committee Mr. Jessup ddivered his1 
pious speech about peace and cooperation, another United States 
representative, the well-known John Foster DulIes, adviser of the1 
State Deprbne~t and one of the main moving spirits of Amerimo ' 
foreign policy, on his part made a spcech of a directly opposite 
nature at the annual dinner of the Advertising Council in Detroit. 
The New Yurk H ~ d d  Tribrme reports that in this speech DuIles) 
called for the ueation of a striking force of great power diitrib- 
uted in canvwimt places along the Soviet perimeter which, ac- 
cording to DulIes, is more essential than defensive forces for 
everg nation allegedly threatened by Russia, In this speech Dune 
d e c W  that next year the United 8 a t ~  would spend k t  60
bilIioa doUars on mmwmnt.. He added: ' W e  dare not consider 
that this present effort wdI do the job once arid for dl or that 
we an predetermine the year of greatest danger. The p a r  af 
g e t  danger will be the year we relax. W e  s h d  have to fmd 
a $icy that can be sustained for many years without relaxing." 
To relax means to halt the armaments drive; it means to re- 
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d m ,  to cut - if not altogether to discontinue - the pqration 
for another war. Xt is this relaxing that, according to Mr. Dull- 
represents the greatest danger. 
Mr. Jessup said it was necessary to compare the speech of the 
Secretary of State Mr. Achmn with the speech of the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs of the USSR Vyshinskg both in substance and 
in spirit to pe&e the aspirations of both sides. But would it 
not be better to cumpare Mr. Jessup's speech with the speech of 
John Foster Dull= to perceive the real direction of the foreign 
pole of the United States, to perceive where the reactionary 
form in the United States are d y  driving mattus, what they 
are d n g  upon? At last Mr. Dulles has decided to admit o@y 
that the United Skates, which heads the aggressive Atlantic bloc, 
is preparing not for defense, but for attadc, that a strilung force 
of great power distributed in convenient places along the perim- r
eta of the USSR is bang (rested and that this is mote important 
and essedal than defensive forces. Is it not clear that Mr. Ddcs 
has at Iast dotted the i's, giving fresh proof of the aggressive nature 
of the fmign pohq of the United States? 
Can this fact be ignored while listening to the h@ speeches 
I 
of the Amerian representatives at the Assembly? And d m  the 
reveldon of Dde, &cia1 representative of the Stake Depart- 
ment, mean anytbiag, is it not worthy of notice and does it not 
cause the necessity of being wen more on tbe alert after these 
speeches than was necessarg More? 
If our speeches are ta be compared for their "substance and 
spirit,'? tbea while making this comparison it is absolutely neces- 
sary to add to the speeches of Acheson and jessup the speech of 
We, who in the same s p c h  has also j d e d  the u n p l -  
ldled violation of international: law and international agreements 
cornmined by the American Congress when it adopt& the Mutual 
Semi9 Ast of October 10, 1951, with Kernten's ameodrraent ap- 
propriating 100 million dollars for financing the subversive and 
terrorist activity of its agents against the USSR and the People's 
D e m o c r ~ .  * * * *  
THE United Stahs reprrwntrtive Mr. Jerrup bas attempted m 
adduce some arguments in support of the draft of the Three. 
H e  has undeaaken this to prove that the Governments of the 
United States, Great Britain and Frmm proposed to the repre- 
sentative of the Soviet Unioa here in Paris that the four Foreign 
Ministea meet and discuss questiaas which could facilitate the 
relieving of i n t d a n d  tension. Mr: Jasup said here that t h y  
proposed that the agenda of such a meeting include an item under 
the heading: Existing Ievefs of armunents and armed fo- and 
the measures to k adopted jointly by the USSR, the United State, 
Great Britain and France for the internatid control and re- 
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duction of armed forces and amments. Jessup said that the meet- 
ing was not held and that the three Powers - France, the United 
Stater, and Great Britain - decided to devote their efforts to pre- 
paring a sound, progressive, as he said here, proposal for disama- 
merit to be submitted for the considedon of the General AS- 
sembly. 
Mr. Jessnp's memory, however, is failing him. It was not the 
representative of the United States but the representative of the , USSR at the Conference of Deputy Foreign Ministers in Paris 
who proposed to include on the agenda the question of the im- 
mediate mmtnencement of the reduction of armed forces of thc 
four Powers: the USSR, the United States, Great Britain d 
France. As fox the representative of the United States, incident- 
dy, this was the very same Mr. Jessup, he came out with objec- 
tions to including this item on the agenda. And the United States 
delegate, supported by tbe ~epresentatives of Great Britain and 
France, adhered to this stand until the very end of the codereace 
of Deputy Foreign Ministers. 
We may be told that the question of the reduction of arma- 
ments demanded the preliminary dution of the question of the 
level of armed forces. But the precise point is that by insisting 
on discussiag the level of amed forces the representatives of the 
United States, Great BriWia and France thus tried to e d e  the 
qucstion of the reduction of armed farces. 
Why, it is not fortuitous that at one meeting of the Deputy 
Foreign Ministers Conference in Paris the French representative 
Pam& said that the French Government considers it necessary to 
aert certain efforrr if9 the sphere of amamenlr and pese ly  for 
thir redon France could not agree to the draft ageada containing 
a formulation about the reduction of armed forces of the four 
Powers. 
The representatives of the United States and Great Britain 
adhered to a similar stand and they categoricauy rejected 
the proposal of the Soviet Union to include on the agenda the 
question of the reduction of armaments and armed forces, 
inchding the armaments and armed forces of the USSR, the 
United States, Great Britain and France. The representatives 
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I of these three Powers stubbornly insisted on including, instead 
i of this, an item sbout the existing level of armaments. It is sufficient to ponder over this formulation to become 
convinced how far from the truth is Mr. Jessup's allegation 
that at the conference held in Paris from March to June 1951 
the Deputy Foreign Ministers of the United States, France and 
Great Britain proposed to d i m s  the question of the reduc- 
tion of armed forces. No, they did not propose this. The repre- 
sentative of Gxeat Britain, Davies, defending the formulation 
of the 'Three" concerning the level of armed forces, stated 
that it was still not known in which direction the question of 
armaments should be solved: in the direction of their reduc- 
tion or, on the contrary, of their increase. Even at that time 
Davies already explained that the control mentioned in the 
proposals of the three Powers should be understood not as 
control over the reduction of armaments but as control over 
their lerei. 
Compare, on the one band. these two pronouncements of 
Mr. Davies; on the other hand, compare the statements made 
by Davies with the pronouncement of Parodi, who at that 
time represented France at that conference, and you will see 
what this formula-the question of the existing levd of armed 
forceemeans and whether it resembles the proposal for the 
reduction of armed forces. 
I will say to this d i d y :  it does not resernbie it because, 
as we shall further see, the "leveI of armed forces" i s  not a 
"reduction of armed forces," This level may mean, as Mr. 
Davies said at that time, either an increase or o reduction, 
and far tbis reason he objected to including on the agenda 
the question of the reduction of armaments. 
This is the history which is now king repeated bere. This 
is w h t  Mr. Acheson said. These are two sides of one and the 
m e  coin: the armaments which they are taking up in Rome 
and the "disarmament," to use their language, which they are 
taking up in Paris. They want to reconcile these two tasks. 
But, gentlemen, we are sufficientIy experienced political lead- 
ers to understand that these two tasks are irreconcihble, that 
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only an impasse can be created by tying simultansowIp to 
arm with one hand and "to disarm" with the other hand. I 
. Now Mr. Jessup states that the d ~ f t  redution of the 'Three" 
about the so-called arms reduction is a continuation of the line 
pursued by the United States, Great Britain and France at the 
Paris Confemce of Deputp.Poreign Ministen. This is indeed 
the case, but this means that the present draft of the resoIu- 
tian of the "Three" is just as far removed from the task oE 
reducing armaments and anned forces as the stand the three 
Powers took at the Faris Conference of Deputy Foreign 
Ministers. And there this stand meant: no talk whatever or, 
if you wish, nothing but talk about arms reduction, but no 
reduction of armaments whatever; it is necessary, they said, 
first to determine the level of armed forces, and only then 
would it be clear whether to reduce arms or to arm. 
But judging from everything tbat Mr, Jmup said fuaher 
on about the telative size of armed forces and armaments of 
the Soviet Union--of which I shall speak further--there 
could be no talk whatever about a reduction ~f armaments 
because the American, British and French delegations and 
those suppoxting thm are now making every effort to prove 
tbat the existing lwel of armaments is such that if anyone 
should reduce armed fa- and armammb, it should be only 
the Soviet Union. 
ConsequentIy they already say in advance that they will 
not reduce anything. A11 the more, they will not reduce by 
om-third. 
1 shall dweil more on this aspect of the matter further on 
but will now limit myself to what I have said, bdieviag that 
this is quite sufficient to re-establish the real state of d i r s  
and show the banlrrupty of the statemats made by the United 
States delegate hi at the Paris Conference the United States, 
Great Britain and Prance aUegedly defended the need for 
reducing armaments and armed forces. They not only did not 
defend such a need but fought against the recognition of such 
a need. They wouId not agree to include such an item on the 
' agenda of the Foreign Ministers Council for which the four 
deputy ministers were to prepare an appropriate agenda. 
Therefme Mr. Jessup's statement regarding the Confamce 
. of Deputy Foreign Ministers k sePiwsIy at variance with the 
truth. just as far removed f ~ a m  the truth are Mr. Jessup's 
as well as Mr. Lloyd's disquisitions an a number of other 
questions: on the size of the armed forces of tbe USSR and 
the United States, aggre&on in Korea, pxoposd for the pro- 
hibition of atomic weapons, on the Information Bureau, and 
so on and so fotih. 
Everything that has been said here by Messrs. Jessup and 
Lloyd on the above questions can o d y  be explained by their 
desire to divert attention from the principal important issues 
demadng serious attention and to draw us into a discussion 
of those questions which have no direct relation to the matter 
and aan only complicate the situation ia our committee and 
heat up the poIitical atmosphere, as has been said here. 
1 do not consider it necessary to dwell on all these questions 
but will touch only on some. First of dl 1 shd deal with &. 
Lloyd's allegation that the Soviet Union has not introduced a 
single constructive proposal on the question of aid to under- 
developed countries. In this connection I should like to recall, 
for inslance, the fact that at the previous session of the Gen- 
eral Assembly, during the discussion of the 20-year program 
for attaining peace through the United Nations, the delega- 
tion of the USSR submitted a petfectry constructive proposal 
that in the further elaboratioh of this program provision be 
made: "To render t d m i d  aid to ecwrcdcally backwaxd 
countries, if not exdusiveIy, then at least mainly, through the 
United Nations. In doing so, to proceed from the fact that 
such aid must be directed toward promoting the development 
of the internal xesources of the economically W a r d  
countries, of their national industry and agriculture, toward 
strengthening their economic independence. and should not 
tx d e  conditiond upon demands for politid, economic or 
military privileges for the countries rendering such Jd." 
It should be added that the delegation of Great Britain 
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voted against this proposal. And this notwithstanding the fact 
that an analogous proposal submitted on the initiative of the 
Soviet Union was adopted by the Economic and Social fiuncil 
in 1949. Moreover, last year the Soviet Union also submitted 
a proposal that the General Assembly recognize that the dcvel- 
oprnent of international trade must be effected without dis- 
crimination, on the basis of equafrty and respxt for the 
souereiguty of all countries aad without interference in the 
internal affairs of other states. 
It was no one else but Younger, then representing Great 
Britain, who declared that this proposal of ours was "Soviet 
propaganda." Moreover, Younger stated that the British dele- 
gation, perceiving insincerity behind the inte~tioas of the 
USSR in this proposal, wouId vote against it. The British 
delegation did vote against this proposd. 
Mr. Lloyd preferred to keep silent about all this. But this 
is exactly how matters stood. It turns out that the Soviet 
delegation introduces constructive proposah of which Mr. 
Lloyd speaks, and the British delegation rejects them. 
The h v e  proposals dearly express our policy. Great 
Britain's policy is dearly expressed in her attitude toward these 
proposals, as well as in the well-known way in which British 
monopolies treat underdeveloped countries and ia the ~ t i v -  
ities of such monopolies as, for example, the Anglo-Iranian 
Oil Company. This is how matters stand, Mr. Uoyd, as regards 
construcfive proposals. 
As for the participation or don-participation of the USSR 
in various internationa1 organizations of which Mr. Uoyd has 
likewise spoken, first of all it is necessary to consider what 
these organizations represent. There is, for example, tbe 
International Refuge Organization. lnsteud of facilitating 
the repatriation of refuges, this organization has become an 
office for hiring and supplying plantation owners with cheap 
contracted labor, for reuuiting traitors as memaaria and 
organizing armed groups for subversive activity and & t a p  
within the USSR and the People's Democracies. It is for the 
cncouragetnen t of this criminal activity, for direct partiup- 
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tion, 1 wodd say, in this criminal activity that the United 
States has now decided to appropriate lW million dollars. 
As for the international trade orpoitation, at the Fifth 
Session of the General Assembly we already stated that the 
Charter of this organization does not correspond to the 
interests of many countries and that if the necessary amend- 
ments were introduced into the Charter the USSR might be 
able to join it. This statement, however, has bad no effect so 
far. The USSR takes an active part in international organiza- 
tions that are meritorio-for example in the World MeteoroIog- 
ical Organization, the Universal Postd Union and others. 
This seems su5dent to reveal the reverse side of the state- 
ments made here Iast time by Mr. Lloyd. 
I wodd abo like to dwell on the statement of Mr. Jessup 
regarding the armed forces of the Soviet Union and the 
United States. 
Mr. Jessup spoke here at length about the atmd forces of 
the USSR and countries friendly to the USSR. He tried to 
compare the numericat strength of the armed forces of the 
USSR and the United States, stating in particular that the 
armed forces of the United States did not exceed l,joo,ooO 
men by 1950. In doing so Jessup however preferred to keep 
silent about the fact that in his April message to Gngiess 
the President of the United States had already pointed out 
tbat in the past 10 months the United States had more than 
doubled its armid forces and that they would be brought up 
to 3,500,000 men, not counting the 2,000,000 men in different 
military reserve formations and national guard units, and this 
without the armed forces of Great Britain. France, Italy and 
other countries which are members of the Atlantic bloc. 
Turkey alone, it seems, is preparing to put up an army of 
400,000 men if she is at let finally accepted by the Atlantic 
bloc. If all these numbers are added up, if account is taken 
of the American and British navies, the American miIitary 
bases, the American stocks of atom bombs accumulated during 
these years under cover of talks about internationa1 control, 
it should become dear to anyone chat Jessup's arithmetical 
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operation does not in reality correspond to tkre figures whic 
he manipulated. As for the numerical strength of the arm 
forces of the Soviet Union, as 1 k v e  already pointed out i 
my speech at the General Assembly, it is half of the numerica 
strength of the armed forces of the United Sttes, Grea 
Britain and France. 1 
If you want to know exactly, please sign the agreement 
which we propose for the reduction of armaments and armed 
forceq probibition of the atomic weapon and c9tablisbmeat 
of international control+nd we will lay all the figures on the 
table, even to the last machine gun, to the last soIdier, and 
then you will see what our armed forces are like and whether 
your judgment is right, Now, however, it is too early to s p d  
of this for two reasons: firstly, because you dispIay a remarkable 
knowledge of our armed force-the result of the work by 
the representatives of these countries in the Soviet Union in 
the dipIomatic sphere-and secondly, you maintain that this 
preeiseIp corresponds to the fact. Hence the task is solved. 
We do not want to disappoint you one way or moeher. 
And 50 let us sign the agreement right here at this very 
same table; let us sit down and lay on the table, we, all our 
figures; and you, your figures. 
And in face of such facts we are told here that the proposal 
of the USSR for reduction of the armed forces af the five 
Gxcat Powers by one-third will allegedly create some kind of 
an advantage for the Soviet Union, and objections are raised 
against this proposal. But what do they put up against our 
proposal? This can be seen from the third point of the draft 
resolution of the "Three." They propose: 
1. To instruct the commision to draw up proposals which 
wil l  be incorporated in the draft treaty on the balancd reduc- 
tion of all armed forces and armaments. 
2. This reduction of armed forces and umaments should be 
brought to a level sufficient for defense. 
3. The system of this *'disarmamenti* should include pro- 
gressive disclosure and verification on a continuing basis, 
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covering dl types of armaments, including also the atomic 
weapon. 
4. The verification should be h t d  on e k t i v e  internatiod 
inspectio~ 
5. As regards the atomic weapon, they again put forth the 
Baruch plan, which allegedly envisages the estal " ' t of 
international control over atomic energy and allegedly can 
ensure the prohibition of the atomic weapon. 
It should be noted that the main point in these proposals 
is the establishment of the level sufficient for defense and the 
so-died progressive disclosure and verification, or, as Mr. 
Achaon said, "disdamm and veribation by stages." 
As for the "level of the armed forces" tbis is an old acquain- 
tance of ours. This is that very same lwei of m e d  forces 
which was so d o u s l y  advocated at the Paris Conference of 
Foreign Ministers by the representatives of the United 
States, Great Britain and Frarrcc, who counterpoised the level of 
armaments and armed foxces to the reduction of armaments and 
axued forres. 
Here again the question arises as to what is to serve as r 
criterion for establishing this level, Mr. Acheson tried to 
give an answer to this question. But, honestly speaking, he 
could not produce any sort of a serious and comprehensible 
answer. He said, for example, that a "great country has r 
great many people and therefore can d o r d  and will have a 
greater army than mother country." But right there and then 
he added h a t  stU it would be necessary to impose - I am cit- 
ing Mr. Acheson - a %at limitation kyond wbich no country 
is permitted to go no matter bow great it is, irrespeclive of 
wbat it can do, irrespective of how vast, according to its 
words-this remark of Mr. Acheson is very strang+its terri- 
tory is, how numerow its popuhon is and how many pmb- 
h it has. So wbat do we get? It is p r o w  to establish as 
a criterion a level depending on the size of the county, its 
population, and so on, but it is said, nevertheless, that no 
matter how big the country is, we wiIl limit it to a attain 
n&r which evidently will not be in proportion either to its 
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area, length of frontiers, size of its population ar other 
politica1 conditions which. for example, consist of whether it 
. is separated from other countries by an ocean 3,000 miles 
wide, whether its immediate neighlmrs are friendly or, on the 
contrary, hostile states, and so an and so forth. Irrespective 
of rlI this-although this country is larger, although all 
factors requiring tbat it k given a bigger army are on hand 
-we wit1 not give it a bigger army; we will limit it. 
It is dear tbat with such a reservation concerning strict 
limibtion, the entire meaning of this so-called criterion is 
lost* the entire meaning of defining the lore1 of the armed 
forces of which the draft resolution of the "Thee" speaks is 
last. But no less important is the fact that the very definition 
of the level of the armed forces suficient for defense, accord- 
ing to the draft of the 'Three," sh~1~1d be assigned to the 
commission which will itseIf have the right to decide whether 
the given number of armed forces is needed or not by m e  
state or another for its defense. It means that for the defense 
of my State someone else, wt reckoning with us, with our 
demands, opinion and position, will define the number of 
the armed forces which we wiI1 be graciously permitted to 
have. Of course, irrespective of how this matter will be te- 
garded by the country concerned, this commission will simply 
tell each state what quantity of armaments and what armed 
forces it is d o w d  to have and what resources it can use for 
these purposes. And this Mr. Acheson called in his speech 
"a mutually agreed upon program." 
Can this entire scheme of defining the Ievel of the armed 
forces sufficient for defense be comiderd redly serious, 
especially if account is taken of the fact that the commission 
itself and all its measures have to be carried out io conformity 
with the well-known Acheson-Baruch plan, according to 
which the so-called inkmational control agency can only be, 
and will be, nothing more than an American control agency, 
that is, an agency whose petsoanel will consist of people able 
to carry through the fine of the United States in settling a11 
questions of foreign policy? 
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As for "progressive disclosure and 'verification" or "reveab 
ing and d c a t i o n  by s t a p , "  to use Acheson's terminology, 
I will merely say that this measure barrow& from the 
Baruch plan caanot facilitate the solution of the task. 
Even in the American press sober voices are heaid warning 
against such a method of so-called reduction of armaments 
and armed forces. Attention is drawn to the fact that the 
principle of a census of armaments by stag& was one of the 
biggest obstacles to attaining control over atomic energy. 
And this is true; similarly true also is the remark of certain 
organs of the American press that because this psinupie was 
politically unfeasible from the very outset, it has became an 
anachronism. After the Ameritan monopoly of the atomic 
weapon was destroyed, after Russia made the first expiosioo 
of the atom bomb, it should have become dear that the Russians 
already had the necessary information. For this and for other 
weighty reasons the principIe of stages sbodd have been 
h d o n e d ,  the American press states, 
"The system af stages" is a dead formula. 
But the authors of the draft resoIution of the "Three" con- 
tinue to insist on their dead formuks, although they try to 
present them as the very latest method for solving questions 
that interest us. This method borrowed from the Baruch plan 
is not only old but also unsuitable, and herein Iies i ts main 
shortcoming. This shortcoming fatally stamps the entire draft 
resoIution of the "Three," from which these "stages" or this 
"progressive disdosure" should be eliminated. 
Mr. Lloyd tries to prove that the so-called United Nations 
plan, or more correctly speaking, the Acheson-Baruch-Lilien- 
thal plan, envisages prohibition of the atomic weapon. 
Wherein does he perceive such a prohibition? Let us look 
at the draft resolution of h e  "Three." In the &aft resolution 
this m a t h  is mentioaed thm times - in the preamble, point 
3A and in point 3D. The preamble merely contains a reference 
to effective international control over atomic energy to ensure 
the prohibition of atomic weapons and the utilization of 
atomic energy exdusively far peaceful purposes. Thus this is 
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a mere statement of the aim to lx kept in mind when drawing 
up the plans outlined in the preamble. But to point out the 
aim, such as the prohibition of atomic weapons, does not 
yet mean prohibiting atomic weapons. Therefore the preamble 
consists of empty words binding no one to do anything. It 
merely states the aim, the task--to probibit--but it is not 
prohibition at all. Therefore the actuaI prohibition is being 
put off. It is not declared at all. We are not king msked 
to adopt s decision prohibiting the atomic w e a p  now. And this 
is where it differs from our proposds, for we p r o p  dearly and 
simply that a decision to prohibit atomic weapons and establish 
international control be adopted right now, right here, at this 
session of he General Assembly. And the praclicd naeasures 
should be set forth in the convention to be drawn up by February 
1, 1952, and so on and so forth. 
Thete is a big difference between the two fomdations of the 
question. 
Therefore, a11 we have in the preamble is the stutemmf of tbe 
aim which shouM be kept in mind whik drawing up the plans 
mentioned in the preamble, but we do not have the prohibition of 
atomic weapons. 
Point 3A instructs the disarmament commission to draw up pro- 
posals which will be incorporated in the draft treaty on the regu- 
lation, iimitation and b c e d  reduction of all armed forces and 
dl arrnamente. Further on it mentions the principles by which the 
commission sbodd be guided, and these indude the principles 
requiring the atablishmeat of effective international control en- 
suring the probibition of atomic weapons. Point 3D indicates 
that in formulating the propals for the above-mentioned treaty, 
the United Nations plan for control over atomic energy, i.e., the 
previously mentioned Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan, should be 
t h  as a basis. 
And we are being told that all this stands for the prohibition 
of the atomic weapon although, of course, it is perfdy clear to 
everyone that the prohibition of the atomic weapon Is not in ques- 
tion at all. 
It is impossibIe for anyone who is truthful and unbiased to 
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deny that not a single one of the above-enumerated items contains 
a p m p d  which d d  be regarded as a declaration of the prohibi- 
tion of atomic weapons, at probibision of atorplir weapons, 
Unable to oppose anything to the indisputable fact that the 
draft resolution of the "Thre*' d m  not contain prohibition of 
the atomic weapon, provided one does not confuse km, acour- 
agement, desire, instruction to draw up a proposal for the prohibi- 
tion of atomic weapons with d probibilion of atomic weapons, 
Lloyd, spe.&mg of our pr+, tries to depict the matter as if 
we want every state to declare that it will discontinue the manu- 
facture of atomic bombs and destroy those already rnanufactud, 
and he adds that the Swiet Union evidently hoIds that in this man- 
ner prohibition will be achieved. 
But where did Mr. Lloyd get all this, we would Like to ask. 
on what basis d m  he attribute lo the Soviet Union sorrPething 
we never said? On what basis does he do this when he has 
before him our amendments and, in particular, our amend- 
ment to the Erst poht of the operative part of the three-power 
draft which contains nothing resembling what Mr. Lloyd 
a d k s  to us here? 
I am, therefore, compelled to call to mind tbe text of our 
proposal on this matter hoping that you will immediately 
perceive the enormous difference between Lloyd's statement 
and ours. 
Here is the text of our propowl: 
"The General Assembly, recognizing the use of the atomic 
weapon as a weapon of aggression and mass annihilation of 
people to be cantrary to the conscience and honor of the 
peoples and incompatible with membmship in the United 
Nations, declares the unconditional prohibition of the atomic 
weapon and the establishment of strict international control 
over the implementation of this prohibition." 
This is far removed from what Mr. Lloyd said here. It is 
not each state which proclaims something or other, but the 
Assembly which does the proclaiming. And it does not proclaim 
that we wiIl no longer manufacture bombs and destroy those 
already manufactured, but something entirely different. And 
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that there may be no- doubt that the matter is not so simple 
as perhaps Mr. Lloyd would have liked to depict it when he 
spoke of wr propals,  I wilt cite the second paragraph of this 
proposal : 
"Tbe General AssembIy instructs the Atomic Energy and 
ConventionaI Armaments Commission to prepare and submit 
by February 1, 1952 for consideration of the Security Council 
a draft convention envisaging measures that ensure fulfillment 
of the decisions of the General AswmbIy on the prohibition 
of the atomic weapon, discontinuation of its production and 
the utilization solely for civilian purposes of atom bombs 
already produced, and on the establishment of strict inter- 
national: control over the implementation of the above con- 
vention." 
This is our proposal and it does not in the least resemble 
what Mr. Lloyd, faIsifying our proposd, said here-may he 
forgive me for the frank expression-falsifying. 
And we submit this as the first point of the draft resolution. 
Of course, it is passibIe to say: "We will not accept it." But then 
it is necessary to say: "We do not desire to prohibit the atomic 
weapon." Or it is possible to say : 'We want to prohibit the atomic 
weapon." But in that case why not accept our proposal 7 Without 
equivmtion, without ambiguity, without reservations! 
Just think how the whole world will m a  if we leave this hall 
at some moment -claiming: "The atomic Bomb hnr  bee^ PoAib- 
ited!" 
Do you want this? Then say so. 
you wilI not say so? Then that meam you do not want it. 
There can be no two positions here, and reconciliation between 
these two opposite stands is also impossible. And no verbal eva- 
sions, no legal subterfuges will help anyone hide the truth from 
the anxious eyes of the millions upon millions of people through- 
out the world who desperately long to hear the sacred words 
emerge from t h e  walls announcing the prohibition of the atom 
bomb, the unconditional prohibition of the atom bomb, datruc- 
tion of all atom bombs, establishment of cankrol, drawing up of a 
convention where aH this is said, and, after the convention shall. 
haw b m  signed, the immediate verification of aU atomic estab- 
lishments, as we propose. 
This is our pro@ and of course Mr. Lloyd has read it. All 
the more surprising that he set forth our p r o p d  in such a dis- 
torted form. Indeed, is Lloyd's e r t i o n  true tbat according to 
our pioposaI it is sfideat for every state to announce that it is 
discontinuing the manufacture of the atomic weapon wbm our 
pmposal clearly says that the Gened Assembly d d a m  the pro- 
hibition of the atomic weapon and the establishmeot of strict 
international control? Does Mr. Uoyd not understand that our 
proposal does not testrict itself merely to a decision of the Genera1 
Assembly announcing the unconditional prohibition of the atomic 
weapon and the establishment of international control, moreover 
strict international control at that? Does he not see, reading the 
text of our proposal, that under it the Atomic Energy and Con- 
ventional Armaments Commission must prepare and submit by 
February 1, 1952 a draft convention envisaging measures that 
ensure he implementation of the General Assembly's decisions 
to prohibit the atomic weapon, to &abM international control 
and a number of other measures indicated in the second paragraph 
of our proposd quoted ahove? 
, Thus Mr. Lloyd imputes to us what we do not propose, repre- 
senting it as our so-ded proposal, and he keeps silent about what 
we really propose. 
In rdi tg ,  3 repeat, we propose that the General Assembly de- 
dare the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weapon, that 
m appropriate convention be drawn up, that this convention en- 
visage measures ensuring the observance of the General Assem- 
bly's decisims on the prohibition of the atomic weapon, measures 
for the discontinuation of the production of atom bombs, utiliza- 
tion solely for civilian purposes of atom b d s  already produced 
and measures far the establishment of stria international contd 
over the implementation of this convention. 
And we are toid: Every state announces that 'it is discontinuing 
the manufacture of atom bombs and destroying those already 
manufadud, and it is thus that prohibition of the atomic weapon 
will be achieved. This is a oricatu re. This is a farce. But we are 
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not in the mood for farces or for jokes. W e  want to discuss s d -  
ousiy a serious matter and to make serious decisions. * * * *  
1 m u  p d  to Mr. Lloyd's replies to our questiw : 
1. We asked the authors of the resolution of the "Three" 
if tbey agree that the General Assembly should instruct the 
Atomi~ Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to 
prepare and submit to the Security Council by a definite date-- 
wegnarned the date-February 1, 1952--a draft convention 
envisaging the unconditionil prohibition of the atomic weapon 
and the estabIishmmt of strict international control over the 
implemenbtion of this prohibition. 
Instead of replying to this question Lloyd declared that the 
draft resoIution of the "Three" envisages that the commission 
should draw up proposals for the draft treaty or treaties on 
the given matter, as he expressed it, on the basis of the United 
Nations plan, more correctly speaking, on the basis of the 
Acheson-Baruch-tilienthal plan. But it is known that this 
plan does not envisage prohibition of the atomic weapon, just 
as it does not envisage strict international conkrol, of which 
we spoke above. 
Thus, by taking the Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthd plan for a 
basis, Woyd and his colleagues in the draft resolution of the 
"Three" refuse to make provision for the prohibition of the 
atomic weapon in the convention to lx completed by February 1, 
1952, Insisting that the Baruch plan for the atomic weapon be 
taken as the basis, Mr. Lloyd in substance rejects our pro- 
posal, being fully aware that the Baruch pian is unacceptable 
to us, and not only to us, but also to a number of other states; king 
fully aware that the Baruch plan does not provide for the 
probibition of the atomic wapon but postpones the settlement 
of this question to some later stage; knowing well tbat on this 
basis we cannot reach an agreement; also knowing we11 that 
the so-called international control agency envisaged in the 
Baruch plan has nothing in common with real international 
control. For this reason we have the right to state that the 
representatives of the three Powers, on whose behalf Mr. 
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Lloyd spoke h e r d r e a t  Britain, the United States and France 
A v c  given a negative answer to our second question. 
2. In his reply to our third question Mr. Lloyd maintains 
that the draft resolution of the "Three" goes farther than the 
proposals envisaged in the Soviet amendment, which speak 
of measures that ensure fulfillment of the decisions of the 
General Assembly on the prohibition of the atomic weapon. 
prohibition of its manufacture, utilization solely for civilian 
purposes of atom bombs aIready produced, and measures for 
establishing control over the implementation of the convention. 
Instcad of replying to our question Mr, Lloyd again refers 
to the Baruch plan, presenting matters as though this plan 
redy  provides for prohibition of the manufacture of atomic 
weapons and an effective international control. We have 
already pointed out that neither one nor the other is provided 
for in the Baruch phn. 
As for placing d l  atomic raw material and all facilities for 
its production under the authority of the so-called international 
contra1 agency, about which Mr. LIoyd spoke in his reply, 
this proposaI, as already pointed out in the past, is utterly 
unacceptable, &cruse all stocks of atomic raw material and 
iIl plants for the production of atomic energy, as weU as 
enterprises in allied industries-metallurgical, engineering, 
electric power, chemical, and so on and so forth-are to be 
placed under the authority of this so-called international: 
agency or in its possession, which, essentidly speaking, is what 
I is intended. This would mean Nrniag over m the so-called international control agency, which according to tbe schemes ' of the supporters of the Baruch plan shovld in substance be 
ad agency of the American manopoIists, all power over the 
economic Iife of each country which has atomic raw material 
and can produce atomic energy. 
3. Replying to our fourth question, Lloyd said that the 
three Powers agree that the General Assembly should recog- 
nize that any sincere plan for the substantial reduction of 
armed forces and armaments must include the establishment I .  57 
of an international control agency. He, however, has not 
directly replied :a the question put by us, asserting that 
whether the internatiana1 control agency is to be within the 
framework of the Security Council or not would depend on 
the terms of the agreement. He has explained that if the 
phrase "within the framework of the Security Council" is 
understood to mean that the 0perati~II of the system of contra1 
would be made fully dependent upon the so-called right of 
"veto," this would beyond doubt be unaccepbble to the Gov- 
ernments of the three Powers. 
Such a reply from Mr. Lloyd could only amuse extreme sur- 
prise. Indeed, Mr. Lloyd most likely k s  that in the resolu- 
tion d the General Assembly of December 14, 1946, adopted at 
the second part of the First Session of the General'AsdIy, i t  
was decided that the international control agency would operate 
within the fwneworh of tbe Secnrity Cogncii. 
Was this decided or not? It was decided. Is this recorded any. 
where? It is m r d e d .  Is this recorded in the decisions of the 
second part of the First Session of the General Assembly? It is 
recorded in the minutes, and you can read it. 
That is why Mr. Lloyd's remark as to whether this control 
agency wifl be within the framework of the Security Council or 
not proves hat the Governments of the United States, Great 
Britain and Fmce do not wish to take into consideration the 
decisions of the General Assembly for which they themselves 
voted in the past and which carry their signatures, If this ques- 
tion is already settIed--and it is already settled-why than raise 
this question? This can be done ody with one objective--to warn 
ia advance that it will not be taken into consideration. 
And this is already becoming a practice- There was, for 
exampk, a gentlemen's agreement regarding the dections to the 
Security Council, under which debite geographical areas nom- 
inated their candidates: the Latin American m~fltrieg nominated 
their candidate; countries of Eastern Europe, their candidate; 
and now the American representatives are nominating Greece 
instead of Byelomssia, and when they are reminded that thee was 
such a geatIemen's agreement, they allege that it was concluded 
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by another, as attempts to evade giving a direct reply to the 
question at i s s u e t  of the general reduction of umaments." 
We see that now, five 9- later, the same attempts are bemg 
repeated. I shall also calI to mind that at the Paris Session of 
the General Assembly in 1948 I too had to refer to this matter 
md to ddare that ". . . the question of the s tzcdd  'veto' Is 
altogether incorrectly interpreted in relation ta h e  work of the - 
intemationd control agency. Of course the right of 'veto' h l o n g ~  
to the security Guncir . . . 
"But this is a different matter and the poiat at issue hcrr is 
that no one, at Ieast as far as the Soviet Union is  concerned, 
ever proposed nor does anyone now propose the appfication of 
the right of teto'  in the work of the control agencies . . . ". . . We say clearly and explicitly: the internatiod conlrof 
agency must not have the right of 'veto,' the Security Council 
must have the 'veto' right. Therefore no one dares allege that 
we waut to include the right of 'veto' in the internationd control 
I,  agency. . . . 
In accordance with this priacipIed stand of the Soviet Union on 
the "veto" question, at the Third Session in 1948 the Soviet 
Union voted for the proposal submitted by the Polish delegation 
which said "that it wiU not be necessarg that all the represenMiws 
of the permanent member states of the Serurity Council vote 
aEmnatively when the international control agency adopts de- 
cisions with regard to verification and inspection on its part." 
This was a clear repIy to the question of the non-application 
of the "veto" in the international control agwq. But through 
the efforts of the delegations of the United States, Great Britain 
and France this proposal, was rejected. Evidently their p h  
excluded the adoption of a proposal fully clarifying the question 
of the voting procedure in the international control agency and 
underscoring the non-application in the fatter of the right of the 
so-called "veto." 
4. As to the question of whether the reprmtatives of the 
United States, Great Britain and France agree that immediately 
after the conclusion of the convention the international atomic 
weapon control agency shouId inspect d the enterprises for 
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the manufacture and storing of atomic weapns with rhe object 
of verifying the implementation of the canvention on the pro- 
hibition of the atomic weapon-Mr. Lloyd made no reply to this 
either. Instead of replying to this plain question, he preferred to 
state that inspection is needed. But this is another question. This 
, is not what we asked; we asked whether they would agree to 
1 inspeaion of a l l  the p h t s  for the mufacture and storing of the 
atomic weapon immediateiy after the codusion of a conventim. 
N o  answer was given to this question, 
Nor a n  one ignore the fact that Mr. Lloyd particularly 
stressed that inspection should k carried out in conformity with 
successive stages. In other words, the inspection of atomic piants 
wiil not be carried out immediately after the signing of the am- 
vention if matters do not Peach the stage assigned to the atomic 
weapon. Thus, it is dear from Mr. Lloyd's answer that the 
United States, Great Britain and France do not agree with our 
proposal for tbe immediate inspection of ah atomic plants as 
soon as the convention we propose is signed. 
5. lastly, it is necessary to turn to Mr. Lloyd's answer to our 
first question: "Do the United States, Great Britain and France 
agree that the General Assembly should declare the uneondi- 
tional prohibition of the atomic w e a p  and the establishmeat 
of strict international control over the impltmeotation of this 
prohibition ?" 
Mr. Lloyd, as we have heard, replied to this question by stating 
that the adoption by the General Assembly of a t r i m  draft 
resolution would constitute a clear declaration in favor of the 
unconditional prohi bition of the atomic weapon effected through 
strict international control. 
The draft resolution of the "Thee," which we all read and 
whose text we all know well, does not contain any deckation 
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by the General AssembIy of the unconditional prohibition of the 
atomic weapon and the establishment of strict intemational control 
over the implementation of this prohibition. Therefore, refer- 
to a tripartite draft resolution whose adoption, accordtng to Lloyd, 
would mnstitute a ddamtioa of tbe uncanditional prohibition 
of the atomic weapon effected through strict internatiod con- 
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t d  b not correspond to what the draft resolution of the 
"The" proposes. 
I t  is dear that this time, tm, Mr. Lloyd waded givmg a direct 
answer to our question. 
It is likewise dear that a dim3 answer to Our question is our 
pro* ta include in the draft resolution a point with the f d -  
Iowing content: 
"The General Assembly, recognizing the use of the atomic 
weapon as P weapon of aggression and mass annihilation of 
people to be contrary to the conscience and honor of the peoples 
and incornprlde with mernkrship in the United Nations, dedares 
the unconditional prohibition of the atomic weqmn and the 
establishment of strict internationd contra1 over the implementa- 
tion of this probibition. 
"The h e r d  Assnmbly instructs the Atomic Energy and Con- 
ventional Armm&b Commission to ptepare and submit by 
February 1, 1952 for the consideration of the Securig Council a 
draft coriventim envisa~ing measures that ensure fuhiUment of 
the decisions of the GeneraI Assembly on the prohibition of the 
atomic weapon, discontinuation of its praduction and h e  utilita- 
tion solely far civilian p"poses of atom bombs d r d y  produced 
and on the estabiishment of stria international control over the 
implementation of the above canvention." 
1 stress what I have d d y  said here, but I feel it necessary 
to r e p t  it because of the importance of this matter which con- 
cerns a weapon of aggression and mass annihilation of people. 
Here is a dearcut, precise, unequivocal, absdutelp definite and 
determined proposal for the genuine prohibition of the atomic 
weapon in the name of the Generai Assembly, 
Is it not evident that precisely this proposal is a perfectly dear 
and definite proposal for thc uaconditional prohibition of the 
atomic weapon, with all the ensuing consequences, and with the 
simdtmeaus establishment of international control to ensure 
the implementation of thia prohibition? 
S UCH is ow stand with regard to the repiies of Mr. Lloyd who spoke here on behalf of the three Powers and, comequently, 
oux stand with regard to the replies of the Governments of the 
United States, Great Britain and France. 
It follows from the h v e  that in its present form the three- 
power draft resolution does not pxovide the cond~rl~tls ntrrsyary 
for carrying out the task anfronting us-to prohibit the atomic 
weapon and reduce armaments and armed form and to establish 
f striA international control. From the h e  the mth the Soviet 
Union proposes for carrying wt. this task is J& evident. This 
path is h g h  the & i o n  of the above-mentioned serious 
shortcomings from the draft resolution submitted by the Gavern- 
m a t s  of the United Stakes, Great Britain and France; this path is 
through the idusion' of amendments in the draft that -wouId 
ensure the successful xcomplishment of the impomt  task 
rakd before the General Assembly of the prohibition of the 
atomic w a p  reduction of armaments and armed form and 
establishment of strict international control. 
The USSR delegation takes cognizance of the fact that the 
situation which has arisen with regard to this question is charac- 
terized by considerable divergenes in tbe position of the Soviet 
Union on the one hand, and that of the United States, Britain 
and France on the other. We are willing, howwer, to continue 
our efforts and to take part in the work of the p~posed suh- 
committee. The delegation of the Soviet Union is confident that 
the ameadments it has submitted can faciIitatt the successful 
accomplishment of the task confronting us for the good of the 
peoples who yeam for world peace. 
Speech in the Political Committee 
December 12, 1951 
Mr. President, Mars .  Delegates: 
I N the opinion of the delegation of the USSR the work of the Subcommittee has yielded certain positive results. It has 
h d p d  to establish precisely the stand of ehcb of the four detega- 
tions, to define more deatly their aspications and the aims they 
have set themselves, and it IWS eliminated certain differences, d- 
though these are of relatively minor importance. Nevertheless. 
the Soviet delegation holds tbat this is the strong aspea of the 
Subcommittee's work and that it would be incorrect not to mention 
this positive side of the Subcommittee's work, just as it would 
be q d y  incorrect to overestimate the i m p o b c e  of the work 
accomp1ished by the Subcommittee, inasmuch as, in substance, un- 
solved differences remained dividing the USSR, on the one hand, 
and the United States, Great Britain and Frmce, on the ather hand, 
on very important questions whose solution is expected of us - 
this may be said without fear of exaggeration - by the peoples oE 
the entire world. Herein lies the weak aspect of the work KCOM- 
p1ishd by h e  Subcommittee. But what the Subcommittee has 
been unable to do must be done by the Committee of Twelve, 
the Political Committee, the General A s d l y ,  the entire 
United Nations. 
Our paramount task consists preckdy in overcoming and 
eliminating the differences on major questions and, in any me, 
in raising these questions to their full stature, as merited by their 
knport and signifiance. That is why the Soviet delegation deems 
it necessa~ to dwell precisely on these questions without wing 
to cover everything that was under consideration by the Subcorn- 
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mitt% but believing itsdf h d  to speak about thing3 of prime 
importance. 
I W start with Paragraph 2 of the memorandum dealing 
with commm aims. The memorandum states that both the pro- 
posals-in question are the proposals outIincd in the draft m- 
lution of the three Swes, the United States, Great Britain and 
France, and the amendments of the Soviet delegatiwoincide 
with regard to wlain common aims which they strive to attain. 
As proof, the memorandum points out that the USSR delegation 
has agreed to the b t  paragraph of the preamble of the dmft 
resolution of the "Thee," which says that the Gmeral Assembly 
desires "to lift from the peoples of the world the burden of 
increasing armaments and the fear of war, and to liberate new 
energies and resources for positive programs of reconstmction 
and development." 
Subscribing to this formula, the Soviet Union has been fully 
aware of its significance, has been fully aware of the respoasibiIity 
placed on it by such an imporeant commitment as that indicated 
h v ~ o  lift from the peoples of the world the b d m  of increas- 
ing armaments and to liberate new energies and resources for p i -  
tive work of reconstruction and development. 
This is an important commitment. From this there must 
inevitably follow corresponding conc1usions pertaining aIso 
to the entire foreign policy of each s h k  accepting this form& 
The delegation of the USSR and - I am convinced of this - 
the defegations of aLt countries sincerely assuming this com- 
mitment and m d y  consistently and resoluteIy to implement it are 
confronted with a n d e r  of task which wodd facilitate the de- 
velopment of tbis noble aim set forth above and ensure the possi- 
bility of attaining it. 
There can be no contradiction between this aim and the 
metbods which would ensure its attainment. If contradiction 
arises here, this can only mean that the methods prove to be 
unsuitable for the attainment af the above aim and, conse- 
quentIy, other methods must k chosen. 
assuming the commitment of lifting from the peoples of 
the world the burden of increasing armaments and fear of war, 
65 
as it is stated in the fiat paragraph of the preamble of the M t  
molution of the 'Thee," one must ask wesdf: Haw can this 
b k  be carried out--the task of lifting from the peoples the 
burden of armaments. especially of increasing armaments? How 
can one lift from the peoples the fear of war? How can one 
liberate new energies and resources for the reconstruction and 
development of countries? NahualIy it also follows &at by leav- 
ing thae qucsliom unanswered or by giving ambiguous or, 
moreover, incorrect replies to these questions, matters cannot be 
advanced even one miIlirneter. 
But to give a c o r n  answer to the above question one must look 
xound oneself, see what is happening in the world, where arma- 
ments and tbe burdm rhv impose on peoples are growing more 
and more. What is this mused by? What causes are g i o i  rise 
ta these phenomena? And what meam can and must be empIqed 
for ehinating these phenomena? 
We s h d  not start now to present facts abundantly cited h e  
earlier which 6 c i e n t l y  wpIaia this question. W e  consider it 
necessay medy to tecaIl rhat the three Governments that sub- 
mitted their draft resolution have at their disposal sbsolulely no 
facts, no data, and consequently no grounds whatever thst could 
justify the attempts they are making to deny that they and their 
Atlantic bloc allies are engaged in their countries in a f m i e d  
armaments drive and, mareover, on a constmtIy increasing scale. 
Such a situation, of course, must inevitably p k e  a heavy b d n  
on the population of these countrits md so annot  f a d l i e  the 
easing of this burden to any degree. On the other hand, they do 
not have any facts, any data whatever, and, because of this. no 
grounds whatever, to present matters iu though such an amments 
drive is under way in the Swiet Union and in the countries friendly 
to it. Were it necessary again to refer to facts, many of them could 
be cited, for wm during the time which has passed since the 
kgirming of the Subcommittee's work and up to its conclusion 
and resumption of the work by the First Committee, many n m  
facts have accumulated which indisputably confirm the above 
assertions. 
I 
This d e s  it asy to d d d e  who can and who must b ~ a r  ! responshilitp for the situation that hiu arisen. 
1 The first paragraph of the p r d l e  is of great importance. T h e  
&st d u s i o n  which shwld be drawn from the statement it 
contains is the duty of taking effective measures for stopping 
the armaments drive, reducing armaments and armed f a c a ,  
prohibiting the atomic weapon, and establishing international 
contmI. Thereby the burden of armaments will be lifted from 
the peoples of the world. Thereby the peoples of the world will 
k rid of the danger or, as the preamble of the resolution of the 
three States xeads, from the fear of war. 
But are the three Governments which submitted the hft of 
their resolution oa this quation ready to carry this out in reality? 
With the same sincerity with which we have hitherto replied to 
tbis quwtioa in the Subcommittee, I must repeat this answer here 
as well: No, they are not ready. Thcse three Powers are not m d y  
to carry aut what they propose in the preamble, in the first 
paragraph of this preamble of the draft resolution of tlle "Three." 
This has been proved with special darity by the debates in the 
Subcommittee and the efforts which have been exerted by the 
representatives of the United States, Great Britain and Frmre 
to wade the need for settling this problem in a positive way, I 
am now coming to the differences on the most important prob- 
Iems which the Submmittee has not sucaeeded in eliminating 
for m o m  indicated by us earlier, for w n s  which I s h d  try 
to piesent later on. 
The first and most important question of the entire present 
problem is the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the estab- 
lisbment of an international control system. The Subcommittee 
has devoted much time and attention to this question, analyzing 
in detail the proposals of the Three and our proposals, but has 
not reached any agreement. 
Yesterday Mr. Lloyd made short shrift of this question very 
easily by reducing the entire matter to one paint* the question 
of simultane~18ly prohibiting the atomic weapon and. establish- 
ing an intematid control agency. This, of course, is an im- 
portant question, but when Mr. Lloyd, speaking on behalf of all  
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three ddegations, said nothing eist in arplanation of the attitude 
of these deIegations to this problem. he undoubtedly was not being 
loyal to the principle of objectivity which he praised here so much 
when discussing tbe Subcommittee's work. 
In reality this question has not one but a great many important 
"peas. 
The Soviet Union demands and insists that the General 
Assembly snake a decision declaring an unconditional ban on the 
atomic weapon and the establishment of strict international con- 
trol over the enforcement of this ban and that a draft convention 
be drawn up and submitted for the coasideration of the Security 
CounciI by February I, f 952, providing for measures to ensure 
the implementation of thii decision. This demand is contained 
in the amendments to Paragraphs 2 and 3 of tbe preamble and 
in Paragraph 3 of the amendments of the delegation of the USSR 
proposed for inclusion in the draft resolution of the Three. 
The Soviet Union proposes thar the AssembIy thus adopt two 
resolutiwls simultaneously or, more mrrdy, make two derisions 
in one res01ution: o-n the ban of the atomic w e a p  and 
the establishment of an internatiwd control agency, another411 
drafting a convention with practid measures for ensuring the 
implementation of the decision of the General Assembly relating 
to the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the establishment of 
str ict  international controt Not limiting itself to this, the Soviet 
Union demands that reduction of armaments and armed forces 
begin immediateIy and proposes two measures. 
First measure: a reduction of the armaments and armed forces 
of the five P0wers-h United States, Great Britain, France, 
China and the Soviet Union-by one-third within me year d 
the adoption of the respective decision, and smnd measure: 
convocation of a world conference of all states, both members 
and non-members of the United Nations, to examine the question 
of a substantial reduction of armed form and armaments and of 
practical measures for the prohibition of the atomic weapon md 
the establishment of international control over t!m enforcement 
of such a prohibition. 
Thus, according to the Soviet Union's proposal, three prob- 
lems must be d e d  ~h~~Jtdneu~( . r iy :  
1. The unconditimal ban on the atomic weapon and the estab- 
lishment of an hkmational control a m ;  
2. A reduction of armaments and armed forces d all the f i e  
Powers ; 
3. The convocation of r world conference for realizing the 
sameaimsintheoaseofallotherPowers. 
Tbat is why Mi. Lloyd was absolutely wrong yesterday in 
deging that the Soviet Union separates the two problems - 
the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of ama- 
ments and armed forces. The Swiet Union's amadments to 
he threepower draft resolution point to the organic intercon- 
nection of these measures. In tbis case too Mr. Lloyd was not 
objective in presenting the position of the Soviet Union on the 
question of the redution of armaments. 
The Governments of the United States, Great Britain aad 
France do not agree to these propals. They object to these 
proposds, seeing in than some kind of a trap set by the Soviet 
unioa. 
The Govemmenh of the United States, Great Britain and 
France hold that in order not to land in this trap it is necessary 
to postpone the prohibition of the atomic weapon until the 
macbinerp of i n tedond  control is dabfished and pt into 
aperation. They maintain that otherwise the entire matter will 
k reduced to a mere promise to prohibit the aomic weapon 
without any possibility of verifying whether this promise will 
really be W e d .  
This cansideration too m o t  be regarded as convincing. A 
decision of the General A d l y ,  esptcdlp if it is adopted 
unanimously, annot be regarded as woahIw nor considered 
an empty phrase; it cannot be said that it will be of ria s i g n 3 m  
whatever. As for the *Let Union, we consider, and we dtdaie 
this W y  and dehitdy, that we will regard such r decision as 
fully binding upon us even without any sanctim whatever which 
would be provided for nomfulfjlIment of this decision against 
those who will not want ta W or will try ta violate tbis 
decision. 
But let us accept for one minute the standpoint of the s ~ r s  
of the draft resolution of the Three. Let us assume that dl will 
yree that at b t  it is necessary to set up, as this is pro@ by 
the Govemmts of the United States, Great Britain and Prance, 
an international control agency and put it into operation, and 
only then will it be possible to implement the pmhbition of the 
ammc weapon with all the consequenw foUowing thdm. 
W e  shaft nur stop to refall that from the standpoint of the Soviet 
Union such a decision would be absduteiy incorrect bemuse it 
could not lead to the desired objective. But if the Genera1 
Assembly were to act precisely as the United States, Great Britain 
and France insist, in that case the question would inevitably arise 
-what system of international control: exactly do the Govern- 
m a t s  of the three States-the United States, Great Britain and 
France-propose ? What system of international control exactly 
do they consider necessary to establish and put into operation in 
order to ensure prohibition of the atomic weapon, as they say? 
We know what answer ran be given, will be given and is 
already given to this qustion. We know that this is the Baruch 
plan which is being advertised us a plan of' the United Nations 
and from which all three Governments - the United States, 
Great Britain and France - do not want to retreat a single 
step. True, they state that thq are ready to ex& m y  other 
plan if it will be better than the Baruch plan. But right there 
and then they add that there is no better plan and that. they do 
not want to take one step from the so-called h u s h  p h .  
Wt do not agree to this. The shortcomings of this plan have 
been proved sufficiently and are admitted wen by hose who in 
the past were ready to defend tbis plan tooth and nail. Fox 
example, tbe Time.r, in the artide "Disarmament" of December 
I, 1951, pint& to the unsubstantiated merits of this plan, call- 
ing thii plan utopian and not concealing such an important 
fact as that in practice it would h just as difficult far the 
United State to accept this plan as for the Soviet Union. In 
practice, the Times said, it would k just as difficult for the 
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United States to accept this utopian propal as for the Soviet 
Union. Dca  this not contain a devastating appraisal of the 
pradicabilitg of these proposals or, to be more exact, does this 
not prove that these p+s are devoid of any practical sig- 
nificance? In such a case, however, a legitimate question arises: 
What grounds are there for the Governments of the United 
States, Great Britain and France to continue to support the 
Much plaa if even the Time3 considers that this plan has no merit 
whatmer and hat it is utopian, unacceptable in practice even for 
the sponsor of this plan - the United States itself? 
Speaking of the Baruch plan, one must mmmkr  &o some of 
its specific features as, for example, the notorious system of 
stages created especially to prestrve for the United States under 
all conditions, and even after the establishment of an international 
control agency and its going into operation, and after the s o - d e d  
prohibition of the atomic weapon, advantages in the manufacture 
of the atomic weapon which ia the opinion of the United States 
it has. Why, the meaniag of this system of stages consists in not 
disclosing one's secret and in preventing the prohibition of pm- 
duction of the atomic weapon immediately after the signing of 
the convention or adoption of the decision on the prohibition of 
the atomic weapon in some other way, and in postponing this 
matter until the later, until the latest stage, and, it s h d d  be 
assumed, until the verg last stage, until the time that will never 
come. 
Only naive people may not be able to see though the wth  
crafty mechanism of this system of stages, a system of sodled 
progressive "disclosure and verification," of which the Government 
of the United States, Great Britain and France tirelessly speak, 
not wishing. however, d I y  to "disdose" and "verify" the most 
important and most dangerous weapon of mass destruction of 
the people. 
The soIe argument which, essentially speaking, the Govern- 
ments of the United States, Great Britain and France put forth 
against the immediate prohibition of the atomic weapn boils 
down to the fear that some state will take the patb of violating 
such a decision, will not carry out this decision, and that other 
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partaers acting in g o d  faith will h d  themselves in a position 
disadvantageous and unfavorable for them. Fear, however, is a 
poor munsel. It is a p r  counsd in usual, eveqday affairs ; it 
is a st i l l  worse counsel in political affairs. Fear befogs the mind 
and impels those subjected to it to a false path and dictates wrong 
actions. 
Nevertheless, we are told that it is impossible to takc some- 
Wfs ward. The Soviet Union, however, dws not propow that 
anyom take somebody's word and is not itself inched to take 
somebody's word. That is why the Soviet Unim considers it 
necessarg to esdIish strict, effective international control. Inter- 
national control according ta the idea of the Swiet Union, must 
M y  be international and not the kind that is being presented 
by the sponsors of the Baruch plan, whose views Baruch frankly 
qressed stating that the personnel of this agenq should be, 
so far as possible, internationd. So far as possible ! 
In order somehow to get out of the diffffulty arising in view 
of the refusat to agree to the immehate unconditional prohibition 
of the atomic weapon, at least in priociple, it is suggested that 
this cannot be dowed d l  international cone01 is established 
and put into operation. 
Mr. Lloyd said that the Soviet Union holds that here must be 
a certain period between the prohibition of the atomic weapon and 
h e  establishment of international control. Yes, indeed, there 
must be sucb a period and it must inevitably be in the very nature 
of things. And this bas ken admitted also by the sponsors of 
the Baruch plan themselves. At least in his s p e d  of Jme 1% 
1946, Baruch, speakiag of the so-mIIed stages of development, 
said that, "once a charter for the Authoxitp has been adopted, the 
Autboritg and the system of control for which it will be responsi- 
ble will require time to become fulIy organized and effective." He 
a h  said that only after the system of contd over atwnic energy 
was d y  implemented would the manufacture of the atom bomb 
be stopped. 
Five years have already p s e d  since &en, however, and hope 
for the possibility of establishing a system of intematiomf con- 
trol on the basis of the Baruch plan bas vanished, There are no 
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grounds for m@ng that the situation in tbIs respert can change, 
all the less so since, as we have m above, the Baruch plm b 
increasingly l&g its supporters and adherents. But even five 
y w  ago it was impossibh to agree to the solution of the problem 
of the atomic weapon propwed by the Baruch plan, which was 
mergetidy condemned and resded by a number of states. But 
let us assume that on a certain day and hour a convention on the 
prohibition of the atomic w a p n  and on the establishment of in- 
ternathid control is signed md ratified. In such a case it I m m d -  
ateIy comes into force and cotquent~y the prohibition d the 
atomic weapon must come into force, and thus it becomes 
a fact with all the resulting legal consequences, not to speak of 
the moral and political mnsequaces. 
What are these consequences? 
The most important of them is the commitmenl of all s t a h  
which ratified this convention to discontinue immediately the 
manufacture and, wm more impomt, the utilization of the 
atomic wpm; M use immediately the already produced atom 
h m h  exdusivcly for chitian p u r p e s .  Here are two consequeace~ 
which follow from the very fact of the signing, ratihtion and 
coming into force, according to all international rules and inter- 
natiod practice, of tbis convention oa the prohibition of the 
atomic weapon and on the establishmeat of international con- 
trol. But if we take the standpoint of the spom~s  of the dmft 
resolution, this convmtian, notwithstanding the fact that it has 
been ratified and has become effective, w 9  still not be operating 
because it is necessary to wait until the machioe7 of an &ma- 
tiond contd agency is set up, until the oeceswry personnel is 
selected and until this entire machinery is set into motion. But 
wilt it be set into motion, and when exactly? There is dmce on 
this point. Yet without any guarantee that this machinery will 
C r d y  be set into motion in the stipdated time, the entire an- vention with its prohibition of the atomic weapon IXCOIII~S sus- pended in mid-at. 
We have aheady drawn attention to the fact that the so-called 
international control agency pIaaaed by Acheson-Baruch-Lilimthal 
must in substance be an American atomic supxtmst and that it 
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would carry out a line corresponding to the policy of the Un~rcd 
States, and not even to the policy of Great Britain, w h i 4  accord- 
ing to the authoritative statement of the Prime Minister of Great 
Britain. is now the chief atomic base of the United States of 
America, and even less to the policy of France, but corresponding 
only to the policy of the United States of America, wbich can- 
not allow any other situation without running the risk of I&g 
the main lever af command in the entire sphere of atomic energy, 
We remember that objective p p l e .  nat interested in utilizing 
the international control agen& f i r  their o m  purposes, when 
analyzing the Baruch plan unanimousIy arrived at the conclusion 
that the Baruch plan in general aims to freeze or block the entire 
question of the prohibition of the atomic weapon, 
Confirmation of such a conclusion can be found in Mr. 
Acbeson's letter of 1946 accompanying the report on international 
control over atomic mergy which directfy states, as I have already 
pointed out, that the Baruch plan must not be interpreted as a 
commitment to prohibit the atomic weapon immediately after this 
plan is put into operation, and that, although such a necessity 
might subsequently arise, a decision, no matter when it is made, 
will be bound up with considerations of highest policy affecting 
the security of the United States and must be made by the Gov- 
ernment of the United States in accordance with its constitutional 
processes and ia the light of dl the facts of the world situation. 
What does this mean? This means that if tbe Baruch pIan 
were adopted, if the Baruch pIan envisaging an intematikal 
control agency in accordance with the scheme it proposes were 
implemented, prohibition of the atomic weapon by the United 
States might not follow. 'in other words, the United Srates might 
not declare the prohibition of the atomic weapon even after in&- 
national mntmi is put into operation, if the interests of the 
United Stat=, if the so-called highest interests of its poliq, do 
not require this, or require a directly opposite decision. 
What sense is there in making such a proposal with the reserva- 
t ions  that are contained in such official dmments as the letter of 
Achesan to the United States Secretary of State Byrncs, in the 
phrase which I have just quoted and which bas not-been refuted 
or corrected by Acheson? sense is there in assuring us that 
the proposal of the Swiet Union is illusory and not real, the pro- 
posal to ban the atomic weapon and instruct the Committee of 
Twelve to draw up a convention envisaging in it both inkma- 
tional control and pr& measures for the do-t of this 
prohibition, and that, on the coatrarp, bt to set up i n t e r n a t i d  
control is real? This plan must lx based on the Baruch p h .  
This plan, if it is adopted, will say everyding except one thing, 
namely, except that as soon as this plan or this convention enters 
into force the atomic w a p n  will k immediatdy prohibited. This 
wi I I  not be said in the &mican pian! 
In the &id document ttus whole question is made dependent 
upon considerations of highest policy affecting the security of the 
United SW, is made dependent upon the constitutional procedure 
of the United States and on the international situation, in the 
light of which, according to the Achcsw m m d u m ,  this 
question should be 'settled. 
But is it not deax tha& this formula conceafs reservatiwrs wbich 
can, wen afkr a contd agency is established and put into opera- 
tion, direct the &for& of this control a p c p  along chmcIs which 
wilI most easily yield to certain pressure? These teservations will 
give the United States the passibiLiQ of pmtecting itself from any 
control on the part of this wcalltd international control agenq 
by r e f m c a  to considerations of the "highest policy" and "facts 
of the world situation." 
We p r o p  a dear-cut and simple solution40 ban the atomic 
wapon. 
Wh has this atomic weapon now! The United States oE Amer- 
ica and the USSR. 
W e  say openly and firmly: "Ban the atomic weapn," and we 
assume the obligation of carrying this out. 
We are told: "NO, we canna take your word foi it, a c q t  our 
plan-the Baruch plan." But they tell us this only because thy 
know that the Baruch plan they propose will never I d  to the 
prohibition of the atomic weapn. They say this only to gain time 
in order to keep on stockpiling this horrible weapon more and 
more ! 
We ate presented with a mythical plan, tbe prestige of which 
has been undermined even among those who formedy ardently 
supported it-take for example the Tjrne~. And is it only the 
Times? 
That is why we can say that the pramtation of the question of 
the prohibition of the atomic weapon as it is done in the drafi 
iesolution of the "Thee'-whereby the entire prohibition of the 
atomic weapon is made dependent upon the establishment of an 
intamatid control ageacp, and then the setting into motion of 
this international agencg itself is made dependent on "highest 
poliq" and an the facts "in the light of the world situation"-is a 
bluff which can produce nothing but deception of the peoples. 
But you state that you do not wane deception. ht us then turn 
these aspirations into tangible, flesh-and-blood deeds that will 
really show the peoples the truth and make them calm, free them 
from t h  fear that they, their ttumes, and their children will  be 
destroyed, free them from the fear of war, k, is said in the first 
paragraph of the preamble. 
We say that it is incorrect to present the question of the pm- 
hibition of the atomic weapon and control as it is done in the 
draft rmIution of the United W, Great Britain and France. 
Oa the one hand prohibition of the atomic weapon is made 
dependent upon the establishment of an international control 
agenq; on the other hand a plan for the establishment of this 
agency is proposed which: 
1. Has already c d e d  forth serious objections and a negative 
appraisal on the part of a number af states, as well as institutions 
and specialists in this sphere in the United States, Great Britain 
and in 0 t h  countria ; 
2. Has already been rejected by a numkr of states which do 
not agree to this plan and insist on n p h  which would realiy 
ensure the establishment of an international conha1 agency and 
the observance of elementary standards of international law, 
guaranteeing respect for state sovereignty. 
Thus the proposal to make the prohibition of the atomic 
weapon d e p d e n t  upon the establishment of an international 
contmI agencg, which in turn is made depndent upon the adop- 
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tion of the Baruch plan, which in turn is made dependent u p  
highest policy and all kinds of other reretvations, creates a vicious 
axle, in the full sense of the ward, from which there is no way 1 out. 
But a way out must be found. And this way out may consist 
in the General Assembly's dedaring immediately the unconditional 
i 
ban on the atomic weapon and establishment of an international 
control agenq and instructing the Committee of Twelve, which 
we have agreed to establish in the Subcommittee instead of the 
two formerly existing commissions, to prepare a convention pro- 
viding for measures ensuring tbe implementation of this pro- 
hibition. The refusal to adopt such a proposal represents nothing 
else but refusal to get out from the impasse which is W c i a l l p  
being mated or has already been created, an impasse which has 
continued for five years now and to whi& it is high time to 
put an end. 
To our direct question as to wh&r the sponsors of the reso- 
lution of the "Three" agree tbat the General Assembly declare 
an unconditional ban on the atomic weapon and the establish- 
ment of stria international controI over the enfoirement of this 
ban, Mr. Lloyd has not given an answer, preferring to get along 
with a hazp phrase that the "adoption of r tripartite draft resolu- 
tion by the General AsscmbIy would already be a dedaxatim in 
favor of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons en- 
forced by strict international control." 
The work of the Subcommittee has shown that this hazy 
phrase mnceaIs in reality a rejection of the proposal on the pro- 
hibition of the atomic weapon. Nevertheless the work of the 
Subcommittee has been useful because it has helped to rwed the 
thaughts which Mr. Lloyd has tried to cover up by diplomatic 
phrases. 
It is necessarg to face the truth and take facts as they are. And 
the facts are such that even if h e  proposal for the prohibition of 
the atomic weapon and detailed regulations on intematimd 
control i r e  included in one and the same mnventioh, internatid 
control woutd not kgin operating simultaneously with the sign- 
ing of the convention but after the l a p  of a certain time necessary 
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for carrying out a whole system of intricate organizational 
measures without which this control agency cannot operate. Those 
who are not interested in the prohibition of the atomic weapon 
are prepared to grasp at thls circumstance, xooted in the very 
nature d tbings, in order to delay the discontinuation of the 
manufacture of the atomic Weapon, to delay the ban against the 
utilization of the atomic weapon, to delay all this u t i I  the mntroI 
machinery begins to function, although there is no indimtion 
anywhere of the provision to ensure that it will ever begin to 
function in genera1 with things the way they are in this matter. 
W e  are told that our proposal me-: fust prohibition, and then 
control:. This is untrue because we say--the decisions to ban the 
atomic weapon and establish international coatroi must be made 
sirnuitaneously and from them must follow a l l  the consequences 
arisiag from the mmaI and political obligation such decisions 
impose. It is precisely the pr~posat  contained in the draft  so- 
lution of the "Three," however, that amount to a refusal to pm- 
bibit the atomic weapon until the system of international control 
begins to operate. This means that even after the rspective states 
agree on the need to ban the atomic weapon and to establish 
international control, they may i eote  such an agreement and 
continue to manufacture atomic weapons and even to utilize them 
in carrying out their military pkns and, even more, in the military 
actions they are conducting against other psopfcs. 
It should be added to the above that there is absolutely no 
logic in the argument that a decision to prohibit the atomic 
weapon before the internationa1 control agency starts functioning 
will create a loophde and will maice a fiction and a fraud of 
probibition of the atomic weapon. Such a fraud, however, would 
certainly be m p e d  and would certainly cover with eternal shame 
the state which resorted to such perfidy. 
There is another circumstance that must k noted here, namely, 
that even with no convention in existence prohibiting the use of 
the atomic weapon, the atomic weapon is not being used in the 
military d o n s  unleashed in various pkes  by the policy of a 
State which possesses the atomic weapon, dthough there are some 
madmen who are inciting to its use at present. If not moral con- 
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siderations, then apparently considerations of common sense, 
caution 8nd fear that use of the atomic weapon may cause irre- 
parable consequences restrain the people indined to risky ven- 
tures from taking such a step. 
There is dready an example of how certain considerations, 
moral, poIitical and others, I would say business considerations, 
prevent& the use of poison gam against the enemy, as the 
Second World War showed, even by those not legally bound by 
the Hague Convention. 
Why is all this forgotten now when the prohibition of the ' atomic weapon is being discussed? Why is such fierce resistance 
being offered now to the General Assembly's discharging its 
noble duty by declaring the prohibition of the atomic weapon 
and the establishment of international control, on the pretext that 
such decisions of the General Assembly might be utitiwd by 
unscrupulous governments for perfidious ends? There are no 
grounds for this whatmer. 
The attempt made yesterday by .Br iWs  ddegate to represent 
the plan of the Soviet delegation as a plan providing for stages 
is absolutely fruitless. He enumerated three such stages. 
Lloyd objected to this plan prtxisely because it envisagd some 
kind of stages. Why then does he agree to these very same stages 
in the plan outlined in the tripartite draft resolution? This is 
d i h l t  to explain by generally accepted laws of Iogic. But the 
point is that our plan does not envisage any stages, and this is 
easy to understand if account is taken of the fact that the essence 
of the system of stages is not in the transition fmm one position 
to another, which is perfectly natural bemuse it is impossible to 
solve tasks immediately and simultaneausly; the pint is that the 
unacceptability of the system of s t a g s  stems from the fact that 
this transition from one position to another is made d e p d e n t  
upon various preliminary conditions which give wide scope for 
arbitrary action by the agencies put in charge of tbis math. 
Thus, in the sphere of prohibition of the atomic weapon, tran- 
sition from the stage of mntrd aver raw materials to the stage of 
control over the production of the atomic weapon, according to the 
Acheson-Baruch-Lilienthal plan, is made dependent upon a mm- 
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ber of conditions, the apptaiwl of which is @aced f ullp withh the 
competence of the leadlag agency. Thus the transition from one 
stage to amber, according to the ~ a r &  plan, is not a nahd. un- 
hindered transition from one stage to mother or from one action 
to another, but is d e  dependent upon the discretion and ubi- 
trarg will of those in h g e  of the given matter. 
It is ridiculous to speak of s h e  when all that is meant is 
the performance of one task or another in a necessary sequence 
determined by physical and makerial aspects of the matter. Argu- 
ing, as Mr. LIoyd did yesterday, h u t  stages, one could say, for 
example, that breakfast consists of a n&r of stages, and one 
could count quite a number of such stages, beginning with the 
setting of the table and ending with the last nwrse. 
All the above-mentioned considerations seem to us &dent 
to eliminate aU doubt not only concerning the €act h t  there 
are differences of opinion between the USSR, on the one h d ,  md 
the United States, Great Britain and France, on the other, with 
regard to methods and the attainment of common a h ,  as the 
memorandum says, but dso that these so-called "common aims" 
are far from common and far from identical. One should have 
a clear understanding of the situation that has arisen. More 
work is necessary, much more, to make these "common aims" 
reaUy common and really identical. 
W e  have not lost hope that this can h accomplished in the 
course of wr further persttent and patient work. 
In support of our proposal that the General Assembly pro- 
daim the uncmditiond prohibition of the atomic weapoa and & 
establishment of international control, we indiated tbe special 
m o d  and plitical significance such a decision of the General 
Assembly would have. We must lay stress on this now too. Such 
a decision of the General Assembly will not be a scrap of paper, 
as some peopIe think, nor an empty phrase, nor a fraud. It caa 
be neither the one, nor the other, nor the third, kame it accords 
with the ianemmt aspirations of millions of p p l e  and objec- 
tively can, must, and will serve to eliminate, or at Ieast to lessen, 
international tension; it wiU serve the cause of peace, will be 
directed against warmongers and the policy of war adventures. 
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T HE second difference separating the Governments of tbe United States, Great Britain and France from h e  USSR 
pertains to the reduction of armaments and armed forces. The 
substance of the proposal of the USSR is that the five Powem- 
the United States. Great Britain, France, China and the USSR- 
reduce dl their armed forces and armaments by one-third in the 
course of one yar. This proposal also meets with objection on 
the part of the above three Powers. Yet it s h d d  be said that in 
this mse, too, we cannot recognize the arguments adduced to 
support this objection as in the Ieast satisfactoty. 
Indeed, we are told that such a reduction cannot be regarded 
as a reduction contributing to peace if it is not known what a m d  
might the Great Powers are reducing and to what Ievel they in- 
tend to bring such a reduction. As for t h  level, we have a l d y  
spoken h u t  tbis in sufficient detail. The most essential point of 
this matter may be recalled in brief. This is that, so far, the 
initialor5 of the propod regarding the lwel have not been able 
to say anything coherent about the principles which should de- 
termine this level. The attempt made here by Mr. Acheson on a 
pmious don, as X explained last time, cannot be regarded 
as at all satisfactoy, Taking the size of the country's territory and 
population as a basis, Mr. Achesw held that it is this that should 
serve m a criterion for defining the Ievel. The bigger the country, 
the larger the population, the more armaments and armed 
forces the state should have. Mr. Acheson added, however, that 
nevertheIess some kind of limit, some kind of ceiling, should 
be fmed beyond which this h e 1  must not rise. Tbis means, 
however, tbat if tbe prinaple set forth by Mr. Acheson as a 
criterion and the level, of which the United States' representative 
spoke Iast time, are applied, the quantity of armaments and the 
numerical strength of the amed forces will correspond neither 
to the size of the country nor to the size of the population. What 
then, one natudy  asks, remains of this so-called Iwel? Besides, 
if one is to proceed from the so-called level, and this has already 
been confirmed by the representatives of France, Great Britain 
and the United States st the Conference of the four Deputy For- 
eign Ministers in Paris, the entire question may, in the final andv- 
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sis, result not in a reduction but in an increase of armaments. What 
then, one naturally asks, is the value of this level and this entire 
undertaking concerning the so-called duction of armed forces 
if no duction of armed forces whtevr may result? 
The second question raised by the representative of Great 
Britain pe& to the need to know the site of the armed forces 
and mameats of each country. We also s&ciently explained this 
question when we pointed out that if the reduction proposed 
by the Soviet Union is agreed to, all the e r e s  on med forces 
and armaments will be kid on the table at once. This is  also 
evident fmm Paragraph 7 of the amendments of the USSR, 
which deciares that ail the stakes submit forthwith to the inter. 
national control agencp, and, in my case, not later than one 
month after the acceptance by the General Assembly of decisions 
for the prohibition of the atomic weapon and the reduction of 
armaments and armed forces, complete information regarding the 
state of their armed forces and all types of armaments, including 
the atomic wapm, at the time of acceptance d the said decisions. 
If the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and 
France are really interested in exact information about the arma- 
ments and armed forces of &the USSR, here is a direct way to obtain 
it. In that case Mr. LIoyd, as well as the representatives of the 
h e r  two Powers in whose name Mr. Uoyd spoke, will. have no 
need of using information which he himself said here was not 
quite accurate or, as I would say, is altogether inaccurate. 
What thrn in such a case is left of the objections to the Soviet 
proposal for a reduction by one-third of the armaments and armed 
foms of the five Great Powers? Nothing, except perhaps the 
objection that such a reduction will not create a 'Wmce of 
power" and will leave intact the Soviet Union's aIleged miIitary 
superiority. But if Woyd is using inaccwatc information about 
the annamms and armed f o r m  of the Soviet Union. as he him- 
d f  has a d m i d ,  then how can he talk about the military 
superiority of the USSR which, of course, is determined by data 
b u t  armaments and armed form, and without which data it 
is impossible to estimate the military power of any state? 




Great Britain and France, it is clear that the theory of thc so- 
d e d  balance of power underlies their position on this isue. 
But h i s  theory has never served the cause of peace. Even more, 
it has never pet been possible to achieve the so-called balance of 
p e r .  
It is known, for example, that the so-called balance of power 
in the R r  East as provided for at the Washington Conference 
of 1923-22 on navd limitation was a model of absdute insdil- 
ity in the very fields in which the attempt was made to achieve 
a balance and stability of the situation. In reality the Wahington 
agreement not ody did not ensure a "balance of power" in the * 
Far East but consolidated Japan's undivided domination in South- 
em Manchuria and gave Japan important strategic guarantees ia 
case of war, which guarantm J a p  did not fail to use in the 
Second World War, turning upside down, in the graphic words 
of the head of the Swiet Government, J. V. Stslin, the entire 
system of the postwar peace regime. 
This brings to mind the rather witty guestion asked by a 
British p l j t id  leader as to how the requirements of a navd 
Power like Great Britain can be balanced with the requirements 
of a land Power like the Soviet Union. How can infantry divisions, 
this question asked, be measured against a m  bombs or heavy 
b m k r  squadrons; how can jet planes be compared with piston 
engine pIanes, or modern submarines with prewar submarines? 
Yet, ignoring dl the lessons of histoy, df the facts of the 
very recent past, ignoring the lessons of the Second WorId War 
unleashtd by Hderite Germany, miIitarist Japan and fascist 
Italy, but, m the other hand, reverently remembering the practice 
of the League of Nations, harmful to the cause of peace, an 
attempt is now being made to turn the United Nations organiza- 
tion onto a path, already known for its disastrous consequences, of 
skmgthening peace by the so-called "bahce of power." 
The Soviet Union will not move along this path. The Soviet 
Union also urges the United Nations not to take this path if it 
does not intend sharing thc sadly remembered fate d the League 
of Nations. * * * 
T HE memorandum points out that evidently all agree to the idta of conroking n world conference of all the stam on 
armaments reduction, but that in this matter there are essential 
differences with regard to the method and time for the convoca- 
tion of the conference. This is true, for &re are such differ-, 
do~hraately. But these differences go much further than just 
method and time. 
Taking the matter of convoking a world conference seriously, 
the Soviet Union recommends that the General Assembly adopt 
a corresponding decision in perfectly dear and unequivocal terms. 
The merhod of convoking such a mnference--this is a decision 
of the G e n e d  Assembly containing an appcal to the gouem- 
mats of dl the states, btb members of the United Nations 
and states at present not members of the United Nations. 
Tim-ot later tbm June 1, 1952. 
The prepitration of the world conference-recommendations 
that the Security Council prepare and submit, within three months, 
practical propats for the implementation of the entire decidon 
of the General Assembly, the draft of which we are discussing 
and, consequently, of that part of the decision which concern 
the conpbmtion of the world coderenee. 
It seems clear that every sincere supporter of the -Id con- 
ference should without reservation uphold those proposals, How- 
ever the three Governmen&the United States. Great Britain 
and France-propose a different method. They limit themsefvs 
merely to the statement on behalf of the General Assembly that 
such a conference should be convoked, without indicating the 
dare, even approximately, for the convocation of such a conference. 
They limit themselves to indicating that this conference should be 
called wbea the work of the Committee of Twelve is at a stage 
when, in that Committee's opinion, some part of its program is 
ready for submission to the Governments and, consequently, the 
conferente may be called. Thus, in this case too, the whole matter 
boils down to mere desires unconned with practicaI measures of 
any sort and is, therefore, of very little signifimce, if not to 
say of no significance at aU. 
A comparimn of these two proposals is  sufficient reveal 
84 
dearly the entire diffcmc between than and to leave no d d t  
that in d i t p  the three Governments arc not at all concerned 
about the c o n v d o n  of a WOCM conference on mameats re- 
duction nor,  therefor^ ithut a r ~  actual reduction of armaments 
and armed forces within s short a time as possible. Yet this is 
precisely what the interests of peace demand, the interests of all 
I 
peace-loping peoples. 
I b v e  dwelt in &dent detail-regretfulIy in more detail 
than I would haw wished4n only the most important quedons 
causing differences the USSR, on the one band, and ttre 
three Powers, on the other. 1 did this only to show how i m p o m  
these differences are, differences determined by the picp of the 
Soviet Union, on the one hand, and by the poiicy of the three 
Powers--the United States, Great Britain and France--w tbe 
ohr, in the given matter, i,s., in the matter af prohibition of the 
atomic weapon, establishment of international control and reduc- 
tion of armaments and armed forces. 
The eliminatim of these differences is of tremendous sig- 
nificance ia the important matter of removing the tension in 
inkmatiom1 relations, in the matter of improving these relations. 
Ln the S u b e o m m i ~  we arrived at certain important decisions. 
I Even what are d e d  hem and referred to irr the memorandum 
as minor decisions, despite the fact that they are minor, are of ' great imprtaate. Every step which climinatn differences betareen 
US, let them he in minor matters st present, gives us hope that 
the nwtt step may eliminate dif fexmta in more important matters. 
And we are striving for this, we want this, we are working for 
tbis. 
Certain important decisions were readred in the Subcommittee, 
in partidar decisions on uniting the ~6mmissions, on the c o m p  
sition of the joint committee, on its membersfiip, and procedure 
of work; the question of voting arid of the "veto" have been 
clarified. An agreement was achieved on d these questions. X 
believe that my neighbon on the right will confirm this. 
It is hardly necessary to stress how irnprtmt all this is to the 
cause of peace, to the welfare of the peoples who are demanding 
of the United Nations organization that it take active and decisive 
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measure to terminate the frantic armaments drive which is 
tightening the noose aronnd the neck of h e  states folWmg 
this path, the armaments drive which is swallowing huge resources 
and energies for the preparation of a new wodd war, resources 
and energies which could be used to improve the m m i c  p s i -  
tim of the popuhtion suffering from the armaments drive and 
weighed down by the burden of war budgets in the States of 
the Atlantic camp. 
The United Nations organhhn is faced with a tremendous 
task-& task of uncondifionally prohibiting the atomic weapon, 
of reducing mamen& and armed forces and atablishing strict 
international cmtrol. We must continue this work, the work in 
tbis direction, and utilize every opportunity which arises to ac- 
complish the above-mentioned task in the interests of strengthen- 
ing peace, in the interests d dl peace-loving peoples. 
Speech in the Political Committee 
December 18, 1951 
D URING the past few days the attention of the First Committee has hen nmcentrard on the so-ralIed revised draft resolu- 
tion of the "Three" - the United Skates, G m t  Britain, and 
France - and the amendments to it submitted by the delega- 
tion of the USSR. 
The representatives of certain delegations, first and foremost 
the authors of the altered draft resolution, have spent no little 
effort trying to convince us t h t  the changes which have been 
introduced in this draft d l y  entitle it ta be legarcled as an 
altered draft, as a revised draft, when compared with the orig- 
inal draft of the same three Powers - the United States, Great 1 Brihin lad France - submitted by them as early as November 
19. 
Careful d ' n a t i o a  of the revised draft resoIution, how- 
ever, does not reveal m y  reaIIy serious changes in it. True, in- 
dividual minor corrections have been introduced in this draft, 
but in substance this so-dled revised draft does not differ 
from the previous one. This draft, like the original one, con- 
stitutes an attempt to substitute for the question on reduction 
of armaments and armed forces, prohibition of atomic weapons 
and establishment of inteinational control, the proposal to col- 
lect information on armaments and armed forces, and essen- 
tially it goes no further than that. As before, this draft retains 
the objective of frustrating the reduction of armaments and 
i 
the prohibition of atomic weapons. 
Therefore, one must be very careful in accepting the state- 
men&. made here by the authors of this draft, primarily by Mr. 
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Jessup, that the United States strives to find a practical solution 
which would lead to certain, as he said, agreed results in order 
to reIieve international tension, and that the proposals put for- 
ward by the United States allegedly constitute the key to a 
future decision, opening a wide road along which it is possible 
to advance, striving for the solution of the unsettled problems 
and the lessening of friction and disagreements. If on the given 
question the Government of the United States had really been 
guided by such aspirations, there wodd be no necessity to re- 
sort to such hay and indefinite formulations as those running 
through the revised draft resoIution of the "Three," which in 
this respect does not in the least differ from the original draft 
of this resolution, This is most obvious, for instance, from 
an analysis of Paragraph 3 of the revised draft resolution of 
the "Three," whose entire difference from the original text of 
this paragraph of the draft resolution consists in the rephras- 
ing of some of the provisions and in a more subtle formulation 
of others, which sem no less to mask the red purpose of this 
paragraph wbich actually reduces itself to the defense of that 
very same Baruch pIan at all costs. 
In this so-called revised draft resolution of the "Three" 
evergtbing finally boih down to several changes of secondary 
importance which have the objective of diverting attention 
from the basic Iine of the United States, Great Britain and 
France, which aims to hold firmly to the fundamental concep- 
tions of which Messrs. Jessup, Lloyd and Mmh have spoken 
here, having in mind that very same Baruch phn. 
All the latest statements of Mr. Jessup, echoed by Messrs. 
Uoyd, Moch and several other delegates. for example the repre- 
sentatives of Bolivia and Peru, to the effect that the United States 
allegdy tries to achieve an interna6onal system which would 
mure the reduction of alI armed forces and all types of arma- 
ments, ate completely contradicted by the many facts that per- 
meate the entire practice and policy of the United States of 
America and certain other states limping in its w*. 
Despite the fact that this is the second month that the United 
Nations has been extensiveIy discussing the questions of prohi- 
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I bition of atomic weapons, establishment of international con- trol and reduction of amamen& md armed forces, and that the United States, Great Britain and France declare their wifing- nes to take the necessary measures in this sphere - these states are limiting themselves to mere declarations, which, in addi- ' tion, are attended by serious resistance to any attempt to put 
these dechmtiws into any sort of definite form, evea remotely 
resembling a decision of the General AssembIy. And at the 
I 
same time in these countries, under the leadership of their 
I governments, ceaseless work is under way, assuming ever great- 
: er proportions, to increase further the amammts and umcd 
1 forces of these countries, constantly to produce and perfect new 
types of weapons of aggression and mass destruction of people, 
' s u c h a s a t a m i c ~ p .  
The last semi-annual 1951 report of the United States Sccre- 
tarp of Defense to the President of the United States insists on 
the further expansion of the American &Iitarp program, and 
calls upon the American people to make further srcrifrces so 
that this military program can be successfully fulfilled. 
In bis report, the United States Secretary of Defense s p d s  
of the most gratifying, as he puts it, successes attained in the 
developmept of different tgpes of atomic weapons and the re- 
searches in creating thermo-nuclear armaments, not to speak of 
planes, 'naval vessels, tanks, and so on and so forth. 
Mr. hve t t ,  the United States Secretary of Defense, literally 
goes into raptures over the growth of armaments in the United 
States on the basis of the American military budget of 60 bil- 
lion dollars. 
Notwithstanding the warning voices already sounding here 
and there about the danger of the approaching crisis of over- 
production, the expansion of war industry at the expense of 
civilian industry is proceeding full b h t ,  with the volume of 
war production in the United States at present, as is known, 
amounting at Ieast to two billion dollars monthly, which is 
three times above the level of the k t  month of 1950. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the policy of an armaments 
drive and the preparation for another war is incrmingly un- 
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dermining the economies of the countries which have chosen(( 
such a path in their domestic and foreign policy, a poky disas- 
trous for the economies of these countries, this line is still being 
mried out, inspired, on the one band, by such organharions 
of employers as the National Association of Manufacturers in 
the United States and West European countries, which are 
raking in profits on the war and war preparations, and, on the 
other hand, by the leaders of the foreign policy of these coun- 
tries, which have united in the aggressive Atlantic bloc. 
In this connection one must mention the recent statement of 
Foster, spokesman of the United States Defense Department, 
wbo called for tbe acceleration of the production of armaments 
both in the United States and in the countries of W ~ e m  Eur- 
ope allied with it, and who warned of the various dangers 
which the world, according to him, allegedly faces. 
"We must," Foster said, "clearly understand that next year 
might be the most dangerous in the history of the West. If we 
accustom oursdves to this idea," he continued, "and act accord- 
ingly, we will be fully able to accomplish what we are urged to 
accomplish by General Eiwnhower and many other leaders of 
the North Atlantic Alliance and carry out our program of re- 
armament." la atha words, of the armamenfs drive. 
That is why the United States Government and the Govern- 
mdats of Great Britain and France, okdiently following it, do 
not really take measures for the prohibition of atomic weapons 
and the reduction of armaments and armed forces. To adopt 
such proposaIs aid to begin realiy to carry t h m  out by no 
means tallies with the entire trend of the present foreign policy 
af the United States, which is stubbornly steering a course of 
cmplicsting international reIations and preparing another 
world war. 
Under sucb urcumshnces is it feasible to assume that the 
ruling circles of the United States - as well as those of Great 
Britan and Fiance, supparting them in this matter - can real- 
ly seriously strive for a reduction of armaments and armed 
forces and for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the estab- 
lishment of international control? 
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That is why we venture to say in reply to the question put to 
us above that it is precisely here that one must look for an ex- 
planation of that resolute resistance wbich is being offered by 
the Governments of the United States, Great Britain and 
France to the adoption of the proposals of the Soviet Union and 
of the amendments in which these proposaIs are formulated 
and which are designed for real prohibition of atomic weapons, 
real estabfishment of international control, and real reduction 
of armaments and armed forces. 
That is why in the speeches of Mr. Jessup, not to mention 
the speeches of Messrs. Lloyd and Moch, it is impossibIe to find 
- and w c  do not find - any striving to reconcile the stand of 
the United States, Great Britain and France on the given ques- 
tion with the staad of the Soviet Union. They stubbornly resist 
this rapprochement, which is of course quite natural, since the 
Soviet Union insists not on verbal assurances of readiness to 
carry out these important decisions that are really capable af 
elimkting the tension in international relations and of en- 
suring the peace and security of the peoples, but insists on 
these decisions themselves, decisions such as the unconditional 
prohibition of atomic weapons, establishment of strict interna- 
tional control over the enforcement of this prohibition, and re- 
duction of armaments and armed forces. 
But these Powers cannot at the same time merely reject the 
Soviet proposals, the Soviet amendments. They have to lend 
a semblance of propriety to their stand on this question. They 
have to cover up their stand with florid verbiage, Mind which 
they try to conceal the real substance of the matter. 
Worthy of attention in this connection is the report carried 
recently in the American press to the effect that Richard Bis- 
sell, Assistant Chief of the Mutual Security Agency of the Unit- 
ed States, urged that the foreign policy of rhe United States 
be formulated anew in such a way as to show-pmisely to show 
and only to show-that the pxogram of European mmmnent 
is a secondary matter compared with the broader aim of improving 
the social and economic position of the Wet Ew- countries. 
BisseU referred to the fact that the prestige of America had 
91 
dropped alarmingly in the estimation of the world public dur- 
ing tbe past year because the people, according to BisseU, bad 
begun to arrive at  the conclusion that the United States stands 
solely for armaments and that all assertions that the United 
States allegedly seeks some end other than the armaments drive 
and the increase of armed forces have been blasted. 
There can be no doubt &at: the introducrion at the Sixth Ses- 
sion, right here at our Sixth Session of the General Assembly, 
of the draft resolution of the "Three" on the reduction af arm- 
aments and armed forces pusues a simijar aim - to submerge 
the real reduction of armaments and armed forces and the red  
prohibition of atomic weapons in talk about the prohibition of 
atomic weapons, and to reduce the entire matter mertfy to the 
collecting of information on armed forces md imamen& and, 
as previously, to concentrate on the armaments drive, on 
thwarting any reduction of armaments and the prohibition of 
atomic weapons. 
We all make no secret of the fact that it is precisely from this 
standpoint that we consider both the original draft of the reso- 
lution of the "Three" and the altered draft of this resolution. 
Notwithstanding certain editorial changes, the content of the 
draft resolution of the United States, Great Britain and France 
in the revised version remains exactly the same as that of their 
formcr draft. One can easily become convinced of this by care- 
fully examinihg the revised draft of the abwe resolution. If 
this revised draft does contain some new elements, it must be 
said that this by no means improves matters. This should first 
of a1I be said abut the second paragraph of the p d k  of 
the revised draft resolution of the "Three" which refers to the 
so-called effective system of collective security. 
Needless to say, the striving for effective coIlective security 
in itself, to which, as is known, special articles of the United 
Nations Charter, namely Artides 5 1  and $2, are devoted, can- 
not, of course, arouse any objection if the Charter is rally ad- 
hered to and if this formula is applied in conformity with the 
principles, aims and tasks of the United Nations, We know, 
however, that the formula for an effective system of collective 
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c security was already used, not d y  aot in conformitp with the United Nations Charter, but in direct violation of the Charter, wbea the rmlution of Nwember 3,1950, imposed by the Atiantic -ping of United Nations members, appmed measures that had nothing in common with the principles cnuaciated in tbe CllarteK, , The events af last year have shown with stilI greater clarity that the program of so-called collective measures envisaged in Resolution No. 377 - of which we shall speak in more detail later when dealing directly with this question - in reality is a dangerow program, a program, I will say outright - of war, al- thoug: carnoaged by phrases h u t  d t y ,  p h t w  about peace. The program outlined in the report of the s w d e d  Collective Mmures Committee is bound up with tbe conthudon of the armaments drive, mobilization of manpower and material re- sources for the further prosecution of the war in the Fat East 
undereea by the Atlantic bloc, with the preparation fox other 
war ventures and, comisequently, has nothing ia common with 
the task now confronting the United Nations - the task of re- [ ducing armaments and umed fozces. 
It is Imown that the references to collective rnmres, to "ef- 
fective" so-called mwures of "defense" and similar aims which 
camouflage the bellicose schemes and plans of their sponsors 
are extensively used precisely for the further spreading of war 
psychosis, the further expansion and intensification of war 
I measures. The incorporation of this formula in the dteted draft reso- , lution of the "Three" is incompatible with the aims which the 
United Nations Charter sets before them when it spealrs of ef- 
fective collective measures fox the prevention and removal of a 
threat to peace and the suppression of acts of aggression and 
the peevention of other violations of peace or, as it is stated in 
Artidc 51 of the Charter, for the exercise of the inherent right 
of individual or colhive  self-defense and of maintenance of in- 
ternational peace and sxurity. 
The second paragraph of the preambk of the dtered draft 
resolution, speaking of this effective system of so-called collec- 
tive measures, undoubtedly has in view the so-ded system of 
callective senuitg h d y  reflected in the Remlution of the 
Generoll Assembly adopted at the Fifth Session. The delegation 
of the USSR objected to this resolution; a number of other dele- 
gations objected to it because dl these "collective measures" are 
in reality directed not at defending peace, as shown for exam- 
ple by the war in Korea, but at facilitating the impIementation 
of the aggressive plans of the Atlantic bloc, which tries to phy 
a leading part in decidisg matters of war and peace in the 
United Nations. 
If we turn to Paragraph 3 of the preamble of the revised 
draft resolution of the "Three" which replaced Paragraph 2 of 
the original draft, the entire difference consists in that the 
phrase about "levels adequate for defense but not for aggres- 
sion" has been omitted here, if we do not count ane more dif- 
ference: this is that the words " h e  necessary means to this 
end," which were in the original draft at [he end of this para- 
graph, have now been transferred to the beginning of this 
paragraph. 
Mr. Jessup explained that the phrase about the level of armed 
forces and armaments was deleted because of the doubts h u t  
this formulation voiced by the representatives of the USSR and 
other delegates, and he presented this as some kind of an essen- 
tid change. 
Although the revised draft resolution of the "Three" no 
longer contains references to the "level" or to the "criterion" 
of the general limits and restrictions of all armed forces and 
armaments, this, however, by no means signihes that the span- 
wrs of the draft have really decided to abandon their stand on 
this matter. 
Such a supposition would be completely gmundless, and this 
is clearly seen from Point 6-A of the revised draft resolution 
which reproduces the idea expreswd in Paragraph 3 of the pre- 
amble and in Point 5-B of the original draft. 
Ind& Point 6-A instrum the commission to defme the m y  
in which the general limits and reduction of all armed forces 
a d  all armaments can be calculated and established. However, 
9.4 
chis of course obligates the commission to determine the very 
same level, determine the v q  same criterion of which the orig- 
inal &aft spoke, Thus, the matter mmim in the very same 
, form as in the ariginrl. 1 In its time the delegation af the USSR proposed to substitute another point for Point 5 of the original draft. The same holds tiue also for the present Point 6 of the revised draft, which we propose to replace with mothex point, namely to instruct the Atom~c Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission to prepare, within three months, practical proposals for the apph- cation of said decision for aubrnission to the Security Council, having in view the decision of the General Assembly on the 
given question. 
We consider it inexpedient to give the cornmissbn the nar- 
i 
row assignment contained in Point 6 of the revised draft reso- 
lution which, moreover, is again reduced to defining the "level" 
and "criteria," which is exceedingly inexpedient, as shown by 
the experience of the f xuitless discussion of such questions. 
W e  consider more expedient and more practicable the pro- 
posal of the head ~f the Syrian delegation who spoke of the 
need to give the commission freedom of action md not to vest 
it with restricted powers which could hamper it in finding ways 
I for wiving the problems confronting it. 
The proposal of the Soviet delegation is heading in this di- 
rection, and this seems correct to us. This Qpees k ~ e r  prospects 
to the commission in its future work. 
* * *  
n important question is a one-third reduction by the ptma- A neot members of the Security Council - the United States, 
Great Britain, France, China and the USSR-of the armaments 
and armed forces in their possession at the moment oE the adop- 
tion of the given resolution in the course of one year, counted 
from the date of the adoption of this resclution. 
M. Moch tried to joke here on this score - he'himself being 
the one who enjoyed it most - by relating anecdotes about a 
man who has one suit of clothes and who is asked to cut this 
suit by one-third. The representative of France, however, would 
do k ~ e r  not to joke about such matters decting the situation 
in certain countries where, with the policy they are pursuing 
now, many people wdl soon be without wen one suit of dothes. 
(Laivgktev. ) 
The point spoken of in the amendments of the Soviet Union 
proposes that the General Assembly shodd "urge the govern* 
ments of dl states, both members of the United Nations and 
those not members of the United Natiom at present, to submit 
immediateIy to the international control agency, and in any 
case not later than within one month after the General Assem- 
bly &pts decisions on the prohibition of atomic w e a p  and 
the reduction of mmmcnts and armed forces, compIete infor- 
mation regaxding h e  state Of their armed forces and all types 
of armaments, including information on atomic weapons, at the 
time of the adoption of the said decisions." 
I see no need to speak again at length in favor of these two 
provisions which I have just outlined. 
I pointed out that the objections to this proposal, i.e., our 
propod for the one-third reduction by the Great Powers of all 
armaments and armed form, are based on- the utterly false as- 
sertions that the adoption of such a proposal would preeme for 
the Soviet Union its alIeged military superiority. We also 
pointed out that the objections to the proposal of the Soviet 
Union, moreover, are based on the false theory of the so-called 
"balance of power." 
W e  cited arguments and presented historic facts refuting 
both th is  theory and the stand of those who are again trying to 
revive this theory and to apply it to present conditions, assert- 
ing that precisely the "bahnce of power" among the Great 
Powers can be a guarantee of international peace and security. 
Unforhnately we have heard nothing in reply to this criti- 
cism, except the unconvincing arguments of the Bolivian dele- 
gate on this sybjtct, 
The Bolivian delegate considered it necessary to present ob- 
jections to our arguments, but the Bolivian delegate had to ad- 
mit that after hearing from the Soviet deIegation about the 
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I Washington qreement of 1921-1922 and taking an interest in this question -which we, of course, can only welcorn+he be- gan to study this agreement and arrived at the coaclusion that this agreement was aimed at ensuring peace in the Fat East by 
establishing a Mance of armed forces ammg the United States, 
Gr-eat Britain and Japan, but that in 1934 militaristic Japan d c  
nouncd this agreement, became an aggessor and udeashed the 
war in the Far East. 
But I spoke of the very same thing, What then did the Boliv- 
ian delegate change or add to what X had said, except that he 
revealed the secret of his "erudition" in this matter? 
But having said what he did, he unfortunately did not draw 
the proper condwion from it. EvidentIy he was hampered by 
I 
the lack of time and by his haste in studying this question. Yet, 
by carefully weighing the facts which he learned from his ap- 
parently kpbimrd md cucsoy examination of the given +on 
;,it would not have been difficult for the Bolivian delegate to 
draw this conclusion on the given question. And this codusion 
auld only be: the Washington agreement did not prwent Jspanese 
aggression, and the so-called " b a b e  of pnwer" collapsed under 
the weight of the contradictions which tbm split the Powers that 
concluded the Washingroa agrecmmt, contradictions which wn- 
h u e  ta operate in the camp of the capitalist powers even at 
the present time. 
Peru's delegate, toa, made a mistake in statiag that the Soviet 
Union, while seeking prohibition of atomic weapons, at the 
same time strives to preserve for itself freedam of action witb 
regard to other types of weapons of no less destructive effect. 
I must remind the representative of Peru, as well as the rep- 
resentative of Lthnon who expressed the same idea, if 1 am 
not mistaken, that as far back as 1948, in the additiond pro- 
posals to the Soviet draft plan for the work of the Conventional 
Armaments Commission, the USSR submitted a propod point- 
ing to the need for full prohibition of production and use not 
only of atomic weapons. but a h  of atbet types of weapons de- 
signed for mass destruction. 
Thus, the quation of the need to remove and prbhibit not 
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only atomic wmpons but aIso a11 other types of weapons of 
mass destruction of people, raised by them after s delay of three 
years, had already been put forth by the Soviet delegation in 
1948. Since then there has not been the slightest hint on the 
part of the Soviet Union that it hm changed its stand on this 
question. Such a fatmulation of the question fully conforms to 
the stand and the general policy of the Soviet Union which it 
has doped from the time this qwstim first am%. 
This, for instance, finds expression, and will fmd expression 
also in the fact that I can now declare that we f d l y  support the 
amendment proposed yesterday by the Egyptian delegation, 
which not only mentions the nncondltional prohibition of the 
use of atomic weapons but &a speaks of aIl other tp.pes of 
weapons of mass destruction. 
W e  support this fully and entirely, Mr. Delegate of Peru, 
and you can be perfectly at ease on t b t  score. 
If you really want all other weapons of mass destructioa pro- 
hibited dong with the prohibition of atomic weapons, then 
Tote t o d ~ y  for the prohibition of atomic weapons. But you will 
not vote for this. And you referred here to the principal types 
of weapons of mass destruction in addition to atomic weapons 
only in order to cover up the fact that you will vote for the 
resolution which does not contain even a hint of the prohibi- 
tion of atomic weapons, to cover up your rejection of this pro- 
hibition by artificial, hazy, indefinite, vague and ambiguous 
~hrases on this score. 
And you say that our position is not clear, that there is some- 
thing we want to conceal, that we want to utilize something in 
our own interests when we demand that anahgous types of 
weapons in possession of other states be withdrawn from na* 
tional armaments. You are wrong. You are mtirely wrong. You 
are following too serviIe$ the road which you ought not to 
follow. 
The delegate of Peru atsa made a mistake in the interpreta- 
tion of. the concept "unconditional" prohibition of atomic 
weapons. 
I even find it strange and amusing to speak of it. I know that 
do not like it when I say that I am amused. But d j  "it 
is no sin to laugh at what is really funny." W e  say "uncondi- 
' tional prohibition of the atomic weapon." And you teU us that 
we make "unconditiond" dependent on control! We have 
never done anything of the End. 
You are entirely mistaken in your undersbnding of the ex- 
pression "unconditioaal prohibition." I must explaii that un- 
conditional prohibition of atomic weapons, as we understand it, 
is not at aU dependent upon control, upon its organization, its 
forms, upon the methods of performing the functions of con- 
trol, and so on. No, whw the Soviet Uaion dtmaads uncondi- 
tional probibition of atomic weapons it means that the prohi- 
bition of atomic weapons must not be made dependent upon 
my conditions, sucb as "stages" advanced in the Ekucb plan or 
upon any other conditions capable of nullifying or even re- 
stricting to any degree the operation of the prohibition of 
understand it, and therefore it is we who 
really insist on the uncondittonal prohibition of atomic weap- 
We have always argued that control cannot automaticaIly 
bring about the prohibition of atomic weapons. Control can 
only fulfill the funaim of control, h a t  is, the functions of 
I verifying the observance of this probibition. And if there is no 
prohibition, then there is no purpose in control -whether pro- 
hibition is declared unconditionally or conditionaIly. 
It seems to me that after more than five years af debating 
this question, it is time to understand each other's position. The 
delegate of Peru bas probably still not gained proper under- 
standing of this question. 
The delegate of Peru referred to mathematical paradoxes. In 
this too he made a mi&, because it is far better to d d  with 
md use logical arguments and not mathematical. paradoxes. A 
paradox always remains a padox, md it is a pradwr for the 
very reason that it has no right to claim, to be the truth. But logic 
always iemaim logic, is . ,  it differs from paradox in that it has 
the right to d i m  to be the truth, for what is logid is real, and, 
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vice versa, what is contrary to logic cannot be recognized as real 
or true. 
How far Peru's delegate artuaIly is from the realm of truth, 
from the r& of reality, is obvious from his absolutely unsub- 
stantiated and biased remark deging that the poIicy of the 
Soviet Union has led to the disappearance of trust in the world. 
With d the reservations of a well-bred person, be neverthekss 
said such a thing. Is it possible that he whu said this r e d y  be- 4 
limes what he said - klirves that trust has disappeared in in- / 
temationd relations h u s e  of the Soviet. Union? DO p u  d- I 
lp tbink so? I doubt it, because only persons who wear blinders 1 and who m o t  see what is going on around them because of 1 
these blinders can think so. 
For a11 the facts before us, around us, facing us - d of them 1 
prove that it is by no means the Soviet Union's fault that trust 
has disappeared from international relations. 1 shall not, of 
course, enumerate h e x  facts, Mr. President, not because Mr. 
jessup may lose his self-control and demand a cessation of the 
exposition of these fa&, as he did yesterday during the speech 
of my colleague, the Byelorussian delegate, but because we have 
spoken of this many times here, and 1 do not want to take un- 
due advantage of the First Committee's time and patience. I 
shall merely say that in such a case the deIegate of Peru adheres 
to the view - in speaking of the facts - that if the statement 
is contrary to the facts, then too bad fot the facts. 
I could draw a certain prailel here between the speech of the 
delegate of Peru and that of the delegate of France. The dcle- 
pa of France dm tried to make insinuations against us, al- 
though he knows very well that if he does, be will be exposed 
at once. Digressions such as M. Moch permitted himself here, 
hinting at some 15 countries which have aUegedIp lost their in- 
dependence through the fault of the Soviet Union - digrcs- 
sions of this kind are a form of military cunning, springing 
from the consciousness of the absolute inabiIity to defend r 
position which cannot honestly be defended, and from the de- 
sire to divert attention from the question under discussion even 
at the cost of methods impermissible in decent society. 
loo 
As for the substance of the question we are discussing, M. 
Mwh preferred to repeat here the phrase that the Soviet Union 
is trying, he says, to preserve its superiority in armed form and 
to eliminate the superiority of the United States, Great Britain, 
and France where, according to Moch, it exists. He again spoke 
of the size of the Soviet Union's armed forces. of the number 
I of divisions and aircraft, which he' allegedly L o w s  with rur- prising exactness, and he deliberately understated the corre- 
1 
sponding data concerning the armed forces of the United States 
and its allies. 
Need we return to this question? And if we do need to re- 
turn, then is it not enough to suggest that M. Moch and those 
who are prepared to follow him in this matter at least take 
pains to read the minutes of the Special Subcommittee of the 
Appropriations Committee of the United States House of Rep- 
resentatives for l95l? These minutes give data on the armed 
forces of the United States, Great Britain, Fxance, Itdy, Bel- 
gium, Denmark, the Netherhds, Norway, Portugal and wen 
, Luxembourg. According to this data, the total number of armed ' forces of these countries is almost 3,500,000. This data, wen 
compared with the mythical data used here by M. Mocb and 
others in talking about the armed forces of the Soviet Union, 
is sdcient to a p s e  the entire groundlessness of the whole 
stand and the argumentation of M. Moch and others in this 
matter. 
Nevertheless M. M O C ~  fallowing Mr. J ~ ~ J U ~ ,  continuer to 
repeat arguments which, in face of such fa*, are utterly sense- 
less. He depicts the matter incorrectly, representing our pro- 
posal for the prohibition of atomic weapons and the reduction 
of armaments and armed forces as a unilateral demand design- 
ed to deprive the United States of atomic superiority and to 
preserve our own superiority in all ather respects. 
This is wrong. This is wrong, if only because the prohibition 
of atomic weapons shouId extend to all countries possessing 
atomic weapons, and, therefore, all such countries should be 
deprived of the superiority which the possession of atomic 
weapons gives them. . 
As for conventional armaments, here too the one-third d u c -  
tion of armaments sod armed forces by the five Great Pwers 
in the course of one year wiIl give no advantage to the Soviet 
Union. This is quite obvious from the way the ma&r stands 
with regard to the present state of armaments and armed forces, 
of which we have already spoken, and particdarly from the 
absolutely indisputable h c t  that the purpose of the Soviet Un- 
ion's armed forces is to protect its frontiers and not to carry out 
any aggressive pIans, which are alien to the Soviet State and to 
Soviet foreign policy. 
Even Mr. Acheson admitted that it was aaturd for a f rge 
-try with a large popuIation and with a very long frontier 
to have a hrge army a h .  A hrge army of a p e f u l  state 
cannot k a threat to any state, even to a state with a smaller 
army or even with a very s d  and weak army. On the con- 
traq, a smaU but aggressive sMte pursuing an aggressive pohcy 
and cherishing plans to dominate neighboring countries and 
even &e idea to dominate the world is a real menace to world 
peace as, for instance, was the Ease with old Prussia which was 
by no means a large state but was an aggressive state, a warlike ' 
state, and was, therefore, always a threat to peace, even though 
it had a comparatively Small m y .  
This is caPlfirmed by numerous facts from the history of the 
nations, and these facts ought not to be forgottenI just as the 
lessons of b k h y  ought not to be ignored. Certain delegam, 
however, ure not indined to remember the facts of history, but 
are indind, on the contrary, to dose their eyes to these facts 
and wen more, to contemporary fscts. This refers, in parti&, 
to those who tried here to dispute the fact tbat the responsibility 
for inrematimat tension lia with the Atfantic btm cauntries 
headed by the Unked Stats of America. But is it n d  a fact 
that this tension is caused by the frantic armaments chive, by the 
organization of new military bssa and the -ion of the 
already existing bases in foreign countries? I shall remind yau, 
for instance, that lodrry, at the present moment, the United States 
is organizing five new air bases and, it seems, atomic bases in 
Morocco. In m y  cas~ atomic weapons have now h e n  adopted 
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I as a a of the amammts of the entire American Amy. h this aot cause an hcmw in t u ~ ~ i m ,  nervousness, k; docs it not woke anxiety, shake h e  semity a d  d d e n r e  in security of the vartious nations? Do mt the unl-g of military actions in the Far East, the throwing togetha of new military blocs and the open preparation for a new world war- testified to by the numerous facts from the activities primarily of the United States 
of Ameria-plieate and cause tension in international rela- 
tions? 
I 
But who is implementing all the measures mumerated M e ?  
Who is conducting this frantic armamenb drive? Who is buiid- 
ing new miiitary bases and expanding the old ones in the various 
parts of the woxld, with the chief aim of encircling the Soviet 
Union and the People's Democracies whh a belt of these bases? 
W y  it is the United Stam, having set aa example of 
this mmmenb drive in its own country €00, which must bear 
tbe responsibility fox reammmt,  i.s, for the armaments drive, 
now taking place in certain countries of Westem Europe. To Ire 
convinced of ,f thisit b s&cient to see what took place in Rwne 
at the Athtic bloc council a d  what is now paking place generally 
in the camp of the Atlantic bloc. 
Let us take France for example. A few days ago the newspaper 
Le Monde wrote that the American Government was continuing 
to bring pmwe to bear on the F d  Government in order 
to get it to exceed the "Preach budgetav possibilities," as Lg 
Monde wrote, established in October 1950, is., to get the budget 
I increased still more, md this in spite of the fad that the Frmch Mhhtq of Defwlse bas set the expditures, as is Imm, at 
610 bilIion in 1951, 725 biIlion in 1952 and 752 biIIim In 1953, 
not counting IndmChina, the overseas territdties and the v n d -  
ihrm m the so.calM NATO (North AtIantic Treaty Organ- 
ization). 
Naturally the French Government, as the same Lw N o d e  
reports, must ask Harrman for an increase in Americas aid to 
I make up for tbe deficit which, according to L.P Monde, "may endanger the French armaments pmgmm beprrd repair." But a similar situation has also acisen at piapt  with regard 
to Great Britain, Belgium, Italy and West Germmy? where all 
measures regarding so-called rearmament, or, more tmre&y s+ 
ing, the armaments drive, are determined by the poky and 
direction of aggressive circles in the United States. 
Porter, Presideat Truman's acting Special Rep-tative ia 
the Economic Cooperation Administration in Europe, xecentfy 
declared, at the beginning of December this p r ,  that Europe's 
main task now is rearmament and not rehabilitation. Mormer, 
he warn& that "the burden of rearmament will be heavy," but 
that "the European workers and farmers must bear this Grden." 
Who then, we ask, is the moving spirit of wcaIled m m a -  
m a t ,  of, more c o ~ d y  spealung the frantic armaments drive 
being whipped up by aggressive k f e s  in the United States, 
which is already causing their friends in Europe and other pazis 
of the world to svit their seams? 
This is n que;tion worth tbinking about befare coming out 
with mky arguments in defense of tbe American pIicy of an 
armaments drive, before making decisions in tbis dtection in 
support of this poliq of an armamente drive. 
It m o t  Ix denied that these are precisely the activities of 
the aggressive cirdes of the United stat& of America which also 
determine its corresponding foreign pkj. 
Therefore, we haw the right to amrt thaf the raponsibility 
for the present world tension rests precisely with t h a  aggmsive 
circles of the United States, Great Bfitain and France which hmd 
the agqrmive Atlantic bloc. 
Every day brings a stronger and more dehnite exposure of 
the nonsensical stories of an alleged threat from the Soviet Union. 
It is time it was understood once and for dl that the Soviet 
Union has never threatened anyone and dm not threaten anyone. 
And this has been proved by all of the more thau 30 prs' 
histoiy of the Soviet State, which has been advancing steadfastly 
dong the path of strengthening peace and international co- 
operation and ensuring the security of nations. On the otha 
h d ,  every day brings new faas proving that the threat to 
peace and the security of nations comes from the aggressive 
Arlantic bIoc. It is this which explains the specific nature of the 
I drafts of various resolutions s u b m i d  for the consideration of the General AssembIy by the leaders of the A h t i c  b k .  Such is the mhm also of the revised draft resolution of the "Three" which, as we bave already shown during the discussion of a number of its basic points, d m  not soIve a single problem related to the limitation and reduction of armed forces and armaments 
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and, even less, to the prohibition of atomic weapons and the 
establishment of strict intemationa1 control. Yet in this matter 
there must kx complete Jasity. Guided by precisely such con- 
siderations, the delegation of the Soviet Union proposed to 
fnclude in the draft molution of the "Three," as the first item 
of the operative part, a point proposing that the GeneraI Assembly 
declare the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapom and the 
establishment of strict international control to ensure the observ- 
ance of this prohibition. In this point the delegation of the USSR 
proposes that the Genera1 Assembly instruct the Atomic Energy 
and Conventional Armaments Commission to draw up and sub- 
mit for the consideration of the Security Council a draft con- 
vention providing for measures to ensure the impiementation of 
the G e n d  Assembly's deGisions relating to the prohibition of 
atomic weapons, cessation of their production, use solely for 
civilian purposes of the atomic bombs already produced and the 
establishment of strict international control over the irnplementa- I tioo the said idconention. 
Can there be my comparison between these unequivocal, clear- 
cut, resolute and dehite proposaIs of the Soviet Union and the 
hazy, indefinite proposals, ammpanied by all kinds of resem- 
tiom and conditions, mntaiqed in Point 3 of the draft reso- 
lution of the "Three"? It is high time to realize clearIy the 
profound difference in principle between these two resolutions. 
On one side, on the side of the Soviet Union, there is a proposal 
to declare the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and 
the estabfishment of strict international control, to draw up a 
convention in the shortest time pssible providing for measures 
to ensure the implementation of this prohibition. This is  what 
we have on one side, on the side of the Soviet Union. 
On the other side, on the side of the United States, Great 
Britain and France, thew. is neither a declaration of the pm- 
hibition of the atomic weapon nor a decision to establish inter- 
national control. There are, howwer, quite a few b a q  phrases 
. which add up to instructing the Atomic Energy and Conventional 
Armaments Commission ro draw up propmls on the reduction 
of dl armed f o ~ c e ~  and on the establishment of effective control 
for inclusion in the draft treaty, again with the objective of 
ensuring the o b s m c e  of the prohibition of atomic weapons. 
But where is  this probibition, the observance of wbich is to 
be controlled? You gay: This is *If-evident. But hen permit 
us to ask you to state this dearly and exactly: to prohibit atomic 
w~aP0n.r. 
But the t h e  G w e r m e n ~ h e  United Skates. Great Britain 
and France-da not venture to a&rm the prohibition of atomic 
weapons in dear rind precise terms. ~ h e k  evade this question. 
They mtrict themselves merely to instructing the commission to 
draw up proposals of some sort-and not on the prohibition of 
atomic weapons at that, but merely on the establishment of 
control which aims at prohibiting atomic weapons, 
One might think that there is some joke here, so lacking in 
seriousness is this entire point, if m e  has is view the red desire 
to solve the problem which is contained in these exceptiody 
important words : probibition of atomic w e a p s ,  establishment 
of control to ensure the observance of tbis prohibition-a few 
short but m c e p t i d y  important words for which millions of 
p p l e  are now struggling, millions of people who will win 
victory in this struggle despite el1 the subterfuges, tricks and 
resistance they encounter on this path. These they will inwit- 
a .  surmount, and they wiIl indubitably surmount them vic- 
toriously. 
The delegation of the Soviet Union a h  proposed to inciude 
in the draft resolution d the "Three" its new point on the 
&abLisbmmt of the international control agency withim the 
framework of the Security Council. W e  painted out that the 
eslablisbment of such an agency should be provided for in every 
sincere plan for a substantid reduction of a11 armed force and 
armaments. The new Point 3 proped  by the delegation of the 
USSR, placed under No. 5 in the ttxt of our amendments, points 
out that the tmk of this a g m q  should be "mntroi of the reduc- 
tion of all types of a ~ ~ ~ ~ e n t s  and armed forces, as well as con- 
trol to ensure that the decision to prohibit atomic weapons is 
strictly d scrupulously obseed and tbat this international 
agency will have to obtain information on d armed forces, includ- 
ing semi-military, security and police forces, as well as a i l  m a -  
merits, including atomic wapns," and it also envisages effective 
international inspeaion to be carried out in accorclance with the 
d e d s i ~  of the aforesaid international control agency and fot this 
control to include the wrihcation of the submitted information. 
Is it possible to s p k  more dearly df the real aim, tasks and 
functions defmiig the rights and dutb of rhis control a m  
tban our amendment does? 
Sa that there will be no tack of clarity whatever regarding the 
establishment of the international control agenq, the deleption 
of the USSR proposed that the frrture convention sball provide 
that the international control agencp be entrusted with control 
over the prohibition of atwnic weapons, that it envisage the 
composition, rights and dutid of this agency and alsa h t  it 
instruct this agency to carry out inspection, i.e., verifitation d 
all the tmdertakings for the production and storing of atomic 
weapons, immediakIy after the conclusion of the aforesaid con- 
vention in order to ascertain whether the convwtion on the 
prohibition of atomic weapons has been implemented or not. 
The sponsors of the draft resolution keep silent about our 1 pmpael far immediate i n s H o n  and immedirtc verXcation 
after the mnclusion of this convention, irrespective of whether 
this internationd controI machinerg is funcrioning or not- 
immediate verifiation of the pioduction and storing of atomic 
weapons. They prefer to evade this questim. Yet this proposal 
is of great importance. It proves that the Soviet Union does not 
propose and does not intend to postpone the control of the 
prohibition of 'atomic w a p m  until some later or very last 
stage, as provided for in tbe Baruch p h ,  and as a d v d  bp 
the representatives of the United Ststes, Great Britain and France. 
I must mention another matter. The memorandum of the 
107 
Subrommittee's chairman, Mr. Padilla Nervo, points out, among 
other things, an page 9 of the Rmm text, that these three 
Powers consider that the establishment of an international con- 
trol agency is implied in their draft. 
But why only implied? Why do the Governments of the 
United States, Great Britain and Frmce only imply the estab- 
lishment of such M agency while they foam at the mouth, arguing 
that precisely such an agency i the real key to the settlement of 
the mitire problem of banning atomic weapons? 
And does the Subcommim chairman's memorandum itself1 
nPt state that only the draft amendments af the Soviet Union, 
contain direct reference to the need for establishing an inter- 1 
national control agency ? 
Yet in the Subcommittee, by the way, certain of the t h e e !  
Powers very stubrnly insisted that this phrase should not be! 
iaduded in Mr. Nerw's memorandwn. We hsd to .exert no! 
IittIe effort to show that ttre truth is the truth and that the! 
memorandum a h d d  d e c t  the tmtb. I asked then to be shown 
the point in the draft, resolution of the 'Three" which speaks 
could not be shown, beam it is non-existent. 
Is this not a characteristic cirmmstance? 
The representatives of the United States, Great Britain and 
France are ready to imply many things. They imply the tskablish- 
ment of an inkmatima1 control agency, they imply the pro- 
I 
of the atPbkrhmnt of an inkmrtirml mntd agency. But h I 
hibition of atomic weapcm-hey are ready to imply-they wiLI 
not be found wanting in this matter. But instead of implying, 
it is necessary to make a direct statement, and this is exactly wbat 
they avoid doing. 
They sap-we do not vouch for ourselves. If the Assembly 
makes the decision on the prohibition of atomic weapons and 
here is no club over IS, such us international control, then we do 
not vouch for ourselves. 
But we do vouch for ourselves that even withml a club we wiIl 
carry out this decision. 
Accept this decision ! 
Mr. Jessup says: "Point 4 i s  a new point. It contains the samc 
idea as the Soviet amctldment No. 5 and, like tbek revised 
Paragraph B of Point 3, makes dea~ what was dearly e x p d  
in the originaf tripartite draft, namely that an international con- 
trol agency must be set up to ensure the carrying out of the 
disarmament plan." 
But now if we turn to revised point 3-B, it says nothing about 
the estabIisbmmt of a control agency. This is said i h d i d y  d y  
in the phrase d d n g  with insF ion  which should be carried 
out in conformity with the decisions, as this point states, of "an 
internat id control ageq that is to lx atablished." 
But I say that you are playing with words. Here there is 
reference to "an international control yenq that is to k estab- 
li~hed," But by the same token it m y  be said that everything& 
to be established. having in view that it can be established. TO 
say that inswim will be carried out in conformity with the 
decisions of the "control agency tbd is to be e~trlbIi~hed" by 
no means signifies the decision to &ablisb sucb an agency. And 
if it does signify this, then why not clarify it, why not eliminate 
uncIarity, ambiguity? Why, in such u csue, not say precisely and 
dtfinitcIy; be cot01roI agency is being estdblisked. 
You, however, will not find a proposal to establish such an 
agenq anywhere, either in Point 3, of which I have spoken here, 
M in any other pIace, or in this vtty new Point 4 of the revised 
draft remlution. This Point 4, really a new point, sap tbat the ' commission is instructed to formulate "plans for tbe establish- 
ment of an international control agency within the framework 
of the Security Councif." This is what is said here: to formu1at.e 
phns far the &abIishment of an intanatimf control agency 
within tbe framework of the Security Council. It is important to 
note, however, that this point again does not speak  of the 
I ~ h b ~ h m e n t  of an intemationd control agency itself. k c -  
I quently, here we have the same circumvention of the question 
instead of a precise and definite statement on this sare. 
From aI1 that has just been said, the folIowing conclusion is 
self-mident: the Gwernmenrs of the United States, Great Britain 
and France, rejecting the proposal for the unconditional pro- 
hibition of atomic weapons, or, to be more exact, the proposal 
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that me h e r d  Assembly declare an unconditional ban on 
atomic weapons, avoid a direct commitment to establish a r ~  
international control agency, resorting to camouflage on this 
question with the help of tangled, nebulms phases. The new 
Point 3 propod by the delegatim of the Soviet Union and Point 
3-B in the revised draft resoIution of the 'Three" differ not d y  
in wording, not only in forrnuIation - there is a tremendous 
difference in substance between them. This difference also 
determines our disagreements. 
If the authors of the draft resolution of the "Three" really want 
the convention to include a reference to the establishment of an 
international control agency, there is  nothing to prevent them 
from doing so. And this must be done. But they do not do tbis. 
Tbis is, howwer, done by us, the delegalion of the Soviet Union, 
and herein l i i  the advantage of our proposal. 
On December 15 Mr. Jessup, it seems, spoke three times. In 
his third speech on December 25,  Mr. Jessup displayed no little 
playfdnts and exerted no little effort in an attempt to cheer up 
the First Committee, telling it about the golden chariot drawn by 
60 white dwes, the magic wand and Cinderella. Apparently Mr. 
Jessup has mixed things up, imagining perhaps that he is no longer 
in the Politid Committee but among children dancing in a ring 
around a Christmas Tree. ( h g b m , )  Christmas is appmhing. 
But this would not be so dangerous for the First Committee. Mr. 
Jessup, however, did not succeed in adopting a serious tone after 
his witticism even when he turned to the analysis of serious ques- 
tions discussed in the First Committee. 
Really, can one take seriously Mr. Jessup's remark that since the 
third amendment of the Soviet delegation on the unconditional 
prohibition of atomic weapons and the preparation of a conven- 
tion envisaging measures that m u t e  the implementation of this 
convention consists of two paragraphs, the first of which speaks 
of the prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of 
control, whik the second contains an instruction to the commis- 
sion to prepare a draft of a corresponding convention, lhis mpaos, 
as he said, that there is only a remote connection between 
these two questions, even the hidden aim to wade the esthIish- 
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ment of international control after probibition of atomic weapons 
is decked. 
Mr. Jessup reproached the Swiet Union for not having shown 
AexibiIity by objecting to the Baruch plan for five years. But what 
flexibility did the United States of Amerim show in insisting upon 
this plan for five years, declaring that it is the very best &Ian and 
that there is none better -even if it did make the reservation that 
if a M e r  plan appws they will think about it ? But they know in 
advance that no better plan will appear because they consider it 
the best of all possible plans. Yet they insist, they continue persist- 
ently to adhere to the pasition of this Baruch plan in spite of a11 
fully substantiated and serious criticism to which it has been justly 
subjected from various sides. I gave fa&. Even such a publication 
as the British newspaper Times says that the Baruch pIan is a 
utopian plan. Therefore, it is senseless to defend this plan, 
unless the aim is to have no pIan at all. 
Here is the stand of the ~n{ed States, Great Britain and France. I They ray: '*But you too insist on having your wag - no Baruch 
plan; accept our plan." Then I& us examine the reasons for our 
not wanting your plan. Because it hums a so-called international 
control sgenq into an American supertrust, subordinates to it and 
turns over to it the whole economy of the country whose entire 
fate will thus be determined arbitrarily by decisions of this inter- 
national control agency which, even $ tbk words of the advocates 
of Ulis plan, must inwitably be an agency which will implement 
the policy of the United States d America. This plan threatens the 
-reign rights of nations and states. Therefore, it cannot be 
agreed to by those who value the sovereipty of their country and 
heir people. The Baruch plan is unacceptable precisely because it 
threatens the sovereign rights of nations and states. It is also un- 
acceptable because it is fruitless, for it postpones the most import- 
ant thing to the last stages, again making it dependent upon a 
number of conditions which, in their turn, we entirely dependent . + 
on wur discretion. 
if mention is made of stages, of ownership whch, under the 
Baruch plan, the control agency has of aU atomic raw materials 
and all atomic undertakings, even those allied to the atomic in- 
dusty, it wiil become dear t ? d  of course this plan cannot be ac- 
cepted by t h e  states which do not want to commit suicide. 
-MI. J & U ~  said, as before, that the Soviet Union proposes pro- 
hibition of tbe atomic weapon m paper. But we have already 
pointed to the fallacy and groundlessness of this objection. This 
was also pointed wt by the Egyptian delegate in his s p d  of 
December 15, whose words on this score I do not think it super- 
fluous to repeat before the members of the committee today. 
The Egyptian delegate said: 
"It is practically im@ble to establish an organization for a n -  
tmI over the production of atomic weapons and for the utiliza- 
tion of all atomic energy for civilian purposes, which dso means 
control, without this requiring much time. What are we to do 
meanwhile?" the Egyptian delegate asked. "Could we not draw 
s line h e e n  the production of atomic weapans, control over 
these weapons and atomic energy, and the actual use of these 
wapons? We have," k said, "a certain number of conventions, 
sud; ss the Red Cross convention, thc convention banning the use 
of poison gas and many others whih pursue humane a&. They 
envisage no other control and no other sanction but moral sanc- 
tion. Perhaps you rernemhr," the Egyptian delegate said. "that 
at the hginning of the last World War the United Kingdom, 
France and Germany pIedged themselves not to use poison gas. 
There was a convention prohibiting the utiIiEation of poison gas, 
and atthough this convention has not yet beea ratified by a&" the 
Egyptian delegate said, and f will add on my own behalf that it 
has not yet been ratified for some mysteriaus reason by the United 
States of America although more &in 40 years have bassed since 
then - I continue quoting the Egyptian delegate - "the piedge 
not to use poison gms was strictly observed by bhe three Powers 
and by the other countrjes, despite the fact that Europe was faced 
with so-mlled total war for the first time. 
"Why can we not find," the Egyptian delegate said, "on the 
same basis, some means of prohibiting the use of atomic weapons, 
at feast of those already existing, inasmuch as full control over the 
production and utilization of atomic energy for civilian purposes 
will be a proIonged and tiring pmess?" 
Thus spoke a representative of r d l  country, and it bas al- 
ready been refommended here that the voice of small countries be 
listmed to, and our delegation fully supports md has always sup- 
ported these recommendations. Even more, their voices should be 
respected. Even moie, t k e  countria should be respected. 
This is the bbest k i t  of whether the aspirations are peaceld or 
aggressive. And tbP should be remembered by the gentlemen sit- 
ting on my right, as weU. Particdariy by them, and not only in 
connection with Egypt, Mr. Lloyd. 
' 
1 do not intend to delve into the question of bow much time 
wilI really be requtrd for establishing a system of interriatima1 
controi and for -g into motion the entire machinery of the 
international contra1 agency. 
If, indeed, the establishment and setting into motion of the ma- 
chine~ of i n t e m t i d  control over the prohibition of atomic 
weapons will be, as is a s s d  by the Egyptian delegate and as is 
also spdically assumed by the representatives of the United 
State who spoke here about the 1- of this period, a d l y  
p i o h &  process, it is all the more necessary to recognue that 
the prohibition of atomic weapons must not be made dependent 
upon the completion of this process of orgaaizatioa of control, be- 
cause if it is such a prolonged process, this will be oaly an addi- 
tional argument in favor of the impermissibility of tying up the 
prohibition of atomic weapons with control, with its organization. 
Tbis is an additional argument in favor of our stand, in favor of 
t h  stand not only of the Soviet Union, but of certain other dele- 
gations which have already expressed this view both in their 
speeches and in their draft resolutions. 
If the organization and the setting into motion of he machinery 
of international control over the prohibition of atomic weapons 
is dragged out for many months and perhaps wen years, and the 
prohibition d atomic weapons is linked with tbis control and 
its going into operation, this would be utterly impermissible, b- 
cause in this way the very prohibition of atomic weaponsI of their 
production and their use, would reaIly be postponed (8d kdendcfs 
Gr4ecu - for an &definitely long period, a d  mankind would al- 
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ways be in danger of the precipitation of an at.tomic war at any 
minute. W e  are not afraid of it, if we are to s p k  of h Soviet 
Union, .as we have never been afraid of those who ty to a t k k  us 
or who have attacked us. W e  have never feared them ! But we are 
a country of peace and for this reason we want to prevwt the 
danger of war which threatens mankind surd portends perhaps the 
greatest of calamities. 
As for the delegation of the Soviet Union, while defending its 
proposal that the General 'Assembly declare an unconditional ban 
on atomic weapons, it also upholds the necessity of taking all 
measures to reduce to a minimum the period for establishing inter- 
national contml. And we cven established the date one and a balf 
months ago - Februav 1, 1952 - for preparing a cormpond- 
ing convention. Wc are told that this date is unrealistic. 
Gentlemen, are you seriously concerned over the impraaicability 
of this date? Let us discuss the date if you accept our proposal at 
least in principle. Accept it, and then we will mch an agreement 
on the date. The matter of the date wiil not be an obstade. It 
would be ridiculous if we subordinated the decision of such an 
important question as the prohibition of atomic weapons to the 
question of the date. 
But when you say an "unrealistic date" you tbink that you 
have discovered an Achilles* heel, and that you can down Achilles 
himself by striking at it. You ate, hawever, greatly mistaken. We 
are realists, and for this reason we say: Let us reach an agreement 
on the prohibition of atomic weapons. 
Here we have the General AssembIy declaring: Prohibit atomic 
weapons! But you say: "We do not vouch for oudves because 
there is eo control over us and we do not know whthez we will 
pass this test*" 
But we vouch for ourselves that we shall pass the test wen if 
t h e  is no control. In order to check up on this, the well-known 
British proverb should be foIlowed: "The proof of the pudding 
is in the eating," otherwise p wiil never know how it tastes. But 
you do not vouch for yourseIves. This, of course, may give &e to 
serious apprehensions on the part of those who intend to be your 
pattners, because everyone always presumes that everyone vouches 
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for himself if he undertakes some obligation. But you do not 
vouch. To a certain extent you may be right in your own way, be- 
cause many xesolutio~ have already been adopted which you do 
not fulfill. Many intematiod agreements have been c~lcluded 
with you which you do not fdGU. Is it worth while to enumerate 
aI1 thm resolutions which yoa adopted but have not fulfilled ? 
Incidentally, Mr. jessup bas enumerated bere those draft reso. 
lutiom which were submitted by the Soviet Union md dedined, 
as well a the resolutions which were adopted against the will of 
the Soviet Union and against its vote and have not been fWed 
by the Saviet Union. But he forgot one category of resolutions, 
those for which the United States as well as Great Britain and 
France voted, and which have not been fulfitled by them. 
It will not be amiss to r e d  again in this connection that the 
utopian Baruch plan, as it is called, provides a convenient m a s  
for drowning the actual organization of international control and 
enforcement of the prohibition of atomic weapons in talk about 
intematiod conhl.  
Now, as follows from Mr. Jessup's recent statement, he does not 
seem to dare to deny the mod,  pi t ica l  and even legal fom of 
the General Assembly's decisions, of which we spoke Iast time. 
But he nevertheless continues to object to our proposal that the 
General Assembly declare the unconditional ban on atomic weap- 
ons and the establishment of international control, claiming t b t  
it will be impossible to adopt such a props1 before a control 
mechrism is set set up and put into operation. 
Being aware of the weakness of his p i t i o n ,  Jessup stated that 
he could agree to the general idea of the moral, political and legal 
force of the General Assembly's derisions. 
As I have already said, Mr. Jessup referred to certain earlier 
resolutions of the General Assembly which indeed have neither 
moral, political nor legal force for the Soviet Union, atthough, 
according to Jessup, they are important decisions on the question 
of peace'and international security. 
But it is precisely this last circumstance that we question first of 
slI. W e  voted against these decisions precisely because we doubted 
their usefulniss to the cause of peace and intematiod security. 
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In other cases we did not and do not iecognk the legality of these 
decisions, for instance the legality of the ignominious resolution on 
ppodaiming the Rople's Republic of China an aggressor, on using 
the United Nations in the armed American and Syngman U e e  in- 
tervention in Korea and a number of other resolutions. We openly 
objmed to them. We opedy voted against them, and it would be 
absurd to demand that we fulfill these decisions. Indeed, we are 
here to settIe international affairs and not internal state affairs. 
But ia international affairs a state cannot be compelled to do some- 
Lbing to which it objects. But. the General Assembly is com- 
p a d  of s~vaeign states, aftbough some of them do not fol- 
low their awn paths and cannot always even express their own 
opinions, since they are under very strong pressure, exerted on 
them for purpes contradicting the principles md provisions of 
the Chatter . . . Mr. Jessup mafuses facts here. Had we voted for 
sonic res~tution and then violated it, it would be right to rebuke us 
accordingly. 
But the d state of affairs is just the opposite. I shall s p k  
h u t  the Wrd category of the General Assembly's resoIutions, 
over which Mr. Jessup passed in siIence, those for which the 
United State voted and which the United States docs not fulfill. 
Take, for example, the resolution of January 24, 1Y46, on the 
study of problems that had arisen in connection with the discovery 
of atomic energy. Has it bsen fuIfrlled by the United States? It has 
not! Here is another resolution dated December 14, 1946, es- 
tablishmg the general regulation and reddon of armaments and 
armed forces. Has it been f &i l l4  by the United States ? It has not ! 
Here you have the resolution of November 3. 1947, on masum 
which must be taken against the instigators of mather war. This 
resolution bas not been ful6lIed by the United States either. With 
regard to the USSR, in our press, in statemmts - I do not mean 
only okial, but even quite ordinarg statements - nowhere will 
you h d  d k  for another war! And what h u t  you? 
I bave already s e e n  about the frenzied, mad propaganda with 
which your notorious magazine Coltier's has besmirched itself. 
Just listen to your radio. Look & your press, at alI your s@cers - 
the nro~i re~ponsibie ortes, standing on the top of the state ladder 
116 
- and you will see and hear endless war calls. After that, we shall 
discuss the question concerning the dIocatim 01 I00,000,000 d01- 
Iars. Can there be mything more d i s g d l  than that, t b  p u r  
act dated October 10, 1951? 
A decision on the impermissibility of war propaganda bas been 
adopted, but this propaganda is conducted in the United States 
the broadest scale; it spreads, forming such a sea-, such an o m ,  
that in comparison with it the AtIantic QMan is a mere puddle! 
A decision on the extxadition and punishment of war criminals, a 
decision on mutual relations between the United Nations me&= 
and Spain, a decision on faIse and libeIws information - none 
of these decisions is berng fulfiiied by the United S W .  And what 
a b u t  the international agreements, ehe Ydta agreement, the Pots- 
dam a g m e n t ?  And you wilt assert that it is not you who have 
split Gefmany into two parts, that it is not y w  who have set up 
the Bonn puppet government, that it is not pw who are dragging 
Western Germany into the Atlantic blor: to use it as a springboard 
for attack. An attack against whom? This is said openly - against 
the Saviet Union, against the People's D e m d e s .  Doa this ac- 
cord with international agreements? Is this what is called res* 
for international agreemenb ? Is this what is called resped for the 
United Nations Charter? Does this correspnd to the decisions 
which I have bridy e n u m e d  bere, and does this &ow r e s p  
for the decisions of the General AssembIy? It has become custom- 
ary for you to violate both the decisions of the Gmerd Assembly 
and international agieements which you at one time called gentle- 
men's agreemenb! There is the ignominious affair of thrusting 
Greece into the Security Council. We have had, it seems to me, 17 
rounds of voting because the United States sedcs the electh of 
G e e  at any cost, despite the k c e  of any legal grounds for 
this. You win probably achieve your aim because the iduence of 
the d o h  is unfortunately still great, as grat, in generd, as the 
economic dependence of certain countries on the United States, de- 
p e a b  which still makes itself felt! 
And yet in the face of such and similar facts, the repmmta- 
tives of the Atlantic blac malre bold to lecture us concerning re- 
spect for the decisions of the GeneraI Assembly! 
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In 1946 we concluded a gentlemen's agreement. W e  are ful- 
filling it accuratefy. But it is pfdsely the Unitd Sbtes that is vio- 
lating tbis agreement for a11 to see. And after this tbq dare to say 
that they are not sure that the Soviet Union would fulfil1 the de- 
cisions it signed. Let these gentlemen name at Ieast one decision 
wbich bars our signature and which we have violated at any time. 
Let them show it to us. They will not be able to do this, while we 
can present dozens of cases of such violations by the United States. 
S OME dekptions have submitted amendments, mostly unessen- tial amendments, to the draft resolution of the "Three." But 
there is one ammdmmt which the delegation of the USSR reg=& 
as an important amendment worthy of serious attention: the 
amendment of the Egyptian delegation of wbich I have already 
spoken. 
There is another amendment, in the form of a draft resolution, 
submitted by the Palish delegation and proposing that a decision 
be made to set up under the Security Council a commission on 
atomic energy and conventio~l armaments after the di5salution 
of the Atomic Energy Commission. It also recommends that the 
Security Council dissolve the Commission on Convwtional Arma- 
ments. The Polish draft resolution suggests that the draft resolu- 
tion of the "Three," as we11 as the amendments to that draft sub 
mitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union, be referred to the 
Atomic Energy and Conventional Armaments Commission. 
The delegation of the Soviet Union thinks that this propwaI 
is important and to the point. The experience of the Subcommit- 
tw's work h s  shown that a careful and patient examination of 
the question, particularly one of such exceptional importance as the 
one now before our commit&, yields positive raults. 
It is indeed impossible to deny that for the first time during this 
period we have succeeded in rearbing agreement, though it h only 
on secondary questions, and that, what is more important, despite 
sharp differences in principle separating us from you-& United 
State, Great Britain and France-both sides displayed due tactful- 
nas, patience and t h o u g h t f h  in considering various questions, 
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which, of come, cannot be disregarded when questions of primary 
political importance are being settled. 
That is why the delegation of the Soviet Union maintains that 
the exaerience of the ~-&mmmittee's work has shown that thor- 
ough k d  patient study of questions, particularly those of such 
exceptional importance, gives positive results, as 1 have said. 
Mr. Nervo, chairman of the Subcomdtke, pints out that de- 
spite the wisting differences - unfortUfI8tely large and serious 
differences - in the proposais of the Soviet Udoa znd of 'the 
tbree Powers on a number of questions of primarg importance, a 
certain degree of agreement bas been reached in the Subcommitlee 
on a number of aspects of both programs, and the discussion 
of the~e auestions in the S u h n m i ~ m  has h e l d  to braaden the - L I 
range of agreement on' certain questions, even if they are of a 
secondaty riabe. 
This gives wery reason to support the proposal of the delega- 
tion of the Polish Republic which, as we understand it, proceeds 
from the m i b i i  of further fruitful effort in the search for a 
generally breed sojution to the question of the unconditional pro- 
hibition of atomic weapons, reduction of armaments and armed 
forces and the establishment of an internationd control agency to 
enforce the observance of the decisions adopted on this score. 
Tbe delegation of the USSR has dways striven for agreed de- 
cisions. It is striving for thiS now too, d d e n t  tbat such agreed 
decisions can be reached in the Committee of Twelve, provided 
here is good will, mutual respect and genuine striving for the 
consolidation of internatiod mopration, peace and the security 
of nations. 
Therefore, we fully support the proposal submitted by the dde- 
gation of the Polish Republic. 
Ail qnolrpliot~s in t b i ~  speech brwe been rebraided from #be 
&$siron. 


